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Denver was the first non-Southern City to undergo extensive liti- 
gation over the desegregation of its schools. In this context, it has 
become a mirror for the way America deals with its most pressing 
social problem: the integration of minorities into the educational, 
political and economic mainstream through equal educational oppor- 
tunity. This study examines the difficulties of implementing a desegre- 
gation plan that would result in a unitary public school system and 
developing a plan that would provide an equal educational opportu- 
nity to the large hispano minority. We concentrate upon the imple- 
mentation efforts after 1976 when Judge Richard Matsch was assigned 
to the case. The liability phase and the initial implementation efforts 
have been chronicled in detail elsewhere.' 
1 .  For a detailed description of the earlier years of the litigation, see PEARSON & PEAR- 
SON, The Denver Case: Keyes v. School District No. I ,  in LIMITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURTS' 
ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 167 (H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds. 1978) [hereinafrer cited 
as PEARSON]. 
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I. THE SETTING 
A PORTRAIT OF THE CITY 
Since Denver was founded in 1858 by William Larimer2 as a stop- 
ping point for victims of 'gold fever' infected by the discovery of the 
mineral at Pike's Peak, it has served as the gateway to Colorado and 
the R~ck ie s .~  Today, Denver is a major metropolitan area. Its 
problems and prospects reflect more of urban American than of the 
West.4 
An economic boom in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
drew thousands of migrants into Denver. It transformed the pattern 
of city life, and ensured that Denver would be the financial, commer- 
cial, and manufacturing center for the Rocky Mountain W e ~ t . ~  The 
increasing population led to the expansion of the Denver metropolitan 
area, a trend that continues today. 
2. William Larimer was a Pennsylvania politician, speculator and town siter who founded 
towns in the wake of mineral discoveries. Larimer had previously failed to make Larimer City in 
Nebraska the major metropolis of that state. Denver was founded on the right bank of Cherry 
Creek where it meets the Platte River. According to Denver folklore the site was already occu- 
pied and claimed by the St. Charles Town Association. Larimer is reputed to have plied the 
guard of the St. Charles Town Association with drink who then signed over the rights to the 
town. By 1859 Denver had a population of 2,000. It rose to 4,500 in 1860 but dropped to 3,000 
after the Civil War. C. Aeeorr ,  S. LEONARD & D. MD COMB, COLORADO: A HISTORY OF THE 
CENTENNIAL STATE 52-3, 233 (rev. ed. 1982) [hereinafter COLORADO]. 
3. Denver's success as the major metropolitan area in the state and far west was assured in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century by the railroads. The Union Pacific, Rock Island, 
Burlington, Santa Fe, and Missouri Pacific ran through the city and brought thousands of 
immigrants. 
4. Denver and Denver Metropolitan Area Population Growth. 
Denver 
(Metropolitan area*) 4,759 35,629 106,713 140,500 
Denver 213,381 256,491 287,861 322,412 
(Metropolitan area*) (219,314) (264,232) (330,761) (384,372) 
1950 1960 1970 1980 
Denver 415,786 493,889 514,678 491,396 
(Metropolitan area*) (563,832) (929,383) (1,227,529) (1,619,921) 
1910-1940: metropolitan district; 1950: standard metropolitan area; 1960-1980: standard 
metropolitan statistical area. 
Source: COLORADO, supra note 2, at pp. 335-36. 
5. COLORADO, supra note 2, at 236-40. 
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In the first two decades of the twentieth century, Denverites 
moved outwards creating early suburbs that as today, served to deepen 
the city's social, economic, and ethnic divisions. Newer immigrants- 
predominantly from Southern Europe and Scandinavia-lived in eth- 
nic enclaves near the stockyards, foundries, railroad shops, packing 
plants and smelters where they worked. 
The large immigrant population in Denver led to a growth in na- 
tivism. In the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan had greater popular strength 
in the city and even acceptance by the political establishment. In this 
period and the following two decades, the key to politics was a con- 
servative 'fundamentalism' reflecting small town  value^.^ For in- 
stance, typical of the West in the 1930s, Colorado rejected the New 
Deal. 
Between 1940 and 1970, the population and economy of Denver 
expanded greatly. The state attracted new businesses and became a 
sophisticated service economy. A renewed interest in the environment 
and the outdoors created the tourist industry and attracted new resi- 
dents. An influx of high technology businesses benefitted the metro- 
politan region rather than Denver proper, leading to an outflow of 
middle class whites to the suburbs. Between 1950 and 1970, the sub- 
urbs grew by two and one half times. Denver's population grew by 26 
percent. Attempts by Denver to annex suburban towns were rejected.' 
The Denver metropolitan area enjoyed substantial growth during 
the 1970s, spurred in part by the energy boom and by a national demo- 
graphic shift to the Sun Belt.' The population of eight counties in the 
Denver metropolitan area: Denver, Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Clear 
Creed, Douglas, Gilpin and Jefferson, grew steadily during the decade. 
These counties showed a population gain of 31 per cent, from 
1,237,529 in 1970 to 1,691,921 in 1980.9 Denver's population de- 
clined, however, dropping 4.5 per cent from 514,678 in 1970 to 
491,396 a decade later.'' Its population had increased in the 1960 to 
1970 decade from 493,889 to 514,678." 
6. Id. at 267-77. 
7. Id. at 280-83. 
8.  Id. at 315-17. 
9. DENVER REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, PROFILES OF 1970-1980, Socio-Eco- 
nornic Change by County & Census Tract I (Apr. 1983) [hereinafter Denver Regional Council]. 
10. Id. 
1 1. Table 1 ,  supra note 4. 
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Jefferson County, a suburban area west of Denver, enjoyed the 
highest absolute growth in the region, increasing its population by 
139,018 to 371,753 from 1960 to 1980.12 According to a survey of the 
eight-county region conducted by the Denver Regional Council of 
Governments, the number of households earning from $50,000 to 
$74,999 increased by 233 per cent in Jefferson County alone-a statis- 
tic that indicates where many affluent people were moving to in the 
1970s." 
Blacks have lived in Denver from its earliest years. Some,.but not 
all, were ex-slaves. They clung to their rights and at least initially, had 
some political influence.14 From a population of one thousand in the 
1880s, Denver's black population grew to six thousand in the 1910s, 
concentrated in the Five Points area east of the business district. 
While legislation prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, 
blacks nevertheless, usually were excluded from white hotels, restau- 
rants, and schools. Their occupational opportunities were limited to a 
few menial occupations: domestic servants, waiters, or pullman por- 
t e r ~ . ' ~  Within their own isolated enclave of Five Points, blacks had 
limited vertical mobility, such as ownership of property and small 
businesses and minor political patronage for delivering the black vote. 
The Second World War created job openings in skilled factory jobs in 
the local defense industry. Governmental offices and military facilities 
established in the 1940s also provided employment. Since the Second 
World War, a major aspiration of the black community, in Denver, 
has been progress toward middle class status.16 
The first Mexican immigrants were brought into the state, in the 
earliest years of the twentieth century, by the Colorado Fuel and Iron 
Corporation to work in its steel mills." At the same time, sugar beet 
companies sent agents to areas around the Rio Grande to recruit la- 
borers for their farms. Because of the high costs of recruitment, these 
12. Denver Regional Council, supra note 9, at 1 .  
13. Id. at 4. 
14. COLORADO, supra note 2, at 205-09. 
15. Id. at 288. 
16. Id. at 302-04. 
17. Id. at 295-96. 
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companies in the 1920s encouraged migrant Mexicans to settle in the 
state. By 1930, 13,000 Coloradeans were born in Mexico, and another 
28,000 were hispanics from New Mexico, Most settled in rural areas 
and small towns where they faced segregation, prejudice, and 
harassment. 
Many hispanos left Colorado during the depression years. Others 
moved into Denver where they had to compete, usually unfavorably, 
with the already existing black community. In 1940, the average fam- 
ily income for blacks was 62 percent that of whites. The average in- 
come of hispano families was less than half that of the white level.lg 
- 
There were some official gestures towards recognizing hispano poverty 
in the 1940s and 1950s, but discrimination against all minorities was 
the norm. 
Today, hispanos are the largest minority group in Denver. In 
1960, they comprised 12.2 percent of the total population. By 1970, 
their number had risen to 16.8 percent of the p o p ~ l a t i o n , ~ ~  and by 
1980, hispanos comprised 19 percent of the city's p~pulation.~' In 
1964, hispanos made up 17 percent of the school population, 19.1 per- 
cent by 1975, and 32 percent by 1981. 
The hispanic population has always been a highly disadvantaged 
The median income, education, and percentage classified as 
'professional' of hispanos are the lowest of any ethnic group in Den- 
~ e r . ~ ~  Twice as many hispanos occupied Denver's urban poverty area 
in the northern half of the city. Yet, when hispanos reached middle 
class economic status, and moved into white neighborhoods, they did 
not receive the hostility directed at blacks. 
18. Id.  at 297-98. 
19. Id. at 299. Forty one percent of white families owned their own homes; thirty-four 
percent of black families did, but only eleven percent of Hispanic families owned their own 
homes. Infant mortality in 1940 was 65 deaths per 1,000 live births for blacks, 71 for whites, and 
205 for Hispanic. 
20. PEARSON, supra note 1, at 169. 
21. Branscombe, New Desegregation Plan Unveiled, Denver Post, Mar. 12, 1983, at 1B. 
22. PEARSON, supra note 1, at 169. One interviewee stated that discrimination against His- 
panics has been worse than against Blacks. Interview with George Bardwell, researcher for 
plaintiffs, in Denver (Sept. 16, 1984) [hereinafter Bardwell interview]. A hispanic felt discrimi- 
nation against Blacks had been worse. Interview with Bernard Valdez, former member Denver 
School Board, in Denver (Sept. 12, 1984) [hereinafter Valdez interview]. The cultural differences 
and histories of the two groups are great. Thus, the impact of the discrimination has been played 
out in different ways. Black Denverites are more middle class as a group than hispanic residents 
of the city or  Blacks in other urban cities. 
23. PEARSON, supra note 1, at 169. 
Heinonline 32 Howard L.J. 633 1989 
634 HOWARD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32 
Discrimination has not had the same intergenerational impact on 
hispanos as it has had on blacks. It has been suggested that upwardly 
mobile hispanos are more similar to earlier generations of European 
immigrants. Hispanos' problems are different from blacks', their 
needs are not so much to breach long-established racial barriers, but to 
mediate conflicts between very different cultures.24 Until recently, his- . 
panos have not been involved in the political process. One of the most 
significant developments of the present decade is the emergence of the 
hispanic community as a political force. Many hispanos opposed the 
school integration suit as a form of cultural hegem~ny.~' During the 
litigation, a group of hispanos unsuccessfully sought to intervene to 
stop the desegregation of their neighborhood elementary school and to 
escape from the busing ordemZ6 Many in the hispanic community 
favored better education rather than more integration. 
There has not been a strong political alliance between the hispano 
and the black community. In certain schools where blacks and hispa- 
nos comprised large percentages of the student body, there was polari- 
zation and ~onflict.~' The tri-ethnic mix has complicated 
desegregation in Denver. The constitutional demands of desegrega- 
tion do not always correlate with the needs and aspirations of the his- 
panic community. 
24. COLORADO, supra note 2, at 303. 
25. In the words of Bernard Valdez, who served on the school board in the 1970s: 
You see Hispanics as a group have never been very much pro busing, pro integration, 
forced integration. They believe in integration, but they believe in it taking place more 
naturally. And the reason for this is Hispanics haven't had the degree of discrimination 
that Blacks have had. And there's a different psychic about Hispanics' feelings about 
themselves versus what Blacks feel about themselves. It's difficult to explain that unless 
you're one, very difficult. As a consequence, they don't feel the same compulsion to be 
mixed with Anglos. . . I think by and large, Hispanics think they can do it even in their 
segregated communities. They feel their segregation is voluntary. And that has some- 
thing to do with a cultural pattern and their family strains and all of those things go 
way back . . . centuries. So that gives a different psychologic evaluation to where you 
are . . . . Then comes busing, which catches them in the middle. They're really not a 
part of the whole court at all, they get caught in the middle. Valdez interview, supra 
note 22. 
26. Garcia v. Bd. of Ed., 573 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1978). The Circuit Court granted the 
school board's motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs had received adequate notice of the main 
action and were represented. Collateral attacks on class action judgments have not been en- 
couraged. See note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effcct of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. 
L. REV. 589 (1974). 
27. Interview with Kay Schomp, member Denver Board of Education, 1971 to 1973 in 
Denver (Sept. 12, 1984) [hereinafter Schomp interview]. 
Heinonline 32 Howard L.J. 634 1989 
ENDLESS JOURNEY 
In 1970, blacks were concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods, 
particularly Five Points, which extended east from the central business 
district.*' Since the end of World War 11, blacks have also moved 
slowly east from the Five Points area into the Park Hill area, trend 
that formed the underpinnings of the Keyes case. These inner-city ar- 
eas were all fifty per cent or more black. Smaller black concentrations 
extended east from Denver into the suburban city of Aurora and 
northward along the Platte River.29 
The black population was much more dispersed in 1980, but over- 
all residential patterns were similar to the previous decade. Neighbor- 
hoods east of the business district remained largely black. A major 
difference, however, was the movement of blacks into a number of the 
older post-war neighborhoods in Aurora. In addition, a black popula- 
tion appeared in southeast Denver, traditionally an all-white neighbor- 
hood.30 Hence, the movement of blacks into Park Hill and the lawsuit 
in 1969 culminated a trend that had begun more than twenty years 
earlier. 
Residential segregation against hispanos has always been less 
complete than for blacks. The hispanic concentrations are west of the 
business district. The hispanic neighborhoods are laid out in a north- 
south pattern along some of the major north-south transportation 
lines. As a result, few neighborhoods in Denver have large concentra- 
tions of both blacks and hispanos. Also, hispanos tend to be more 
dispersed throughout the city, due in part to the fact that they out- 
28. F. JAMES, B. MCCUMMINGS & E. TYNAN, DISCRIMINATION, SEGREGATION & MINOR- 
I n  HOUSING CONDITIONS IN SUNBELT CITIES: A STUDY OF DENVER, HOUSTON & PHOENIX 
46 (1983) [hereinafter Discrimination, Segregation]. 
29. Id. at 49. 
30. James Reynolds, speaking at a 1981 conference on the relationship between housing and 
school integration, offered an insightful history of black residential patterns in Denver: 
Before World War I1 the black population was small, and resided in the vicinity of Five 
Points. Starting in 1946, ex-military men both black and white began to seek homes in 
Denver, where they had trained during the war. For many blacks it was their first 
experience outside the south where they had grown up. 
The black neighborhood began to expand and press against the boundary that 
divided the black and white communities. The area under the greatest pressure was 
between 23rd Street on the south, 36th Street on the north, and High Street on the east. 
As the black population increased, it pressed . . . . White congregations whose 
churches were caught in the path of the movement sold their buildings and fled south. 
Address by James Reynolds, Conference on Relationship Between Housing and School Desegre- 
gation, sponsored by Community Research Center, University of Colorado, at Denver (Jan. 17, 
1981). In 1980 blacks constituted 12 percent of Denver's population. 
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number By 1980, hispanos had fanned out into suburban 
neighborhoods, to the north, south and southwest parts of Denver.32 
Denverites point with particular pride to their history of housing 
integration. Grass roots organizations have worked diligently to inte- 
grate neighborhoods throughout the city over the past decade.33 As a 
result, there is a good deal of open housing in Denver, probably more 
than in many of the older, more established cities whose neighbor- 
hoods often defy in tegra t i~n .~~  
Denver is no stranger to integrated neighborhoods, which began 
to appear in the 1950s. The Greater Park Hill Action Committee, a 
catalyst behind the surge toward filing the lawsuit, grew out of an inte- 
grated, middle class neighborhood, Park This is not to suggest 
that integration is a city-wide phenomenon. Separation of the races 
still exists. Southeast Denver remains predominantly anglo, for exam- 
ple. One of the most interesting offshoots of the lawsuit, however, has 
been the work of the Denver Community Housing Resource Board, 
which has succeeded in bringing about increased residential integra- 
t i ~ n ~ ~  while working out of a tiny office shared with neighborhood 
groups.37 
3 1. DISCRIMINATION, SEGREGATION, supra note 28, at 49. 
32. Id. at 50. 
33. Interview with Kathy Cheever, Director, Denver Community Housing Resource Board, 
in Denver (Sept. 15, 1984) [hereinafter Cheever interview]. 
34. Interview with Monte Pascoe, Denver attorney and school board candidate, in Denver 
(Sept. 13, 1984) [hereinafter Pascoe interview]. 
Pascoe said Denver's relative youth as a city has helped foster integrated housing: "Com- 
pare it [Denver] to other cities, it's clear that we don't have those incredibly deep ethnic roots in 
this city. It's a somewhat new city. You're not dealing with 150 years of people living in one 
location." 
Carol Ruckel, President of the Denver Parent-Teacher-Student Association, agreed: 
Of course, people in Denver keep saying Denver [is] different. And it really is. The 
social atmosphere is very different. Has been for thirty years. We have had, since 
World War 11, a fairly large black population. It is a well-educated population. It is a 
relatively affluent population. And they have been much more integrated into our soci- 
ety as a whole in the city than in other cities, especially when you head back east . . . . 
We're doing a lot with open housing here. 
Interview with Carol Ruckel, President, Denver-Parent-Teacher-Student Association, in Denver 
(Sept. 15, 1984) [hereinafter Ruckel interview]. 
35. Interview with Robert Colwell, former Denver high school principal, in Denver (Sept. 
12, 1984) [hereinafter Colwell interview]. 
36. Cheever Interview, supra note 33. 
37. Cheever explained the resource board's objectives in an interview: "We have a commu- 
nity housing-community schools project which we started at the time of the court order, when 
people said the problem is really a housing problem, not a school's problem, and then they went 
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Because many people, black and white, dislike busing, the notion 
of an integrated neighborhood has some appeal. In an October 11, 
1983 newsletter, the resource board said its goal was to "develop coop- 
erative fair housing solutions in voluntary affirmative marketing."38 
Approximately eight schools previously paired for purposes of school 
integration were returned to neighborhood based enrollments, because 
their neighborhoods became more integrated.39 
Despite such optimistic appraisals of Denver as a progressive, in- 
tegrated city, the Colorado Civil Rights Division recommended in 
1984 "that the Board of Education assume a leading role in influenc- 
ing the Denver Housing Authority to begin and implement a program 
of affirmative de~egregation."~' Other Denver organizations have 
joined the effort to promote open housing as a means to reduce busing, 
including the Colorado Council Parents Teachers Students Associa- 
tion, which adopted a fair-housing resolution, as did the Denver Board 
of  realtor^.^' 
off and did things with the schools, and nothing about housing." Cheever Interview, supra note 
33. 
38. Denver Community Housing Resource Newsletter 1 (Oct. 11, 1983). Cheever said: 
Using fliers, slide presentations and civic groups, among other approaches, the 
Resource Board tries to promote publicity about a particular neighborhood's strengths. 
One flier, for instance, stressed that DPS students scored higher than the national aver- 
age on SAT tests. The goal was to provide factual information about city schools while 
dispelling myths and stereotypes about life and public education in urban Denver. 
Cheever added she met with more success when a neighborhood has had grassroots organi- 
zations familiar, and supportive of, integration. "I think the greatest success seems to be in the 
neighborhoods where there's been some support of integration for a long time. And the Greater 
Park Hill area, which you've heard about . . . it makes it easier to work within the neighbor- 
hood." Cheever Interview, supra note 33. 
39. "The court has allowed naturally integrated neighborhoods to have walk-in schools. 
And so, feeling we have a lot of people saying we have busing, this is one way to say, O.K., we do 
have an alternative." Cheever Interview, supra note 33. 
40. Letter from State of Colorado Civil Rights Division to Judge Richard P. Matsch (May 
30, 1984). The letter added, "We strongly recommend that DPS be ordered explicitly to work 
actively with DHA and HUD to reduce minority or majority concentration in DHA projects and 
in assisted housing programs throughout the city." 
41. Report of a Conference on Community Housing-Community Schools 9 (Jan. 17, 1981) 
[hereinafter Community Housing]. 
In May 1983, a developer and DPS entered into a unique agreement that promised at least 
20 percent of the residents in the new development would be minority. DPS, in turn, would 
build an elementary school in the area. Green Valley Ranch, as the development is called, is a 
3,000-acre parcel, and the last major undeveloped parcel of land in northeast Denver. Under the 
agreement, the developer would use a variety of approaches to encourage 'short and long-term' 
affirmative planning. A 20 percent minority base would be required at the outset, with that level 
rising to 30 percent, thus guaranteeing an integrated school-age population. The developer's 
success in integrating the area would result in the construction of more schools in the area. Press 
Release, issued by Office of Marshall Kaplan, Dean of Graduate School of Public Affairs, Uni- 
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Despite the strides the city has made in open housing, segregative 
barriers remain, one of which is subsidized housing. A speaker at the 
198 1 Community Housing Community Schools conference was Dr. 
Gary Orfield, an expert witness in the lawsuit, who said that subsi- 
dized housing contributed heavily to school segregation: 
. . . we find that subsidized housing in the Denver metropolitan area 
has a substantially negative effect on its schools. Eighty-two per- 
cent of the black families living in subsidized housing in metropoli- 
tan Denver live inside the city of Denver in a school district that is 
almost sixty percent minority. . . . If you look at where the whites 
are living in subsidized housing, about two-thirds of them are living 
in the suburbs.42 
Racially segregated schooling has been a continuing phenomenon 
in Denver. In the 1925-26 school year, 60 percent of the 789 black 
children enrolled in Denver's elementary schools attended either the 
Gilpin or Whittier Schools. When the Mitchell, Ebert, and 24th Street 
elementary schools were added, their combined enrollment accounted 
for 80 percent of all black students. One junior high school enrolled 
85 percent of the black students, and Manual High School had 75 per- 
cent of the blacks. 80 percent of the 1,004 Spanish-speaking children 
attended five elementary schools. Only seven Spanish children were 
enrolled in junior high school and only two in day time high 
Even as minorities began to expand beyond their original enclaves, 
their racial isolation continued. 
Over the years, the Denver Board of Education (hereinafter, the 
versity of Colorado, May 1983. This approach has the potential to bring about integration, both 
in schools and neighborhoods. 
In an interview, DPS director of long-range planning, James Daniels, when asked how the 
agreement was proceeding, said, "It's going well so far." He also said the elementary school, 
which opened in September 1984, now has approximately 100 students, about twenty-three per- 
cent of whom are minority. The school can hold up to 870 students, and Daniels said he was 
pleased with the way the new homes had been marketed to minorities. Telephone Interview with 
James Daniels, Director Long-Range Planning, Denver Public Schools (Nov. 7, 1985). 
42. Community Housing, supra note 41, at 9. 
43. Id. Orfield also called for "coordination between school and housing problems," ad- 
ding: "There has to be personal contact with minority families that gives them a real choice and 
escorts them out to the areas that they're not familiar with, both in subsidized markets and in the 
private market." Id. He also suggested that school officials be given the right to veto housing 
proposals. 
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Board) engaged in a variety of techniques that assured the continuance 
of racially unbalanced schools. The board situated schools in a man- 
ner that guaranteed their racial imbalance and purposefully failed to 
adjust school boundary lines to relieve overcrowding at predominantly 
white or black schools in a way that would have promoted integration. 
Rather, the Board adjusted boundaries to perpetuate racial isolation, 
used mobile classrooms to continue racial imbalance at certain 
schools, and assigned minority faculty principally to minority 
The Court in Keyes concluded that the Board had con- 
scious knowledge of the racial consequences of its acts.45 
In 1962, the Vorhees Special Study Committee on Equality in Ed- 
ucational Opportunity in the Denver Public Schools, recommended 
that the School Board consider racial, ethnic, and socio-economic fac- 
tors in establishing school boundaries and selecting school sites. It 
also suggested that boundaries be set so as to establish heterogeneous 
schools and communities. Consequently, the Board adopted a resolu- 
tion to implement the Vorhees Committee's  recommendation^.^^ 
A second study group, the Berge Committee, established in 1966 
to examine the policies of the Board with respect to the location of 
new schools in Northeast Denver, suggested changes that would fur- 
ther school in tegra t i~n .~~  In 1968 the Board passed the Noel Resolu- 
tion, which directed the Superintendent of Schools to submit to the 
Board a comprehensive plan for the integration of Denver's schools. 
After this was done, the Board spent from January to April 1969 stud- 
ying fourteen alternative plans, and then passed, by a five to two vote, 
resolutions 1520, 1524 and 1531. The resolutions were designed to 
eliminate segregation in the black schools in Park Hill, while stabiliz- 
ing the composition of schools in racial t r an~ i t i on .~~  In the past, the 
Board had passed several resolutions in favor of integrated education, 
but resolutions 1520, 1524 and 153 1 differed by offering a concrete 
plan of affirmative action to lessen racial imbalance. This included 
44. COLORADO, supra note 2, at 295. 
45. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 289, 290-95 (D. Colo. 1969) [hereinafter all 
citations to the case will be Keyes followed by the citation]. 
46. Keyes, 303 F. Supp. 289, 2910 (D. Colo. 1969); 3 13 F. Supp. 61, 65 (D. Colo. 1970). 
47. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. 61, 65 (D. Colo. 1970). 
48. The Berge Committee recommended that no new schools be built in Northeast Denver; 
that a cultural arts center be established which would be attended by students from various 
schools on a half-day basis once or twice a week; that educational centers be created; and that a 
superior school program be initiated for Smiley and Baker junior high schools. 
Heinonline 32 Howard L.J. 639 1989 
640 HOWARD LAW JOURNAL pol .  32 
busing three thousand black students from inner city elementary and 
junior high schools to the predominately white schools in Southwest 
Denver.49 The resolutions' impact on the Denver community was 
electric. 
A school Board election in May of 1969 became the focal point of 
the busing issue. An incumbent, Edward Benton, and a newcomer, 
Monte Pascoe, both backers of the plan, were defeated 2.5 to one by 
Frank Southworth and James Perrill, who opposed the resolutions. 
Over 108,000 Denverites, more than half the registered voters in the 
city, voted. Nearly every organization in Denver took a position on 
the issue." For the next decade the issue of busing defined Denver's 
politics. 
On June 9, 1969, Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531 were re- 
scinded and superseded by Resolution 1533, which sought to achieve 
desegregation on a voluntary basis.'' The Board's justification was a 
response to the community sentiment expressed in the school board 
election. Ten days later, eight parents of Denver public school stu- 
dents sought to enjoin the implementation of Resolution 1533 and the 
rescission of Resolutions 1520, 1524 and 153 1. Eighteen years later, 
Keyes v. School District No. I remains an active lawsuit. 
11. A LEGAL CHRONOLOGY 
THE LIABILITY PHASE TO THE FINAL ORDER 
(1969-1974) 
The complaint stated two claims for relief: first, that the rescis- 
sion of the resolutions be temporarily and permanently enjoined and 
second, a declaratory judgment that the rescission of the resolutions 
by the school board constituted a violation of the Equal Protection 
clause.52 The bulk of the allegations contained in the first claim were 
49. Keyes, 3 13 F. Supp. at 66. The Report was titled 'Planning Quality Education-A Pro- 
posal for Integrating the Denver Public Schools'. 
50. COLORADO, supra note 2, at 293. 
51. Id. Interview with Edgar Benton, former member Denver Board of Education, in Den- 
ver (Sept. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Benton interview]. Pascoe Interview, supra note 34. 
52. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 66. Resolution 1533 provided for a voluntary exchange program 
at Hallett Elementary School on a reciprocal basis, i.e., a volunteering pupil from Hallett could 
transfer to another school i f a  pupil from that school would volunteer to attend Hallett. The 
Resolution also called for the transfer of 120 Stedman students, on a voluntary basis, to other 
elementary schools where space was available. 
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tried fully at the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the allegations 
of the second claim at a trial on the merits. 
In hearing the claim for an injunction, district court Judge Wil- 
liam E. Doyle found that during the ten-year period preceding the pas- 
sage of resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531, the Denver School Board 
had carried out a policy of racial segregation. The judge further stated 
that the rescission of the school integration plan would perpetuate 
school segregation and chill the plaintiff's rights of equal educational 
~ppor tun i ty .~~  The court issued a preliminary injunction. The school 
board appealed successfully to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which vacated the preliminary i n j u n c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
After a trial on the merits, the District Court found that the 
Board had acted in violation of the p1aintiffs"Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. The Board's segregative acts were taken with knowledge of 
their effect on attempts to desegregate the school system.55 The court 
concluded that the only feasible and constitutionally acceptable pro- 
gram would be a system of desegregation that provided compensatory 
53. The temporary injunction sought to maintain the status quo and to enjoin the school 
board from modifying the purchase orders for the school buses, from destroying documents re- 
lating to or pertaining to the implementation of the resolutions, and from taking any action 
which would make it impossible or more difficult to proceed with the implementation of the 
resolutions, and from taking any action which would make it impossible or more difficult to 
proceed with the implementation of the resolutions. The second claim for relief addressed itself 
to general injunctive relief and for declaratory judgments as to the unconstitutional acts of the 
school board. It demanded affirmative equitable relief to force the board to deal with the conse- 
quences of school segregation in those portions of Denver school system in the core city areas not 
merely in the Park Hill Schools. Keyes, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969). See PEARSON, supra 
note 1, at 190. 
54. Keyes, 303 F. Supp. 279. 
55. The Circuit Court remanded to the District Court questioning the specificity of the 
injunctive order and directed the District Court to consider the application of title IV, 9 407(a) of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 9 2000(c)-6(a). The Court of appeals published no deci- 
sion. On remand Judge Doyle held that where the statute granting the cause of action for depri- 
vation of civil rights was 42 U.S.C. 9 1983 rather than the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
proscription in the latter statute against ordering busing to achieve racial balance was not appli- 
cable. Keyes, 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969). This too was appealed to the tenth circuit which 
on August 14th vacated the preliminary injunction pending the decision of an appeal taken by 
the school board on the preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals stayed the preliminary 
injunction because of insufficient time before the schools opened to examine the record to deter- 
mine whether the District Court had correctly held that there was de jure segregation in the 
schools. Plaintiffs appealed immediately to the United States Supreme Court, and Mr. Justice 
Brennan sitting as an individual justice vacated the order of the Court of Appeals and directed 
the reinstatement of the District Court's order. Keyes, 396 U.S. 1215 (1969). The reasoning was 
procedural: an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction will not be disturbed by a 
reviewing court unless it appears the action taken was an abuse of discretion. The Court of 
Appeals had not suggested that. 
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education in an integrated environment. The court delayed the imple- 
mentation of such a plan for one year and adopted an interim plan 
which applied to fifteen core-city schools.56 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the 
Board's actions in one neighborhood, the Park Hill section of Denver, 
during the 1960s, constituted dejure segregation. The Court also af- 
firmed the trial court's conclusions that plaintiffs had failed to make a 
prima facie showing concerning the core city schools, but reversed the 
district court conclusion that maintenance of de facto segregated 
schools in the core of the city violated the fourteenth amendment." 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the circuit 
court's opinion.58 Keyes was the first non-southern desegregation case 
to be decided by the Supreme Court. The majority found that where 
school authorities had "carried out a systematic program of segrega- 
tion affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, 
and facilities within the school system, it [was] only common sense to 
conclude that there exist[ed] a predicate for a finding of the existence 
of a dual school system."59 The purposeful concentration of minority 
students in certain schools had the reciprocal effect of keeping other 
schools Anglo.60 
The High Court established the presumption that the Board's seg- 
regative acts in a substantial portion of the school district rendered the 
entire district a dual system. It directed the district court, on remand, 
to offer the Board the opportunity to prove that the Park Hill area was 
a separate, identifiable, and unrelated section of the district. In the 
event the Board should fail in its proffer, the district court was to de- 
termine whether the Board's conduct, in deliberately segregating Park 
Hill schools, made the entire school system a dual school ~ystem.~'  If
so determined, the Board had the affirmative duty to desegregate the 
entire system root and branch. 
Judge Doyle, on remand, concluded that the segregative acts of 
the Board in Park Hill did constitute in the entire district, a dual 
56. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1979). 
57. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970). 
58. Keyes, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971). 
59. Keyes, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
60. Id. at 201. 
61. Id. at 208. 
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school system; the Board's intentional segregation in Park Hill had 
substantially affected schools outside the area.62 On December 13, 
1973 the court ordered the parties to submit plans for desegregation of 
the entire school district. After finding unacceptable the desegregation 
plans submitted by both the plaintiffs and the defendants, the court 
appointed its own expert, Dr. John N. Finger, and thereafter approved 
his desegregation plan, known as the Finger Plan.63 The final decree, 
adopting a desegregation plan which included part-time busing and 
imposed a permanent injunction, was entered in an unpublished opin- 
ion in April 17, 1974. 
The plan adopted by the district court desegregated Denver's 
schools by rezoning attendance areas across all grade levels, ordering 
busing, and reassigning elementary school minority students. Approx- 
imately 37 schools were to be organized in pairs or clusters for pur- 
poses of part-time reassignment of students on a classroom basis. This 
required transportation of students from their home schools to a re- 
ceiving school for half days plus the lunch period. They would then be 
returned to their neighborhood school. A child would be in a "receiv- 
ing" class some days and in a sending class on others.64 
Junior and Senior high schools were desegregated by new attend- 
ance zones and satellites. The Court set a 40 percent minimum per- 
centage and a 70 percent maximum percentage of anglo students in 
every elementary school.65 In the secondary schools the minimum 
was set at 50 to 60 percent anglos. Deviations were permitted from 
those percentages for particular areas and schools. 
Eight elementary schools were to have anglo enrollments below 
40 percent. The departure from the court's guidelines was justified for 
five of these schools on grounds of the school's inaccessibility and the 
desire to continue or to institute bilingual-bicultural programs at pre- 
dominately Hispanic s c h o o l ~ . ~ ~  These five elementary schools were to 
62. Id. at 213. 
63. Keyes, 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973). 
64. Keyes, 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974). The ~laintiffs' plan proposed excessive busing 
and was too complicated. The defendants' plan did not meet constitutional requirements. 
65. Keyes, 521 F.2d 465, 475 (10th Cir. 1975). 
66. Id. at 476. 
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have been left with minority enrollments ranging between 77 percent 
and 88 percent.67 
On appeal, the tenth circuit affirmed most of the desegregation 
plan, but rejected the part-time pairing plan and ordered implementa- 
tion of a full time desegregated school en~i ronment .~~  It reversed an 
order to consolidate two of the high schools.69 The circuit court also 
faulted the plan for leaving five elementary schools as segregated His- 
panic 
The court found that the ,five schools were substantially dispro- 
portionate in their racial composition7' and therefore, under Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of a presumption existed 
against the school district's compliance with its constitutional respon- 
sibility. It held that continued segregation at these schools could be 
justified only on the basis that practical or other legitimate considera- 
tions rendered desegregation unwise, or on the basis of proof that the 
67. Keyes, 380 F. Supp. 673, 692, 717 (D. Colo. 1974). 
68. Keyes, 521 F.2d 465, 479 n.15 (10th Cir. 1975). 
69. One of the great mistakes in the remedy stage was the adoption of the part-time pairing 
plan suggested by Denver Post education writer art Branscombe. The theory of the plan was to 
offer the dual advantages of neighborhood schools and an integrated educational experience. The 
Finger plan assumed that part-time pairing would be easily convertible to full time pairing. 
Part-time pairing offered continuous neighborhood contact with school officials. The child 
would spend part of the school day at the neighborhood school learning basic subjects such as 
reading and mathematics. Then, he would be bused to another school and would return to the 
neighborhood school'for after school activities. Students spent too much of the day on buses, 
however. Parents objected vociferously to this. Part-time pairing was the greatest mistake of the 
remedy stage. Because it offered eighteen of the most severely segregated schools only part-time 
desegregation and deprived minority students of an education equal to that provided in other 
schools in the district, it was rejected by the appeals court, which ordered "implementation of a 
full-time desegregation program within a reasonable time and in accord with changing condi- 
tions." Keyes, 521 F.2d at 479. 
70. In order to integrate the senior high schools, the District Court, in addition to altering 
attendance zones, had ordered a consolidation of East. and Manual High Schools into a campus 
complex. Keyes, 380 F. Supp. 673, 691 (d. Colo. 1974). The consolidation was reversed because 
in acting on its own notions of good educational policy, the District Court exceeded it remedial 
authority. The Court could alter the school system only to relieve a constitutional violation or to 
remove obstacles to such relief. The Circuit Court also affirmed the District Court's requirement 
of desegregation of faculty and staff and ordered the school district to assign its personnel so that, 
in each school, the ratio of minority teachers and staff to Anglo teachers could not be less than 
fifty percent of the ratio of minority to Anglo staff in the entire system. Keyes, 521 F. Supp. at 
484. 
71. Minority enrollments varied between seventy-seven and eighty-eight percent. The court 
remanded for a determination whether the continued segregation of schools could be justified on 
grounds other than the institution of bilingual programs. Id. at 480. bilingual education was not 
a substitute for desegregation. 
72. Id. at 480. 
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racial composition of these schools was not the result of past discrimi- 
natory action on the part of the school board. In an action that did 
not completely please the hispano community, the circuit court ruled 
that bilingual education was not a substitute for desegregation and 
such instruction had to be subordinate to a plan of school 
de~egregation.~~ 
The issue of whether the five predominately hispanic schools 
could be justified was remanded to Judge Doyle.74 The stipulated plan 
for desegregation agreed to by the parties after the remand, approved 
by Judge Doyle in an order entered on March 26, 1976, contained 
nothing related to issues of limited-English language proficiency 
(LEP). The five predominately hispanic elementary schools were now 
included in the overall desegregation plan. 
The circuit court's opinion also resulted in an increase in the 
number of elementary school students bused." According to Willis 
Hawley, later a court appointed expert: 
After full implementation of the desegregation plan in 1975 
Denver achieved approximately eighty-five percent of possible dis- 
trict wide racial balance. In subsequent years, levels of racial bal- 
ance increased. Prior to the implementation of the plan, eleven of 
Denver's 119 schools had enrollments that were more than ninety 
percent minority. Twenty-one percent of the district's minority-stu- 
dent population attended these schools. By 1976 Denver had elimi- 
nated all eleven schools with such a minority proportion of 
enrollment .76 
An order dated March 26, 1976 approved the issuance of-an agreed 
plan in response to the court of appeal's decision.'' One criticism of 
the 1974 implementation concerned the frequent changes in school as- 
signments. The Board had requested that no changes be made in stu- 
dent assignments for three years in the interests of continuity and 
73. 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). 
74. Keyes, 52 1 F.2d at 480. 
75. Id. Originally five schools with overwhelmingly hispanic populations were to be kept 
separate from the initial 1974 remedy. The circuit court disapproved. 
76. The plan provided for the pairing of many of the elementary schools by establishing 
primary schools for grades kindergarten, 1-3 and intermediate schools covering kindergarten and 
grades 4-6. By 1976, the number of Anglo percentages was reduced to a range of thirty-four to 
sixty-four percent because the number of Anglo students had declined from 38,463 (54.1 percent) 
in the elementary schools in September 1973 to 35,307 (51.7 percent) in September 1974. 
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stability. The bilingual issues were left open, but the plaintiff interven- 
ors and the board were in the midst of settlement discussions which 
did not come to fruition. 
~ f t e r  the entry of the 1976 order, the case was assigned to a wor- 
thy successor to Judge Doyle, Judge Richard Matsch." He had been 
appointed to the District Court bench by President Nixon. The son of 
German-Lutheran parents who came to Denver from Burlington, 
Iowa; Judge Matsch began his legal career with a Denver law firm, 
Holme Roberts & Owen. He worked in the offices of the U.S. Attor- 
ney and Denver City Attorney, and was a bankruptcy judge before 
nomination of the federal bench in March 1974 at the age of forty 
three. A private, austere, and closely disciplined person, Judge 
Matsch is a well respected jurist. His forcefulness in the Denver case 
surprised many. 
FROM THE MORATORIUM ON CHANGING SCHOOL ASSIGNMENTS 
TO THE COURT SELECTED PLAN (1976-1979) 
Upon entry of the 1976 order by Judge Doyle, the Board re- 
quested a moratorium on student reassignment. Judge Matsch 
honored the Board's request to avoid altering the student assignment 
plan for three years, from 1976 to 1979, except upon Board request for 
particular situations. It was hoped this moratorium would provide 
stability, continuity and stem the exodus of Anglo students from the 
system. Nonetheless, a decline in student population occurred. 
To plan for declining pupil enrollment and consequent excess 
plant capacity,the Board of Education in 1977 appointed an advisory 
committee of citizens to study the utilization of school buildings and 
to recommend criteria for closures and consolidations. The advisory 
committee submitted a report, which did not contemplate action to 
make changes before September, 198 1. The Board, which accepted 
the advisory committee's report in April, 1978, moved up the time to 
make changes to September, 1980. After the Community Education 
Council (CEC), a court-appointed monitoring group expressed con- 
cerns that imbalances in racial composition and crowded conditions 
had developed in some schools; court hearings were held in January, 
78. See supro p. 15. 
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1979 to consider the status of those  school^.'^ 
The CEC had requested the hearing to obtain a status report from 
the School Board and the Denver Public Schools (DPS) administra- 
tion on the comprehensive, city-wide plan for the schools which would 
be implemented after the three-year moratorium on altering student 
assignments expired." At the hearing, the Board stated that it had 
directed the filing of a report by an Administration Task Force on 
school closings and school assignments in March, 1979. It set May 1, 
1979 as the date for the filing of a comprehensive student assignment 
plan, and June 1, 1979 as the date for its Task Force to report on the 
status of compliance with orders requiring affirmative action in the 
hiring, assignment and in-service training of teachers, administrators 
and staff. A new plan, adopted in Resolution No. 2060, met opposi- 
tion from the plaintiffs/intervenors and, accordingly, a further hearing 
was held on July 20, 1979 on the motion of the defendant School Dis- 
trict No. 1 to implement those portions of Resolution No. 2060 deal- 
ing with school closings and pupil assignments for the 1979-80 school 
year. 
The Board's proposals in Resolution 2060 were designed 'to in- 
crease the number of students who attended their neighborhood 
schools and to decrease busing. The burdens of the plan were not 
equally shared. Some children would be bused, while others would 
attend neighborhood schools. The board never considered upon 
whom the burdens would fall. After the CEC and plaintiffs objected 
to the plan of Resolution 2060, the Board never met in legislative ses- 
sion nor considered alternatives." The administrative staff's reaction 
to the CEC was hostile, petulant and de~isive.'~ Clearly, it took its 
cue from the Board. The staff developed several delaying proposals 
for further study. A decision had to be made. The Board left it to 
Judge Matsch to make the necessary changes in student assignments. 
Matsch later said that the Board's dereliction of duty enabled its mem- 
79. See PEARSON, supra note 1 .  Judge Doyle, who had overseen the litigation since its 
commencement in 1969, was elevated to the Tenth Circuit, a deserving reward given the abuse he 
had received and the success he had achieved in implementing the remedy without violence. 
80. This period is detailed in Keyes, 474 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1979) and summarized in 
Keyes, 609 F .  Supp. 1491, 1500-1501 (D. Colo. 1985). 
81. Keyes, 474 F. Supp. at 1268. 
82. There was no objection to closing four elementary schools which had become racially 
imbalanced. Id. at 1269. 
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bers to avoid criticism from the community, and permitted them to 
continue their politically popular protest against judicial intervention 
in local self-g~vernance.~~ Matsch then ordered the student assign- 
ment changes.84 The next time around, the court refused to make the 
assignments, forcing the Board to make the choices.85 
FOUR SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS IN SEARCH OF A NON-BUSING 
PLAN: FROM THE AD HOC PLAN TO TOTAL ACCESS TO 
THE CONSENSUS PLAN (1979- 1982) 
Another key area in which the school board procrastinated, after 
the implementation of the consent decree, was the development of a 
permanent unitary school district plan once the court had relinquished 
control.86 From July 1979 until the spring of 1982, the Board split 
along philosophical and political lines, with the anti-busers holding a 
four to three majority. 
The anti-busing coalition arose in May 1981 when Franklin Mul- 
len, a businessman who spent approximately $100,000 on his anti-bus- 
ing campaign, was elected to the school board.87 He joined Robert 
Crider, who had opposed mandatory busing throughout his 12-year 
tenure on the school board, Naomi Bradford, a staunch anti-buser 
who also was re-elected in 1981 and who later became the Board's 
president, and William Schroeder. The liberal wring of the Board con- 
sisted of Kay Schomp, Rev. Marion Hammond and Omar Blair, all of 
whom supported busing.88 
The July 30, 1979 memorandum, issued by Judge Matsch, or- 
dered the Board to develop a plan for a permanent unitary school dis- 
trict. Matsch essentially said it was time to close out the ten-year-old 
83. Id. at 1272. 
84. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. at 1501. 
85. The court adopted the plaintiffs-intervenors' proposal for the reassignment of students 
from the closed Ellsworth Elementary School; made its own reassignment of students from the 
closed Emerson Elementary School; made assignments to the new McKinley-thatcher School; 
rejected the Board's proposed removal of Ashley mobile units; approved the reassignment of 
pupils from closed Elyria Elementary School; adjusted the attendance zone of Belmont School; 
adjusted the Fairview-Greenlee-Traylor grouping by pairing Fairview and Rosedale; and author- 
ized the establishment of an Oakland-McGlone pair. There was no adjustment for Gilpin and 
Mitchell, which remained segregated schools. Keyes, 474 F. Supp. at 1272-1276. 
86. Infra pp. 20-26. 
87. Keyes, 474 F. Supp. 1265, 1271-72 (D. Colo. 1979). Interview with Gordon Greiner, 
lead counsel for plaintiffs, in Denver (Sept. 12, 1984) [hereinafter Greiner Interview]. 
88. Branscombe, Denver Board Gets Anti-Busing Majority, Denver Post, Dec. 1, 1981, at 1. 
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On March 15, 1982, nearly 32 months after the memorandum, 
Judge Matsch rejected the Total Access Plan (TAP), a proposal whose 
major tenets were open enrollments and magnet schools, not busing.90 
The Board had approved the plan by a four to three vote, over the 
objections of the three liberals, and after the Board had spent consider- 
able time working out a completely different desegregation proposal 
that called for continued busing, although on a more limited basis.91 
Throughout this period, there was no consensus among the board 
members, only disagreement, and by May, 1982, the Board still had 
the lawsuit to resist. 
In 1980, an Ad Hoc Committee was formed by Board resolution 
to formulate a plan acceptable to the court, a blue print for shepherd- 
ing desegregation on its proper course. The committee, which was 
chaired by Kay Schomp, included representatives of the black and his- 
panic communities, as well as teachers, the League of Women Voters, 
and the Denver Parent-Teacher-Student Association. In addition to 
meeting regularly as a group, the committee held public hearings for 
additional input from the community.92 
After a series of public hearings and much discussion, including 
the release of a draft report in December 1980, the committee released 
its final report on June 5, 1981. Among other programs, it called for 
maintaining 26 "walk-in" or neighborhood elementary schools, treat- 
ing five new "walk-in" junior high schools, and eliminating 27 satellite 
attendance areas.93 The plan also proposed establishing two magnet 
schools at the elementary school In all, the plan proposed 
89. Of the 1981 school board election, Matsch later wrote, "As it has been since the first 
orders in this case, the jingoism of 'forced busing' was very prevalent during the campaign." 
Keyes, 540 F. Supp. 399, 401 (D. Colo. 1982). 
90. "The ultimate objective is to define and create a unitary system so that jurisdiction of 
the Court over Denver schools may be relinquished," Matsch wrote, adding, "It is important 
that the burden of busing be shared and that there be no disproportionate impact on a racial or 
ethnic balance." Keyes, 474 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (D. Colo. 1979). 
91. Keyes, 540 F. Supp. 399 (D. Colo. 1982). 
92. Branscombe, Denver's Plan for No Busing For Schools Sent to U S .  Judge, Denver Post, 
Dec. 11, 1981, at 1A. 
93. Telephone Interview with Kay Schomp, former member, Denver School Board (Nov. 8, 
1985). 
94. Branscombe, Desegregation Plan Unveiled, Denver Post, June 6, 1981, at 4B. 
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blanketing two-thirds of the city with walk-in schools.95 
The Ad Hoc Committee's plan was resisted by the Community 
Education Council (CEC) as an attempt to return to ~egregat ion.~~ By 
October 11, 198 1, after mulling over the Ad Hoc Committee's plan 
and making several changes, the Board adopted a plan under which 
2,600 fewer children would ride the bus, and eight additional neigh- 
borhood schools would be ~reated.~' Board member Omar Blair ob- 
jected to the plan, however, saying it would force a disproportionate 
number of black children to ride the bus. At the elementary school 
level, he contended, 640 out of 890 students bused from satellite areas 
would be black; 943 out of 1,310 at the junior high level, and 2,600 of 
3,000 at the high school 
At that same meeting, William Schroeder presented his own plan, 
the key feature of which was to eliminate forced busing. He wanted 
students assigned to schools nearest their homes, unless they preferred 
a different school.99 
Schroeder's proposal did not sit well with many Denver residents, 
particularly minorities, who saw the plan as an attempt to resegregate 
the schools.'00 At its next meeting, the Board, therefore, resolved to 
send two desegregation plans to the judge. One was Schroeder's, the 
other was a successor to the Ad Hoc Committee's plan.'" This sec- 
ond plan called for restoration of up to 19 walk-in schools, all of them 
in neighborhoods considered residentially integrated and the continua- 
tion of busing, although to a lesser degree. 
The submission of the two plans was an attempt by the bitterly- 
divided Board to shirk its elected responsibility to set DPS's policy. 
The judge refused to select either of the plans. After receiving the two 
proposals, he bluntly ordered the Board to submit one "definite 
95. Id. 
96. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1502 (D. Colo. 1985). Branscombe, Questions Arise in "Uni- 
tary" Schwl Desegregation Plan, Denver Post, June 14, 1981, at IF. 
97. Branscombe, Monitors Critical of New DPS Plans, Denver Post, June 24, 198 1 ,  at 3 1 .  
Another CEC complaint focused on the proposed formation of two magnet schools, which they 
feared would drain students from other schools and cause racial balances to tip. Id. 
98. Branscombe, Bold Schwl Plan Being Readied, Denver Post, Oct. 12, 1981, at 1B. 
99. Branscombe, Flaw Seen in Plan Cutting Bus Riders, Denver Post, Oct. 9, 1981, at 1B. 
100. Schroeder's proposal marked a reversal of the course previously taken by the board. Id. 
101. Branscombe, Schwl Board Proposal Termed Resegregation, Denver Post, Oct. 21, 1981, 
at 1B. 
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plan."lo2 Matsch did not want to assume a receivership position over 
the Denver schools as had occurred in Boston, nor did he want to give 
board members a way to wheedle out of their elected responsibilities. 
Throughout this case, the court ~ushed'and urged the Board toward 
the goal of a unified system. 
Rebuffed by the court, on November 30, 1981, the Board voted 
four to two to formulate another plan by December 10th. The Board's 
anti-busing majority directed DPS staff to come up with a plan that 
would halt mandatory busing. Called "The Total Access Plan" 
(TAP), the plan's foundations were open enrollments and magnet 
schools, both of which, a majority of the Board felt, could create and 
sustain a unitary school system.lo3 TAP was presented on Dec. 10, 
198 1, by then-superintendent Dr. Joseph Brzeinski. lo4 The Board ap- 
proved the plan four to three, the usual tally during that period, with 
the three liberals opposing it.'05 
In addition to allowing students to attend schools close to their 
homes, the Total Access Plan proposed creating 35 magnet schools 
throughout the city, many of them at the elementary school level. 
There would be no mandatory busing. At the elementary school level, 
TAP called for, among other programs, a fundamental school, a 
Montessori school, four education centers for the gifted, a foreign lan- 
guage center, an extended day care center and a center for "academic 
advancement through problem solving." There would also be two 
magnet schools at the middle school level, and every high school 
would have some type of magnet program. Manual High School, for 
instance, would have a "Classical Academy for Advanced Students," 
and Thomas Jefferson would have a pre-engineering program. lo6 To- 
102. Branscombe, Schools Ordered to Choose One Integration Plan, Denver Post, Nov. 13, 
1981, at 1B. 
103. Id. 
104. Branscombe, School Board Moves To End Forced Busing, Denver Post, Dec. 1 ,  1981, at 
1 A. 
105. Branscombe, "Magnet" Desegregation Plan Ready, Denver Post, Dec. 10, 1981, at 1B. 
106. Branscombe, Denver's Plan for No Busing For Schools Sent to LI.S. Judge, Denver Post, 
Dec. 11, 1981, at 1A. Said board member Reverend Marion Hammond, "I think this is educa- 
tionally one of the worst things I've ever seen." Also at the meeting, Mullen accused Blair of not 
speaking for the majority of the black community: "They're embarrassed and tired of having 
Blair represent them." 
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tal Access also stipulated that students who wished to remain at their 
current schools would be given priority to do so.lo7 
Also significant was the brief time the DPS staff had available- 
less than two weeks-to put the proposal together in order to meet 
Matsch's deadline for a unitary plan. By contrast, an alternative con- 
sensus plan, which the Board voted not to send to the judge, went 
through a much longer planning process and had the benefit of input 
from the public, not just from DPS staff.'08 Gordon Greiner, who has 
represented the plaintiffs since the case began in 1969, viewed the To- 
tal Access Plan as a political move, an attempt to use the court as a 
scapegoat. '09 
In January 1982, the school board, once again by a four to three 
vote, approved the hiring of a public relations company to publicize 
TAP and a law firm to defend the plan at an upcoming hearing before 
Judge Matsch. The superintendent said the public relations firm 
would be paid out of the $30,000 earmarked in the school district's 
annual budget for publicity.'1° TAP certainly raised some pertinent 
questions, among them, what the drawing power of magnet schools 
would be, particularly for schools in minority neighborhoods."' 
By several accounts, Manual High School was regarded as one of 
the more successful desegregation stories in Denver, a school that 
make the transition relatively smoothly from a nearly all-black school 
to be integrated one. ' l2 Manual, once a nearly all-black high school in 
107. Branscombe, "Magnet" Desegregation Plan Ready, Denver Post, Dec. 10, 198 1, at 1A. 
108. Id. 
109. ~ e l e ~ h o n e  Interview with Kay Schomp, former member Denver School Board (Nov. 8, 
1985). Schomp stated TAP was "totally staff produced." 
110. I think the board is a political animal. It likes the idea of trying to use the court as 
a scapegoat. 
By continuously and falsely holding out the idea to the electorate that what the judge is 
doing is wrong and unconstitutional, they obviously lost a very important opportunity 
for affirmative leadership and, in effect, again abdicated the responsibility and found it 
more politically profitable to take that point of view to be against busing. 
Greiner Interview, supra note 87. 
11 1. Branscombe, Board Hires PR Firm for Anti-Busing Plan, Denver Post, Jan. 22, 1982, at 
1A. 
112. Writing in a Denver Post "Point of View" Column, Sheila Towle and Michael W. Sim- 
mons asked: 
Would you as a parent send your child across town to a magnet school or magnet 
center when there is no direct route from your neighborhood to the school; when the 
education program for the magnet school or center exists only on paper and there are 
few trained teachers or principals for any of the programs, or when you have to make a 
career decision for your child by the end of the eighth grade? 
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North Denver, had an anglo enrollment of approximately 50 percent 
during the 1981-82 school year, up from five to six percent before the 
decree took effect in 1974.113 Irving Moskowitz, who was directing 
the plan's development, said there was no assurance that white stu- 
dents, given other options, would continue attending Manual High 
School. ' l 4  
The plan incited resistance very quickly. In early February 1982, 
approximately 20 teachers agreed to send letters to Judge Matsch ex- 
pressing their objections to the proposal. In the words of Jerry Mc- 
Cracken, a social studies teacher at Manual, "As an education plan, it 
may be good, but as an integration plan it ain't. ,9115 
Enrollment figures began to surface that didn't bode well for the 
plan's future success with Judge Matsch. DPS staff projections indi- 
cated that under the plan, preponderately one-race schools, most of 
which had disappeared under. the 1974 consent decree, would reappear 
in certain parts of the city. For instance, at Carson Elementary 
School, which was 40.4 percent anglo in 1982, the anglo enrollment 
would have jumped to 83 percent the following year under TAP. 
Meanwhile, at other schools, minority enrollments would soar.l16 
The same patterns reoccurred at the junior high and high school 
levels, according to the projections. Civil groups, including the Metro- 
politan Council of NAACP, the Greater Park Hill Community 
Schools Committee and the 4,000-member Denver Classroom Teacher 
Association, went on record opposing the plan."' 
The four member majority of the school board held its ground, 
Or would you wait a few years and send your child to a nearby school with the district's 
existing program? If you took a chance on magnets, would you choose one close to 
home or across town? 
Towle and Simmons, Total Access Plan: What Meaning, Denver Post, Jan. 27, 1982, at 3B. 
113. Colwell Interview, supra note 35. 
114. Denver Public School Enrollment Figures. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. 61, 78. Copy of 1982- 
83 figures on file at the Institute of Judicial Administration. 
1 15. Branscombe, Plan's Primary Goal Is Education, School Desegregation Secondary, Den- 
ver Post, Feb. 2, 1982, at 1B. 
116. Branscombe, Manual Teachers to Note Plan Opposition, Denver Post, Feb. 12, 1982, at 
IA. 
117. DPS released these projections: 
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however, determined to rid DPS of mandatory busing.' l8 Board mem- 
ber Robert Crider held that busing drove a lot of whites and blacks out 
of the Denver Public Schools. Crider advocated the use of magnet and 
neighborhood schools. Asked for its overall assessment of the court's 
intervention in the case, he said, "The courts haven't learned a thing. 
They kept ordering busing. Judges love it. They kept writing opin- 
ions. It gives them publicity. Lawyers get rich. Judges become legis- 
lators and administrators. 9 9 1  19 
Crider conceded that there were inequities in the school system 
prior to the Keyes case. The inner-city schools in the northeast section 
of Denver weren't replaced as rapidly as schools in other parts of the 
city, he said, and the younger teachers were often assigned to the mi- 
nority schools. He called the remedy a "disaster," adding, the court, 
in using busing to remedy the situation was "playing a numbers 
game." "The court dictates with no responsibility. Local people 
should control the school district, the local people have lost control of 
the d i s t r i ~ t . " ' ~ ~  
The hearing began on March 1, 1982. Testimony included state- 
Elementary (percentage Anglo) 198 1-82 Total Access 
Columbine 40.6 5.4 
McMaen 43.2 83.4 
Mitchell 22.5 4.5 
Smith 32.1 2.7 
Southmoore 45.2 94.9 
Steck 45.5 94.5 
Junior High Schools 
Baker 41.5 22.2 
Hamilton 49.4 81.6 
Hill 45.9 85.4 
Mann 30.1 14.5 
Merrill 34.0 83.9 
High Schools 
Manual 50.1 5.6 
G. Washington 40.7 75.1 
Branscombe, Plan Could Renew School RAcial LInes, Denver Post, Feb. 16, 1982, at 1B. 
118. Dillard, NAACP Council Lambastes School Plan, Denver Post, Feb. 16, 1982, at 1B; 
Branscombe, Magnet School Concept Denounced, Denver Post, Feb. 26, 1982, at IB; Brans- 
combe, Groups Criticize Schools, Denver Post, Feb. 12, 1982, at 1B. 
119. One of them, Robert Crider, said in an interview that the remedy "took a growing 
school district and killed it." "Educationally, things haven't changed," he added. "The kids 
who were learning before still learn; the kids who weren't learning still aren't learning. Using 
transportation to remedy the situation is a mistake. People leave." Interview with Robert 
Crider, former member, Denver Public School Board, in Denver (September 13, 1984) [hereinaf- 
ter, Crider interview]. 
120. Id. 
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ments from a variety of witnesses: On the first day, Irving Moskowitz 
testified that the Total Access Plan would be "a plan for the future . . . 
a breakthrough in public education." Moskowitz also said that under 
certain circumstances, children of the majority race in an 80 percent 
or more segregated school would be guaranteed the right to transfer. 
Attorney Gordon Greiner, who cross examined Moskowitz, asked: 
"A parent has absolute free choice to leave [a school], for any reason, 
including race? Correct?" Moskowitz agreed.I2' DPS Superinten- 
dent, Dr. Joseph Brzeinski, testified March 2, that the plan was not a 
desegregation plan. 
The following day, March 3rd, Judge Matsch himself said the 
plan could cause resegregation. Matsch asked Dr. Mario Fantini, 
Dean of Education at the University of Massachusetts, and an expert 
witness in the case, if segregated housing patterns could lead to 
resegregation under TAP. Fantini replied affirmatively. Another wit- 
ness, Dr. Robert Barr, Dean of the School of Education at Oregon 
State University, said there wouldn't be much desegregation under 
TAP initially, but that DPS would have to guard "against slipping 
back into segregation." A third witness, Dr. Willis Hawley of Vander- 
bilt University, told the court that "voluntary choice plans are not an 
effective strategy" in fighting de~egregati0n.l~~ 
Despite some favorable testimony, Judge Matsch rejected the 
plan on March 15, saying it would fail to remove "the vestiges of racial 
discrimination in pupil assignment." The judge called the plan incom- 
plete, saying, "I'm not certain that would happen, what central admin- 
istration and staff would be doing." He added, the school board was 
121. Id. Board member William Schroeder was quoted as saying, "This is so much different 
from any of the plans we've ever tried before. I don't believe any child will be disadvantaged by 
the plan; every child will have an opportunity for a good education." Branscornbe, Pro: Parents 
To Have their Choice on Schools, Denver Post, Feb. 24, 1982, at 10A. 
122. Branscornbe, Schools Proposal Draws Praise as 'Plan for Future', Denver Post, Mar. 2, 
1982, at 1B. 
The following exchange occurred between Greiner and Brzeinski: 
Greiner: "Would you admit that the Total Access Plan is not designed for deseg- 
regation?" 
Brzeinski: "It's an education plan." 
Greiner: "It doesn't even mention school desegregation, correct?" 
Brzeinski: "That's correct." 
Branscornbe, Plan Not Drawn to Desegregate, Brzeinski Agrees, Denver Post, Mar. 3,. 1982, 
at 1B. 
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asking him to accept the plan "as an act of faith. "Iz3 Lastly, Judge 
Matsch noted "the abrupt switch to what a witness has described ac- 
curately as a radical plan." In this, the judge was referred to the 
Board's decision in late 19 to send 'him the Total Access Plan, instead 
of what had grown out of the A d  Hoc Committee's plan. "In sum- 
mary, the total access plan was lacking in concern, commitment and 
capacity." He ordered the Board to come up with another plan in 
thirty days. '24 
After Judge Matsch's March 15th ruling, the Board began anew, 
On March 18th, it reviewed and approved the consensus plan, most of 
which grew out of the alternative plan the Board had approved the 
previous fall, before it submitted the Total Access Plan to the judge. 
After such an acrimonious period, President Crider made a plea to the 
Board for unanimity.12' The vote was six to one, with Naomi Brad- 
ford casting the lone dissenting vote. On March 30th, the Board voted 
five to two to send the judge a substitute consensus plan. Only Brad- 
ford and Schroeder voted against the motion. Under the new propo- 
sal, the number of students bused for integration, approximately 
14,500, would be reduced by about 2,600. Seventeen new walk-in 
schools, eleven at the elementary school level and six junior high 
schools, would be created. There would also be two magnet elemen- 
tary schools, one stressing fundamentals and the other having an ex- 
tended day program. 
On May 12, 1982, nearly three years after he ordered the Board 
to come up with a suitable proposal for a unitary district in an effort to 
end the lawsuit, Judge Matsch approved the Consensus Plan. Matsch 
wasn't particularly happy with the plan. It did not end the suit and 
123. Branscombe, Judge Indicates Plan Could Lead to Resegregation, Denver Post, Mar. 4, 
1982, at 1A. 
Matsch summed up the testimony that favored the plan in an opinion three months later: 
On the positive side, the expert witnesses who testified at the hearing on the Total 
Access Plan generally approved of the educational philosophy involved in curriculum 
diversity and considered it to have considerable potential for enhancement of the qual- 
ity of education for those students who might be able to participate. 
Keyes, 540 F .  Supp. 399, 402 (D. Colo. 1982). 
124. Branscombe, Jug Rejects Denver Schwl Board Plan on Busing, Denver Post, Mar. 16, 
1982, at 1A. 
125. Keyes, 540 F. Supp. at 402. 
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only applied to the 1982-83 school year. The judge said he would re- 
main active in the case to make sure future reforms were enacted. He 
accepted the plan "with considerable reservations," adding, "I am not 
convinced the incumbent school board had shown a commitment to 
the creation of a unitary school system which will have adequate ca- 
pacity for the delivery of educational services without racial 
advantages. 9,126 
The Board, split by philosophical and political differences, and 
with its majority opposed to busing as a desegregation remedy, was 
still a long way from settling the then 13-year old suit. Although 
Judge Matsch viewed the Consensus Plan, implemented in the fall of 
1982, as an interim measure with a few minor changes, it has been in 
effect ever since. The school district has been unwilling to formulate a 
long-term plan for a unitary system that met the judge's approval. 
Moreover, Matsch wrote in his June 3, 1985 opinion, "the proposal 
was premised on a hope that there would be a discernible movement 
toward natural integration of these attendance zones by changes in 
housing patterns. 99127 
Although Denver has become residentially more integrated over 
the past ten years, residential segregation persists, and has had an im- 
pact upon school enrollment. In 1982, the plaintiffs objected to the 
Consensus Plan on several grounds, one of which was that it would 
lead to racially identifiable schools. They were right. "Barrett and 
Harrington [elementary schools]," said Matsch, "have become racially 
identifiable schools, with their respective Anglo populations falling 
from 43.3 percent and 25.3 percent in 1981 to 18 and 15 percent in 
1983. Mitchell fell from 22.5 percent to 12 percent Anglo."12* 
The plaintiffs claimed that racial imbalance stemmed from the 
Consensus Plan; the school board attributed it to white flight and said 
the existence of three racially identifiable schools did not constitute a 
dual system. The racial makeup of those three schools continues to be 
one of several obstacles to an out-of-court settlement. 
Greiner, asked about the overall success of the Consensus Plan, 
and said he would like to see the racially-identifiable schools elimi- 
126. Branscornbe, Denver Forced-Busing Plan Revived, Denver Post, Mar. 19, 1982, at 1A. 
127. Keyes, 540 F. Supp. at 403. 
128. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. at 1507. 
Heinonline 32 Howard L.J. 657 1989 
658 HOWARD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32 
nated.'29 He blamed the Consensus Plan and wanted the district to 
formulate long-term guidelines, benchmarks that it could use to mea- 
sure whether a system can be considered unitary in the future. Of 
course, the Consensus Plan, originally an interim, compromise mea- 
sure that came at the end of a long, acrimonious period during which 
the Board tried to convince the judge to rely on magnet and neighbor- 
hood schools (not busing), did not have much chance of becoming a 
future blueprint. The Consensus Plan was a political compromise, 
patched together by a school board whose majority abhorred busing. 
It is not surprising, then, that it provided little in the way of guidelines 
toward establishment of a unitary system. 
In the mid 1970s the demographic changes evident throughout 
the city and its school system inevitably made the original desegrega- 
tion plan obsolete. As with many other big-city school districts under- 
going court-ordered busing, Denver experienced an exodus of anglo 
students. There are differences of opinion as to how much of it was 
actually spurred by the Court order and how much of it could be at- 
tributed, at least in part, to factors such as the declining birth rate 
among Anglos. For example, in 1974, the year court-ordered desegre- 
gation first took effect, there were 43,576 anglo students in the Denver 
public schools. By the fall of 1983, that number had dropped to 
20,000. The most severe declines in the enrollment of Anglos, though, 
occurred during the first three years after Judge Doyle issued the bus- 
ing order. In 1975, the enrollment of Anglos had dropped to 40,065, 
and in 1976 to 36,539. The fall of 1977 saw the sharpest decline, with 
anglo enrollment shrinking to 21,23 1-a loss of more than 15,000 stu- 
dents. From 1977 on, the number of anglo students has continued to 
decrease, albeit substantially more slowly.'30 
129. Id. 
130. Greiner Interview, supra note 87. Asked about what sort of guidelines he would like the 
school board to formulate, Greiner commented: 
It's not a Pasadena-type situation. We're not asking for annual adjustments of school 
enrollments. But what we would like to see is an affirmation that the idea that when 
they are presented with choices that they would make those choices in an integrated 
manner. Like the choice of where you locate a school and who goes to it. The choice 
of what school do you close and where do those kids get reassigned. 
Heinonline 32 Howard L.J. 658 1 9 8 9  
1989) ENDLESS JOURNEY 659 
At the same time as anglo students were leaving the system, the 
black enrollment in the Denver public schools declined, though not as 
precipitously as the anglo student population. The black population, 
which stood at 14,831 in 1974, was down to 13,598 in 1983. In con- 
trast to the decline in the number of anglo and black students, hispanic 
enrollment increased slightly, rising from 21,832 students in 1975 to 
23,199 in 1983.131 The largest population gain in DPS during the 
Keyes Case has been the Asian/Pacific Islander population, which in- 
creased from 780 in 1975 to 2,263 in 1983.132 These last two groups 
have had a pronounced impact on the bilingual education issue. 
Some argue that white flight would have occurred without court- 
ordered busing in Denver.'33 Dr. Charles Willie, a Harvard Univer- 
sity professor of Education, advised the court that all major American 
cities have lost white residents, a trend that began in the early 
1 9 5 0 ~ . ' ~ ~  According to Dr. Gary Orfield, a court-appointed expert 
who studied the relationship between housing and school integration 
in Denver, court-ordered busing increases white flight, although only 
temporarily. 
The number of whites leaving the city returned to "a normal 
demographic trend" in 1978, four years after the order took effect, he 
r e ~ 0 r t e d . l ~ ~  Orfield also said the Poundstone Amendment, which pre- 
p 
131. Letter from Sharon R. Hostetter to Lawrence Strauss (Aug. 2, 1984) (Colorado Dept. of 
Education, Planning and Evaluation Unit Ethnic Breakdown of Pupil Membership for Denver 
County, Fall 1974-Fall 1983). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. Declining Anglo enrollment was not confined to DPS, however. Jefferson County, 
which enjoyed robust growth during the time of the Keyes Case, saw its Anglo school population 
decrease, too. There, the number of Anglos enrolled in 1981 was 71,325, a decrease of 448 
students in ten years. In addition, Anglo enrollment in four metro area counties-Adams, Arap- 
ahoe, Boulder and Jefferson--declined four percent from 1971 to 1981. At the same time, minor- 
ity enrollment in those four counties increased by 77 percent during those years, from 16,479 to 
29,632 in 1981. Colo. Dept. Educ., Ten-Year Student Ethnic Enrollment Trends: 1971-1981 in 
Four Major Suburban Counties and Denver (1982). Much of that increase occurred in Arapahoe 
County. Between 1971 and 1981, the black school-age population climbed from 708 to 3,444 and 
the Hispanic population jumped from 1,864 to 3,005. Id. 
134. Robert Colwell, a high school principal in Denver during the 1960s and 1970s who now 
heads an association of private schools in the area, said the exodus to the suburbs was not con- 
fined to whites. 
The percentage of blacks who fled the inner city was almost, I think, as large as the 
percentage of whites. And the court order had nothing to do with t ha t -o r  very little, I 
wouldn't say nothing. I"m sure there were people who left for that reason. But a lot of 
blacks went to Aurora, a lot of blacks went to North Glen and Littleton because inte- 
grated housing was available to them in the suburbs. Colwell Interview, supra note 35. 
135. Weaver, Busing Triggered White Flight? Truism Debunked by Experts, Denver Post, 
Apr. 14, 1985, at 6. 
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vented the City and County of Denver from annexing any counties 
unless a majority of residents approved, was a key barrier that pre- 
vented Denver from having more white students in its schools. The 
Poundstone Amendment was passed in 1974, the year the remedy took 
effect. In recent years, various rehabilitated inner-city neighborhoods 
in Denver have begun to attract whites, some of them with school-age 
children. 136 
Despite these gains, however, a clear pattern has emerged: most 
of the minority students in the Denver Metropolitan area sit in DPS 
classrooms. According to a 198 1 study of Denver housing by Orfield, 
seven out of every eight minority children in the Denver metro area 
attend DPS schools.'37 Since 1974, therefore, changing demographic 
patterns-most notably the decline in anglo students-has made inte- 
gration within DPS more difficult, as there are fewer available students 
with whom to accomplish that goal. 
In the course of the litigation, the Denver School Board, like 
many of its big-city counterparts, became an extremely political gov- 
erning body, a plateau from which its members could launch political 
careers. This trend has had an adverse effect on the desegregation 
remedy. 138 
Since the late 1960s, few elected offices in Denver have offered so 
much vi~ibi1ity.I~~ Busing continued to be an issue for the Board 
throughout the 1970s and in the 1980s, ebbing and flowing, sharpen- 
ing in intensity and then softening-but always there. The issue re- 
mains, years after the court's initial busing order took effect, although 
much of the Board's anti-busing rhetoric has softened.lM Still, some 
136. Id. 
137. Pascoe interview, supra note 34. See infra, pp. 45-46. 
138. ORFIELD & FISCHER, ''A POLICY ANALYSIS OF DENVER" in HOUSING AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION IN THREE METROPOLITAN AREAS: DENVER, COLUMBUS, AND PHOENIX 23 
(1981). "The basic problem, however," Oriield wrote, "is that Denver contains only a small and 
declining fraction of the metropolitan area's Anglo students but retains a very large proportion of 
the minority children." 
139. Interview with Art Branscornbe, in Denver (Sept. 10, 1984). Branscornbe was the Den- 
ver Post education writer who covered the lawsuit for the newspaper from its inception [hereinaf- 
ter Branscornbe interview]. 
140. "In Denver it [the school board] is the most visible position you can hold, more visible 
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Denver residents say that one of the remedy's major obstacles has been 
a recalcitrant school board, an elected group of officials under intense 
political pressure from the community at large, not to implement a 
less than popular, court ordered busing plan.I4' 
The Board was given the politically difficult task of implementing 
an unpopular court order, and resisted-a phenomenon that has had a 
wide range of effects on the school system, as well as the court-ordered 
remedy. Not all Denver School Board members have opposed busing 
as a way to integrate public schools. Kay Schomp, Virginia Rockwell, 
Rev. Marion Hammond and Omar Blair, among others, have fought 
for busing, arguing it was the best alternative for the school system. 
For every pro-busing vote by Kay Schomp, however, there was a nega- 
tive vote by Robert Crider. The conflict between the pro- and anti- 
busers often was played out in the local media. The lack of a consen- 
sus among the board members impeded the remedy's 
implementation. '42 
Until Keyes, those who served on the Board were members of the 
Denver establishment. Board membership was not a highly visible po- 
sition politically. The 1969 school board election was a watershed. 
From then on, elections became ideological battlegrounds centered on 
busing. Increasingly sophisticated political tactics were used for a po- 
sition that paid nothing. A brief look at the board elections from 
1975, the year after the original remedy was implemented, until the 
election in May 1985, reveals the tenacious grip the busing issue has 
had on the Board's politics and how much the Board has evolved as a 
political animal-most notably when it came to getting elected and, 
more importantly, to staking out a political constituency. 
In 1975, the Keyes case was the central concern of school board 
members. Naomi Bradford, who later became the board's president, 
ran a strong anti-busing campaign calling for the immediate elimina- 
tion of busing as a means of integrating public schools. ". . . I will not 
than the City Council. The names of the school board members are better known. In our subur- 
ban districts this is not the case," noted Carol Ruckel, the mother of two DPS students who has 
closely followed the developments in the Keyes Case. Interview with Carol Ruckel, President, 
Denver-Parent-Teacher-Student Association, in Denver (Sept. 15, 1984) [hereinafter Ruckel 
interview]. 
141. Referring to the most recent school board election in Denver, held in May 1985, Sandy 
Berkowitz, a Denver parent said, "Busing really wasn't an issue this time, for the first time in a 
long time." Berkowitz Interview in Denver (July 13, 1985). 
142. Branscombe Interview, supra note 139. 
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put forth efforts to see that busing works," she was quoted in the Den- 
ver Post shortly before the e1ecti0n.l~~ Bernard Valdez, the Board's 
president at the time, said he wanted the governing body to forget 
about Keyes. 144 In addition, Denver resident Nolan Winsett, president 
of Citizens' Association of Neighborhood Schools, ran a campaign for 
the Board on a strong anti-busing theme.14' 
Two years later, Kay Schomp, one of the board's liberals and a 
firm supporter of busing, was re-elected to a second six-year term. 
Also re-elected that year was Robert Crider, the staunch anti-busing 
proponent who later was elected to the Denver City Council. Crider 
ran on a slate sponsored by the School Board Committee, an anti- 
busing group. Only 18 percent of the electorate voted in that election, 
however. 146 Despite the media attention the campaigns receive, light 
turnouts have been the rule in school board elections. Three years 
after the final decree, busing was still crucial to many voters and 
school board members, and Crider capitalized on it. In 1979, another 
anti-busing candidate, William Schroeder, was elected.14' 
Two years later, Franklin Mullen, spent approximately $100,000 
on his successful anti-busing campaign, the first person to spend so 
much, using television to increase his name rec~gnit ion. '~~ Anti-bus- 
ing proponent Naomi Bradford was also reelected that year, and later 
became president of the Board. 149 Still, with ever larger sums spent by 
candidates, school board elections had come to resemble mayoral, City 
Council and other political elections. In the 1980s, candidates dis- 
143. Former Denver board member Kay Schomp offered an example of this phenomenon: 
Now, for the first three years that I was on the board of education, I was part of a 
board of education that was not committed to the court order. They did everything 
that they possibly could to disrupt it,-they dragged their feet wherever possible. ,They 
did not try to get sufficient funds, which they should have . . . . Instead, they kept 
appealing the case and did not approach the thing in a positive manner. 
Schomp interview, supra note 27. 
144. Branscombe, School Board Candidates Ofler Options for Racial Balance, Denver Post, 
May 11, 1975, at 20. 
145. Branscombe, School Board Names Valder Blair To Top Positions, Denver Post, May 29, 
1975, at 1. 
146. Branscombe, School Board Candidates Offer cons for Racial Balance, Denver Post, May 
11, 1975, at 20. 
147. Branscombe, Crider, Schomp Retained on Boards Hammond In, Denver Post, May 18, 
1977, at 1. 
148. Id. 
149. Branscombe, Denver School Board Gets Anti-Busing-Majority, Denver Post, May 20, 
1981, at 1. 
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cussed issues other than busing, and although the issue had not disap- 
peared, it was more subtle.lsO- 
High visibility has made election to the school board a political 
stepping stone to higher office. Robert Crider and Ted Hackworth, 
whose name recognition originated with their school board member- 
ship, both became city councilmen. Naomi Bradford ran unsuccess- 
fully for Congress on the Republican ticket. Former school board 
member Frank Southworth ran for Congress in 1970 while still on the 
Board. 
The busing issue continued to appear in city politics as recently as 
1983, when the city elected Frederico Pena, its first hispanic mayor. 
One of the mayoral candidates in 1983, Monte Pascoe, said his sup- 
port of the court order was tacitly used against him during the 
campaign. ' ' 
The 1969 school board election proved helpful to the pro-busing 
forces in Denver, even though their candidates were soundly defeated. 
The people who had supported the pro-busing candidates in 1969 pro- 
vided a nucleus of support for the remedy in 1974.lS2 
The politicalization of the school board has meant that certain 
board candidates have run for office with the understanding they 
would oppose the court order--or not support it publicly. There is 
much political mileage to be gained by opposing busing, and over the 
years, there has been a stable constituency in Denver that supports 
that stance. As a result, the Board, in varying degrees, has been recal- 
citrant, and in some cases openly defiant toward court-ordered busing, 
creating definite obstacles to the decree's implementation. lS3 
150. Only 15.5 percent of the electorate voted in the 1981 race. Id. 
151. They had become much more politically sophisticated than their predecessors--espe- 
cially when one compared the school board elect ions to the pre-Keyes days. Paul Sandoval, for 
instance, was accustomed to electoral politics, having served as a state senator; Judy Morton 
used two campaign managers. Both were elected. Also elected was William Schumacher, a re- 
tired school principal. Branscombe, Sandoval, Morton, Schumacher to Take School Board Spots, 
Denver Post, May 18, 1983, at 13B. 
152. Pascoe Interview, supra note 34. 
153. "We lost two to one," said Monte Pascoe. "We got way more votes. We got twice as 
many votes as the person would normally get winning the school board election. What that did 
was identify for us 30,000 people, many of whom were willing to perform these other functions. 
And that's something other cities didn't have." 
Pascoe was referring to the initial years of the busing order, during which things were some- 
what fragile with several community groups strongly opposed to the plan. Pascoe Interview, 
supra note 34. 
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SPECIFIC PROBLEMS HINDERING ~MPLEMENTATION O F  T H E  
DECREE: DPS BUREAUCRATIC INTERTIA 
It is difficult to quantify what effect the Board's resistance had on 
the decree. Observers of the Keyes Case, both within and outside of 
the school system, contend the Board's reluctance to approach the 
remedy in a positive light filtered down in the school system in a vari- 
ety of ways. One area was a lack of support by the DPS bureaucracy 
for Denver public school staff who attempted to integrate students. 154 
Another example is how the DPS bureaucracy resisted input on imple- 
mentation from a panel appointed by Judge Matsch after the consen- 
sus plan was adopted. The three-member panel-M. Beatriz Arias, 
Assistant Professor of Education, Stanford University; Willis Hawley, ' 
Dean of the George Peabody College for Teachers at Vanderbilt Uni- 
versity; and Charles Willie, Professor of Education at H a r v a r d l S s -  
was charged "[tlo meet with the Board of Education, any committee 
154. Art Branscombe, who retired recently as education editor of The Denver Post, covered 
the Keyes case from its inception in 1969. One of the factors that has prevented 100-percent 
implementation of the decree, he says, has been the school board's resistance. "The board, as I 
say, has been anti-busing most of the time. They've never taken any positive approach to this 
thing and said we're doing this better. . . They [the board] didn't want to concede that anything 
good had come out of busing. Still don't. Particularly Bradford." Branscombe Interview, supra 
note 139. 
Robert Colwell, principal of East High School in Denver from 1960 until 1974, concurred. 
"The political infighting in the board of education made it quite difficult to make this thing 
succeed. A lot of bickering, a lot of fighting, a lot of name calling." Colwell Interview, supra 
note 35. 
Added Carol Ruckel, President of the Denver Parent-Teacher-Student Association: 
The board has never taken a public attitude that this is something positive, that is 
important for our city, that it's important for our kids to get along with other kids, and 
here is an opportunity for all of us to learn and grow together. . . There's never been 
that feeling from any of the board members or from any of the boards-the various 
boards we've had over the las;t ten years." 
Ruckel Interview, supra note 34. 
Colwell also said: "And so many members of the board during that period of time were 
elected to the board on a platform of no busing. It distracted attention from education-this 
continual warfare on the board." Colwell Interview, supra note 35. 
155. Jim Ward, who was principal of Manual High School when it made the transition from 
an all-black school to an institution whose enrollment was fifty percent Anglo, recalled the early 
days of the decree. He said he received little cooperation from the administration. In an effort to 
ease racial tensions, Ward said, he tried to establish a summer job program for black and white 
students in 1974. They would work together on various projects around the school-fixing the 
sidewalks, for instance-and would form a corps of student leaders in the fall. Those students 
would serve as role models at Manual, many of whose students were not used to an integrated 
setting. 
So I told the administrator down there (a city official) and he said it was a good idea, and I told 
him about the kids from southeast Denver needing the money. Well, when the superintendent 
found out about that, he just raised hell. Who the hell told you to go to the mayor or get 
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or administrative staff designed by the board, and with counsel for the 
parties herein, for the purpose of preparing appropriate guidelines for 
pupil assignment plans for subsequent years, including long-range 
plans." Even some pro-busing board members, such as Kay Schomp, 
objected to the Pane1.ls6 The DPS administrative staff treated the 
Community Education Council with c~ntempt. '~' 
The Board actively discouraged participation by DPS staff in as- 
sisting the Compliance Assistance Panel established by the court. 
Charles Willie, a member of the Panel, wrote a memorandum propos- 
ing techniques of recruiting and employing minority teachers and 
other employees and sent it to the Board. Willie and the two other 
members of the panel visited Denver to discuss the proposals, but were 
unable to speak with school administrators: "Our meeting was inter- 
rupted by a school board member [Naomi Bradford] who insisted on 
arguing about whether desegregation was a good idea.'"'* 
In the opinion of former board member Kay Schomp, a divided 
school board, especially during the volatile mid- 1970s when the busing 
order took effect, impeded the school district's ability to train teachers 
to work in an integrated setting.lS9 James Daniels, formerly a princi- 
pal and now director of long-range planning for DPS, concurred, say- 
$10,000? And I said, well, hell, if you don't get the money. . . Who told you to go? And I said 
it's my responsibility to get the damn thing ready for the fall. 
Interview with Jim Ward, former principal Manual High School, in Denver (September 11, 
1984) [hereinafter Ward interview]. 
156. Toohey, Desegregation Panel Chosen to Aid Bwrd, Denver Post, Dec. 17, 1982, at 1B. 
157. The most recent monitoring group-who made the recommendation that we try to 
arrange the thing so that there would be a tri-ethnic situation in every school (that is, 
each school would reflect the district wide ethnicity, with blacks, Hispanics, Anglos 
and other groups all represented proportionately in each building). My God. Some- 
times you wonder [referring to the daunting administrative task of coordinating such a 
proposal]. 
I like those people. I've respected a lot of them. . . I mean, there is a limit. 
Schomp Interview, supra note 27. 
158. Gordon Greiner described the resistance to the panel: 
Two years ago, he [Judge Matsch] appointed this Compliance Assistance Panel. And 
he did that to help the district answer his concerns in eighteen different areas. You 
have these people that were appointed to the panel, were experts, that had a lot of good 
ideas and basically just got stonewalled. 
Greiner Interview, supra note 87. 
159. Branscombe, Denver Schools Not Desegregated, Court's Expert Says, Denver Post, May 
10, 1984, at 7A. 
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ing he saw resistance to teacher training programs.160 
The lack of in-service training was not the only barrier impeding 
implementation of the court order. Many teachers and administrators 
lacked a commitment to desegregation or to making the plan succeed. 
An administrator's passive or negative attitude to the plan would be 
easily conveyed to teachers and subordinate staff.I6' Also, many 
teachers had no experience with members of other cultural and racial 
groups, or social classes, and thus hadlittle empathy for the strains to 
which the children were subjected.162 Former board member Bernard 
Valdez offered a different view of the teaching situation: "We should 
have bused the teachers."163 
Whi1e.a series of interviews conducted by the authors reveals an 
overall feeling that busing has succeeded in reducing hostility among 
races and engendering a more equal distribution of teachers, facilities 
160. Schomp Interview, supra note 27. She added: ':There was never a sufficient time given 
to make it possible for the staff overall to really know how to handle the different kinds of 
children they were being exposed to at that time." 
161. "That should be something you do automatically. If there's a good positive environ- 
ment in schools, kids will learn." interview with James Daniels, Director of Long Range Plan- 
ning, Denver Public Schools, in Denver (Sept. 11, 1984) [hereinafter Daniels Interview]. 
162. Mrs. Lawrence Lewis, a member of the Mile High NAACP, concluded that a lack of in- 
service training was not the only implementation problem at work: 
[School stag were] not prepared in terms of personal commitment or personal feelings. 
There were enough people who wanted the court order to come about, but the imple- 
mentation of it had to be done by a lot of people who did ont have a commitment to it. 
And I think that was, you know, where the breakdown came. There was just not a real 
commitment to making the desegregation come about and succeed. 
I think if an administrator did not strongly support the portion of desegregation, a 
lackadaisical attitude was sufficient for a faculty with one or two races to prevent any- 
thing from really getting done in that school. If didn't take many of them, it just took 
someone who took the leadership who would direct others in the school and it wasn't 
always an up front kind of direction. It was just a dragging. Just nobody would do 
anything. And so nothing got done. And I think that's where the breakdown really 
came. The board, for several years, was pro-desegregation, and a lot of in-services were 
given, and there was a lot of resistance to them. So if in-services had been what was 
needed, I think they were given to the degree that if the attitude had been what it 
should have been, it could have been achieved. 
Interview with Mrs. Lawrence Lewis, member Mile High NAACP, in Denver (Sept. 1.5, 
1984). 
163. Ann Casey, a high school principal, said many teachers were unprepared for integrated 
classes in 1974: 
Well, many teachers were in elementary schools-well in all schools K through 12- 
had not ever had to deal with any ethnic group other than their own, and in this case 
I'm talking about the Anglo female teacher. . . and many of these teachers had few or 
no skills for coping with this kind of a cultural adjustment that these children were 
being forced to make. 
Interview with Ann Casey, High School Principal, in Denver (Sept. 12, 1984) [hereinafter 
Casey interview]. 
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and materials throughout the system, it is clear that trouble spots re- 
main. One hundred percent implementation, perhaps an impossible 
goal, still faces institutional hurdles, not the least of which has been 
the school board's less-than-enthusiastic reception to busing. 
Racially disproportionate discipline has been an ongoing prob- 
lem. According to Gordon Greiner, "Discipline is an issue that's hard 
to cope with, because you have minorities receiving a range from no 
discipline to lots of discipline. Neither extreme range is good. 9,164 
the fall semester of 1980, for example, 86 percent of the elementary 
students suspended were black or hispanic. The minority enrollment 
at that grade level was 57.6 percent.I6' In 1982, 39 percent of the 
students suspended were black, whereas whites, who outnumbered 
blacks, accounted for 25 percent of the  suspension^.'^^ 
In 1981, seven years after the remedy took effect, Harvey Swan, 
chairman of the five-member Community Education Council, blamed 
the high minority suspension rate on the failure of in-service teacher 
training programs.I6' PTSA head Carol Ruckel contended that the 
disproportionate number of minority disciplinary statistics stemmed 
from cultural differences between students and teachers. "When 
you're dealing with cultural differences-and we try to apply the same 
164. Valdez interview, supra note 22. Asked if he thought the suit had resulted in a more 
equitable distribution of quality teachers throughout the system, Valdez responded: 
You see, initially, using seniority as a right to get transferred, the best teachers moved 
to the schools where Anglo children were moved to. The worst teachers remained in 
the ghetto schools. . . So as a consequence there was no question in my mind that 
education was inferior in the lower socio-economic schools. Then when children were 
moved all over-for the first time to mix, to see some teachers who really were inter- 
ested in education-but I think as the years went on, the transfers began t o .  . . result in 
the same inequalities. 
Id. 
165. Greiner interview, supra note 87. 
166. Branscombe, Minority-Student Suspension Rate in Denver School System Criticized, 
Denver Post, Dec. 16, 1981, at 16A. 
167. DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS CIVIL RIGHTS 
SURVEY 159 (1982). James Esquibel, a DPS elementary school teacher, has conducted a consid- 
erable amount of research on minority suspensions. "In theory," he wrote in a study he pre- 
pared, "suspension is a risk that all students face on an equal basis; in practice I believe that 
suspension disproportionately impacts upon ethnic minority students. If my school is any indica- 
tion of other elementary schools in DPS, then minority students are more likely to be suspended 
simply due to disproportionate numbers of minorities being referred to the office." E~QUIBEL, 
SUSPENSIONS IN DENVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS~ YEAR STUDY 1976-79 3 (1980). 
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behavioral standard to them in school, which basically is an anglo 
standard, you're going to have-it is inevitable-that you're going to 
have more minority suspensions. ,3168 
In 1986, a study of DPS records indicated that 74 percent of the 
students suspended in the Spring of 1985 were black or hispanic, 
though the groups made up only 55 percent of the student population. 
Anglos, who represented 39 percent of the student population, ac- 
counted for only 24 percent of the students suspended. All but two of 
19 students expelled during the January to June 1985 period were 
black or h i ~ p a n i c . ' ~ ~  
The Denver results corroborate national findings. The district 
claimed that pupils were suspended because of an infraction of the 
rules rather than ethnicity.170 However, in April 1987, as part of the 
guidelines that redefine integration for the Denver Public Schools,, the 
- - 
168. Branscombe, Minority-Student Suspension Rate in Denver School System Criticized Den- 
ver Post, Dec. 16, 1981, at 16A. "All that in-service training didn't do anything," Swann said. 
"It was a sham." James Ward blamed the teachers, at least in part, for the high rate of minority 
disciplinary problems. "there are mean kids all around," he said. "Mean people. I think of the 
problems teachers have, they create for themselves." Ward Interview, supra note 155. 
169. Ruckel Interview, supra note 34. Former school board member Kay Schomp concedes 
the disproportionate number of minority suspensions is a moor worry for DPS. "I think it comes 
down to sufficient personnel sufficiently trained who will follow up on the cases or the reasons for 
these suspensions. At the secondary level, again I think there should be a place, an in-school 
suspension system that would not put a kid out on the street, or back in his home, where there's 
probably nobody there." Schomp interview, supra note 27. 
170. Bingham, Black, Hispanic students lead suspensions, Denver Post, Mar. 6, 1986, at 1A. 
According to the Denver Post the suspension and expulsion figures were: 
MIDDLE SCHOOLS 
1,07 1 Total Suspensions, 12 Expulsions 
% of student # of students 
Group population suspended % of total Expulsions 
Anglo 
Black 
Hispanic 
~ m i r i c a n  Indian 1 .O% 
Asian 3.5% 
HIGH SCHOOLS 
972 Total Suspensions, 7 Expulsions 
% of student # of students 
Group population suspended % of total - Expulsions 
Anglo 
Black 
His~anic  
~mkr i can  Indian , 0.7% 
Asian 3.6% 
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Board will monitor suspensions and expulsions to "ensure that disci- 
pline is administered without racial discrimination or bias."I7' The 
issue may be more complex than just racially suspect numbers. There 
have been complaints that a disproportionate number of minority ad- 
ministrators have been placed into disciplinary positions as opposed to 
decision-making places."* 
"Hardship transfer" abuses have continued to be a problem. In 
his June 3, 1985 decision, Judge Matsch pointed at the abuses in the 
hardship transfer program as an indicator that Denver did not have a 
unitary system.173 Such abuses have occurred because of the benign 
attitude, if not active connivance of the board. 
The lenient allowance of "hardship transfers" for parents who did 
not want their children sent to a particular school encouraged wide- 
spread evasion of the desegregation plan. Ruckel contends that the 
Board's anemic approach to implementing the remedy led to abuse of 
the hardship transfer procedure. Asked how one goes about getting a 
hardship transfer, she said: "I register my kid at the school I want and 
use a fake address. Or I use a friend's address or claim an aunt's ad- 
dress. That's done a great deal, and people are very open about it, the 
fact that they've done it. There's not monitoring [of hardship trans- 
fers] from downtown."174 
As a result of the June 1985 decision, the Board tightened its pol- 
icy for granting transfers initiated by parents for work-related reasons. 
In February 1986, the Board approved a majority-minority transfer 
plan that allows students to voluntarily transfer only if the transfer 
improves integration. A student may transfer out of any school where 
hisher ethnic or racial group is more than fifty percent of the enroll- 
ment to a school where his ethnic or racial group is less than fifty 
percent. 175 
171. Id. 
172. Bingham, Schools set rules to curb racism, Denver Post, Apr. 8, 1987 at B1, col. 5. 
173. Id. 
174. Keyes, 609 F. Supp: 1491, 1512-14 @. Colo. 1985). 
175. Ruckel Interview, supra note 34. 
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Integration of faculty throughout the school system has been an 
ongoing problem. In a brief filed in early 1985, in opposition to the 
Board's motion to end the lawsuit, the Congress of ~ i s ~ a n i c  Educa- 
tors summarized many of their concerns: predominantly one-race 
classrooms, the shortage throughout the school system of minority 
teachers, the uneven racial mix of teachers throughout the system, and 
the drop in the hiring rate for hispanic teachers, even in years when 
the overall hiring rate increased. "The school district has a duty to 
eliminate not only segregated schools, but also segregated classes 
within the 
Further, the brief claimed the program for the Gifted and Tal- 
ented was "staffed by a teaching force that is more than 80 percent 
white and serves a student population more than 67 percent white." 
"The exclusion of minority students from the gifted and talented pro- 
gram serves as sufficient grounds for concluding the practice of racial 
and ethnic isolation continue. ,9177 
The low percentage of minority teachers continues to be a con- 
cern. For instance, a November 28, 1984 Denver Post story reported 
that: "The percentage of black and Hispanic teachers in the Denver 
public schools continues to fall short of goals set by the district ten 
years ago when court-ordered busing began. The goals DPS set 
for itself in 1974-16 percent black teaching staff and 14 percent His- 
panic-were designed to reflect the percentage of minority students in 
the district at the time. Since then, minority enrollment has increased, 
while many anglo students have left the system. In 1984, the teaching 
staff was 13.9 percent black and 9.7 percent hispanic, far below the 
student percentages. With few exceptions, the percentage of minority 
faculty members at individual schools fell well below the percentage of 
minority students in DPS.'79 One-third of the administrative staff in 
176. Bingham, Pupils can switch schools ifmove aids integration, Denver Post, Feb. 21, 1986, 
at 1B. Keyes, 653 F. Supp. 1536, 1537 (D. Colo. 1987). 
177. Bingham, Brief Opposes Desegregation Plan Update, Denver Post, February 20, 1985, at 
2A. 
178. Id. 
179. Bingham, DPS Short of Minority Hiring Goals, Denver Post, November 23, 1984, at 1 .  
Minority teachers are especially scarce at the middle- and senior-high school levels, according to 
DPS faculty statistics from the 1982-83 school year. Consider the minority teaching percentages 
at Denver's high schools, for instance. 
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1984 was minority.laO 
In the decision of June 1985, the court found that one of the rea- 
sons the DPS had not complied with the 1974 desegregation order was 
that minority teachers were not evenly distributed throughout the dis- 
trict.lal The District applied a new formula which combined all eth- 
nic minorities rather than separate counts for blacks and hispanics. 
The older formula meant that some schools with large hispanic popu- 
lations had proportionally too many hispanic teachers.la2 The plain- 
tiffs alleged in briefs, filed late in 1986, that overrepresentation of 
anglo teachers in formerly anglo schools continues and is attributable 
to the timing of annual reassignments which is done in the late spring 
rather than in the fall.lS3 However, in the Fall of 1986, five weeks into 
the school year, fourteen teachers in eleven Denver schools were reas- 
signed because DPS made an error in calculation and was uncertain 
how the formula applied to the affected schools which had hispanic 
faculty teaching in the bilingual program.la4 
School % Anglo Teachers % Hispanic Teachers % Black Teachers 
West 87.39 7.21 4.50 
Kennedy 93.02 1.16 5.81 
Lincoln 87.96 5.56 6.48 
South 86.25 5.0 7.50 
North 84.86 7.17 7.97 
Jefferson 86.46 4.17 8.33 
East 85.78 3.45 9.05 
Washington 83.59 5.13 10.26 
Manual 67.83 8.39 20.98 
Montbello 64.88 8.68 25.62 
~ e n " e r  Public Schools, Faculty Data 12 (April 16, 1984). 
180. However, the percentage of minority teachers in DPS is three times the average of the 
Denver metropolitan area, and the district has met or surpassed goals for hiring minorities in 
nearly all other job classifications, including administration. Id. 
181. DPS claimed a shortage ofi minority teaching applicants, particularly in areas such as 
special-education and math-science. Despite a sixteen percent decline in the total number of 
DPS teachers from 1980 until 1984, the number of minority teachers increased slightly. Id. 
182. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1508-12. 
183. The formula is complex. Beginning with the 1985-86 school year to the extent practical, 
the percentage of minority teachers shall be within one-third of the applicable elementary, middle 
or high school percentages. Keyes, 653 F. Supp. at 1538. This means that the percentage of 
minorities teaching in elementary schools (grades one through six) at any one school must not 
deviate from the twenty-seven percent district wide minority percentage by more than a third. 
Thus a range of about eighteen percent to thirty-six percent of minority teachers would be appro- 
priate. Allowances are made for schools with bilingual education purposes. Bingham, 14 DPS 
teachers shuffled to improve racial balances, Denver Post, Sept. 247, 1986, at 1A. 
184. Keyes, 653 F. Supp. at 1538-39. 
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Another barrier to successful implementation of the court order 
has been the continued existence of predominantly one-race class- 
rooms, which is largely the result of academic grouping. Although 
statistics on this sensitive issue are difficult to find, predominantly one- 
race classrooms remain even after schools are integrated, according to 
- 
reports from parents, attorneys and  administrator^.'^' According to 
DPS statistics, during 1985-86 anglos were four times more likely than 
blacks or hispanics to be admitted into accelerated or advanced place- 
ment classes which give intensive preparation for college. Forty per- 
cent of anglos were in such programs whereas only 11.5 percent of all 
blacks and 9.7 percent of hispanics were enr01led.l~~ The "Challenge" 
programs for gifted and talented children tell the same story. At the 
elementary level, anglos comprised 37 percent of the student body, but 
55 percent of the Challenge classes. Blacks and hispanos comprised 58 
percent of the student population, but only 40 percent of the Challenge 
classes. In the high schools the disparity was greater; anglos coin- 
prised 41 percent of the high school population, but 70 percent of the 
Challenge classes. Blacks and hispanos, which made up 54 percent of 
the student population, comprised but 24 percent of the Challenge 
cla~ses.'~' This is slightly better than the 1981-82 figures.lg8 
The figures for special education programs are particularly dis- 
tressing because the consequences are usually final; once a student is 
185. Bingham, 14 DPS teachers shufled to improve racial balances, Denver Post, Sept. 27, 
1986, at 1A. As usual the board rationalized its error by blaming the court. Judy Morton, 
board president, said "I would say we made an error. We regret that it happened, but because 
it's a big issue in the court case, we have to make the changes." Id. The disruption of such a mid 
term change is not insubstantial. One wonders why DPS did not petition the court for a waiver. 
186. Asked about this quandary, which seemingly creates two systems within DPS, one An- 
glo and the other minority, Kay Schomp responded: 
Does it fly in the face of the court order? Yes it does. And I think that one of the 
things that people expect to have happen is that as soon as the integration order goes in, 
they expect the immediate result to be total integration. And you know you have to 
have something like that in place from the time a child enters school, and even then it's 
a shaky proposition. 
Schomp Interview, supra note 27. 
187. Bingham, Anglos dominate college prep, Denver Post, March 15, 1986, at B1, col. 2. 
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placed in special education, he rarely returns to the regular track.Is9 
The results have been especially harmful to minorities. According to 
studies released in March, 1986 blacks were enrolled at a higher rate 
than other ethnic groups in programs for students with emotional and 
learning disabilities. Hispanos, on the other hand, were enrolled at a 
lower rate than their student population in special education programs 
for the emotionally disturbed. Blacks, who represented 22 percent of 
the total student population, comprised 39 percent of the students in 
the limited learning capacity (SLIC) program. They represented 30 
percent of the children in a program for learning disabled and 36 per- 
cent in the program for emotionally disturbed or behavior disordered 
children. I9O 
Because of the disproportionate number of minority children 
placed in these programs, the DPS has retained independent auditors 
to examine how children were identified and tested for the programs, 
whether their parents were fully informed, what impact the program 
has had upon the students, and why so few students ever return to the 
main track once they have been placed in a special ed program.l9' 
In January, 1987, the outside auditors suggested that DPS should 
revaluate three thousand black and hispanic students to determine if 
they were improperly assigned to special ed programs. They also re- 
ported that the Denver Schools excessively relied on a culturally bi- 
Group 
No. of Students% in 
Total in Advanced Advanced 
students' Classes Classes 
Anglo 6,714 
Black 3,924 
Hispanic 4,825 
American Indian 129 
Asian 684 
Total 
188. Id. 
189. In 1982, whites, who accounted for thirty-nine percent of the district's enrollment, com- 
prised sixty-eight percent of the GiftedITalented program's enrollment. By contrast, blacks 
(twenty-three percent of DPS' students) only made up twelve percent of the gifted and talented 
program there; Hispanics, thirty-four percent district wide, were fifteen percent of the program. 
DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS CIVIL RIGHTS SURVEY 
159 (1982). 
190. Gallagher, The Special Education Contract for Mildly Handicapped Children, 38 J .  EX- 
CEPTIONAL CHILDREN 527, 529 (1972). 
191. Bingham, Black Profie in Special Ed High, Denver Post, Mar. 20, 1986, at 1B 
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ased I.Q. test,lg2 which resulted in minorities' significant 
overrepresentation in special education programs. Some students had 
been mislabelled and assigned to classes improperly. The auditors 
urged Denver school officials to cease use of the test. Thy also pointed 
out that children were not tested in their native languages and may 
have been assigned to programs because of language difficulties, and 
that once labelled and placed in special ed programs, the children 
never returned to main track because the school system lacked suffi- 
cient guidelines to determine when students were ready to return to 
the regular program.lg3 
As a result of the report, DPS agreed to review five thousand 
student files to make certain that children were correctly placed. In 
addition, the board agreed to revise testing procedures, relying less on 
I.Q. tests, to retest students who needed or whose parents requested 
testing, to better inform and involve parents of children who are con- 
sidered for the special programs, to attempt to keep children in the 
regular classroom as much as possible, and to set up a system of sup- 
port so that students can leave the special education programs and 
return to regular instruction. lg4 
Intra-school segregation may be a second or third generation 
problem,lg5 yet does little to diminish the impact of segregation if the 
only time students of different races interact is on the playground or in 
STUDENTS IN PROGRAMS 
Number of American 
Program students Anglo Black Hispanic Indian Asian 
- -
Limited learning 
capacity (SLIC) 595 22.5% 39.2% 36.3% 1 % 1 % 
Learning disabled 
(IPCD) 2,476 30.3% 30.3% 37.2% 1.4% 0.8% 
Emotionally 
disturbed (TIC) 797 37.7% 36 % 24.6% 0.9% 0.8% 
Total students in 
district: 58,614 37.7% 22.4% 35.1% 1.2% 3.6% 
192. Bingham, High rate of minority students in special ed to be investigated, Denver Post, 
Nov. 4, 1986 at  B2, col. 3. 
193. The test used was the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised. Bingham, IQ 
test laced with cultural bias, educators soy, Denver Post, Jan. 22, 1987, at 8A. IQ tests have been 
successfully judicially challenged. See Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979) 
modified 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984). 
194. Bingham, School auditors: Retest minorities in Special ed, Denver Post, Jan. 22, 1987, at 
1A. 
195. Bingham, Denver to review studenrs'files, Denver Post, Mar. 3, 1987 at B1, col. 1. 
Heinonline 32 Howard L.J. 674 1989 
19891 ENDLESS JOURNEY 675 
the l ~ n c h r o o m . ' ~ ~  Unfortunately, there are some wrongs even of con- 
stitutional magnitude that courts cannot hope to remedy; school inte- 
gration may be one. Intra-school segregation hampers the spirit, if not 
the effect, of the integration effort. Still more distinct from the imple- 
mentation efforts is the relationship of housing patterns to school 
segregation. 
HOUSING AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
The placement and racial composition of publicly subsidized 
housing has a direct effect on school desegregation. In the Depver 
metropolitan area, whites living in subsidized housing tend to be in the 
suburbs and blacks within the city limits. The housing projects them- 
selves tend to be overwhelmingly of one race. 
The fragile relationship between housing and school desegrega- 
tion can be seen in the attempts to integrate the Barrett, Mitchell and 
Harrington elementary schools which have proven a road block to 
ending the lawsuit. In 1985-86, only ten more anglo children were 
needed to integrate Barrett and Harrington elementary schools to 
comply with court integration guidelines. Mitchell required 26 more 
anglo children.19' However, segregated public housing was a key fac- 
tor in contributing to continuing school segregation. For instance, at 
Mitchell, where 86 percent of the student body is minority, 55 percent 
of neighborhood housing is public, and 99 percent of public housing 
residents are minority. 19* 
196. See D. KIRP AND M. YUWF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 521-563 (2d ed. 
1982). 
197. James Ward, principal of Manual High School when the court order took effect, said the 
remedy has enhanced opportunities for minority students. While students of different races don't 
necessarily mix regularly with one another, students of all races have more to look forward to 
educationally now than they did in the days before the lawsuit. He recalled a tour he once gave 
to a person who was observing the Denver Schools. Upon visiting Manual's cafeteria, the ob- 
server commented that the black and white students sat separately, seemingly in two different 
schools. To which Ward replied, "What's wrong with that? Tell me what's wrong. We have to 
be responsible for certain elements of social relationships between kids, but we can't demand 
that. You have a right-and this is what a Democratic Society says-you have a right to go, if 
you want to sit at that table, you have a right to go sit at that table." Ward Interview, note 155. 
198. Bingham, Just 36 more Anglos would meet court's desegregation guidelines, Denver Post, 
Nov. 27, 1985, at -. For a Denver school to be considered integrated court guidelines require 
the percentage of Anglos to be within fifteen percent of the percentage of Anglos in elementary 
schools in DPS in 1985-86. The percentage of Anglos was approximately thirty-seven percent. 
Thus, the percentage of Anglos in Denver elementary schools should have been between twenty- 
two and fifty-two percent. 
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Not all public housing is of the large project variety. Denver pub- 
lic housing programs include dispersed housing, scattered throughout 
an area, and rent subsidy programs. Even in these programs, 77 to 90 
percent of the participants are rnir~ority. '~~ 
Even where a plan is developed to end racial imbalance such as 
the creation of a magnet school at Barrett, success in reducing the 
imbalance may be threatened by new public housing. The Key Point 
housing development, consisting of townhouses and apartments, is 
planned on a site next to the Barrett elementary school. If that devel- 
opment i's not integrated, it wili be that much more difficult to inte- 
grate the school withqut more busing.200 
The housing picture may not be ,totally bleak. Urban demo- 
graphic patterns change over time. In many cities, including Denver, 
younger professional people are moving into the city and renovating 
older housing stock. If they send their children to public schools, the 
Denver school system, which is a good system in 'comparison with 
other large cities, may be able to reverse the decrease in anglo enroll- 
ment. Until such time, however, the success of a permanently inte- 
grated school system is problematic. 
IV. TOWARD A UNITARY SCHOOL SYSTEM . 
(1983 TO THE PRESENT) 
Four elusive and intractable questions have bedeviled the court 
and the to this lawsuit. The first two: How did the policy of 
containing blacks in northeast Denver affect the DPS as a whole, and 
what was required to remove these effects, flowed throughout the law- 
In the late 1970s, as the demographics of the city changed and 
earlier racial balancing in the schools became more difficult to main- 
tain, a third question arose: What must be done to protect against 
future resegregation and a return to a dual system of white and minor- 
ity schools? Then, as the lawsuit reached its 15th year, the Board 
raised a fourth question: How and when would the court conclude the 
DPS was a unitary system? 
199. Bingharn, Public housing a key factor in school segregation, Denver Post, Jan. 19, 1986, 
at 3B. 
200. Id. 
201. Bingham, Housing plans raise desegregation worry, Denver Post, June 21, 1986, at C2, 
col. 5. 
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LEGAL CRITERIA FOR A UNITARY SYSTEM 
In 1982 Judge Matsch defined a unitary system: 
A unitary school system is one in which all of the students have 
equal access to the opportunity for education, with the publicly pro- 
vided educational resources distributed equitably, and with the ex- 
pectation that all students can acquire a community defined level of 
knowledge and skills consistent with their individual efforts and 
abilities. It provides a chance to develop fully each individual's po- 
tentials, without being restricted by an identification with any racial 
or ethnic 
In concluding whether a school system is unitary, district courts must 
keep in mind the uniqueness of each district, the efforts of public 
school officials, and whether the end of the lawsuit will lead to future 
resegregation and a return to a dual system. 
The Supreme Court has not provided specific guidance as to when 
a racially unbalanced school system should be considered unitary, 
when a district court should return control to school authorities, or 
the manner in which a school desegregation case should be closed.203 
The court made clear in Brown 11204 that its function was to offer 
general guidance on broad principles of constitutional law, but it was 
the responsibility of district courts to apply those principles to the case 
at hand. Unfortunately, the cases at hand usually arrived at the 
Supreme Court. Instead of specific guidelines, the Court has offered a 
number of maxims, which like most generalities, are subject to excep- 
tion and ad hoc construction. Of course, this is an old tradition of 
equity jurisprudence.205 
In school desegregation cases, the Supreme Court has told us that 
the scope of the remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of 
the constitutional violation, that the decree must be remedial in na- 
ture, and that courts must consider the interests of local authorities in 
managing their own affairs, so long as such management is consistent 
with the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ~ ~ ~  District courts must make "every effort to 
achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking 
202. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1499 (D.C. Colo. 1985). 
203. Keyes, 504 F. Supp. 399, 403-404 (D.C. Colo. 1982). 
204. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 15 16. 
205. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
206. See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY, JURISPRUDENCE 4 363 (5th ed. 1941); POUND, "THE MAX- 
IMS OF EQUITY," 34 HARV. L. REV. 809 (1921). 
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into account the practicables of the situation. "207 School authorities 
are clearly charged with the "affirmative duty to take whatever steps 
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial dis- 
crimination would be eliminated root and branch. "208 If school au- 
thorities fail in their affirmative obligations under these holdings, 
judicial authority may be invoked and that equitable power is 
broad.20g ''[Not] every school in every community must always reflect 
the racial composition of the school system as a whole. . ."210 "The 
adequacy of any desegregation plan is measured not by its intentions 
but by its effecti~eness."~" The Constitution does not compel the con- 
stant application of racial ratios for every school in the district.212 
District courts have grappled with these aphorisms and at- 
tempted to concretize what boards should do and when courts can 
dismiss these proceedings. Green v. County School Board offered sev- 
eral criteria to measure whether a district had become a racially non- 
discriminatory school system: the composition of the student body, 
faculty, staff, the school transportation system, the physical condition 
of the school system and extracurricular activities.213 
Determining whether such a system has become unitary involves 
more than counting black, anglo and hispano faces in the classroom. 
In 1982 Judge Matsch, admitting the difficulty of the task and how 
inappropriate the adversary system was for such evaluation, appointed 
a panel of experts to assist in such judgments.214 
In December, 1983, the school board changed its strategy. In- 
stead of delaying and then grudgingly complying with the court's or- 
ders, the Board voted unanimously to seek a court declaration that the 
school system was unitary and desegregated, and that it be released 
from court control. The origins of the Board's action, and its surpris- 
ing unanimity, lay in litigation weariness-the suit was nearly fifteen 
207. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977). 
208. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). 
209. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). 
210. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
211. Id. at 24. 
212. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 539 (1979). 
213. Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
214. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 435-37 (1968). 
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years old-and in a belief that the times, or at least the legal context of 
desegregation remedies, had changed, Board President Bradford 
stated that the motion could be "a common ground for the B~ard ."~"  
It reflected a "war weariness" by the Board and the realization that a 
series of interim busing measures had done little to decrease segrega- 
tion in the schools, or to stem the decline in anglo school population. 
The request for a return of DPS to local control was also a reflection 
of Reagan Administration policies toward forced busing and integra- 
tion. The settlement of a prolonged desegregation lawsuit in 
Pasadena, Ca l i f~rn ia ,~ '~  and a desegregation agreement between the 
Bakersfield, California school system and the United States Depart- 
ment of Justice, lifted the Board's  expectation^.^" Two weeks after its 
resolution to seek court discharge, the optimism of the Board was 
dampened by, the decision on bilingual education which, among other 
things, did not separate the language issues from the desegregation 
ones.218 
The Board filed a formal motion on January 19, 1984 for entry of 
three orders: 1) a declaration that the DPS was a unitary system with 
respect to faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, facil- 
ities and composition of student body; 2) a modification and dissolu- 
tion of the injunction relating to the assignment of students to schools; 
and 3) a declaration that the remedy previously ordered in the case to 
correct the constitutional violation had been implemented and that 
there was no need for continuing court jurisdicti~n.~'~ In its request 
for an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the District stated it would 
show its compliance with the six criteria for a unitary system of 
Green 220 and the working defidtion in the court's Memorandum and 
Opinion dated May 12, 1982. 
In support of the motion, Board attorney Michael Jackson stated 
- - -- - - 
2 15. Keyes, 540 F. Supp. 399, 404 (D.C. Colo. 1982). 
216. Branscombe, Move to End Court Hold on Schools Blasted, Denver Post, Dec. 17, 1983, 
at 1 .  
217. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Ed., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979). 
218. Voluntary Desegregation ofSchools Divides Bakersfeld, California, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 
1984, at I, 28 col. 1; U.S. Shifts Tactics on Desegregation ofLower Schools-N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 
1984, at I, 1 col. 1 .  The Bakersfield program used meet schools. The Pasadena School system 
also ended court oversight despite continued difficulty in reaching racial guidelines At this time, 
the Denver Board added out-of-town counsel who had been successful in settling the Pasadena 
litigation. 
219. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1521-22 (D. Colo. 1983). 
220. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1492-93 (D.C. Colo. 1985). 
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that the school district was firmly committed to the maintenance of a 
non-discriminatory educational program. He pointed out the 1976 
Pasadena decision, in which the court ruled that a pupil assignment 
order could be dissolved, even though there may have been other is- 
sues regarding the unitary character of the school district which had 
not been resolved.221 Plaintiffs' counsel Gordon Greiner objected. He 
said that it had been two years since the court, with obvious reluc- 
tance, put in place the present pupil assignment plan: 
Obviously, the Court did not sign off on the plans passing constitu- 
tional muster. Nothing has changed. The plan was flawed then. It 
is still flawed. There were fifteen schools that didn't meet racial 
balance projection that fall. I think for the board to come in here, 
knowing these circumstances, and ask for an evidentiary hearing is 
nothing but a waste of time.222 
Greiner introduced evidence showing that the fifteen schools were 
more racially unbalanced in 1982 than previously projected, and that 
they were still more unbalanced in 1983.223 The court summarily de- 
nied the Board's motion to separate the bilingual issues from the de- 
segregation ones. 
On February 8, 1984, the Board received a boost when the De- 
partment of Justice moved to intervene as amicus curiae. This was the 
first time that the Justice Department had intervened in a private, i.e., 
citizen filed, desegregation case. The Department said it would inter- 
vene in cases in which court-ordered busing was in effect only upon 
the school board's request. ~owevber, the Denver Board never for- 
mally requested the Department to intervene, nor voted to do so! The 
Board president, Naomi Bradford, on her own initiative, requested 
Justice Department intervention.224 The Justice Department decided 
to intervene after the Board unanimously resolved to ask Matsch to 
declare the system unitary. The Court permitted intervention. 
221. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 435-37 (1968). 
222. The January hearing is reported in: Branscombe, Hearing Set on Halting Busing Order, 
Denver Post, Jan. 21, 1984, at 1 .  
223. Id. 
224. Under the Court's guidelines, schools were out of balance if Anglo students did not 
comprise between twenty-four and fifty-four percent of the student body. 
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The position of the School Board was: 
Once a school district has complied with a constitutionally accepta- 
ble court-ordered remedy that is designed to desegregate the system 
in the full sense, and has maintained substantial compliance with 
that remedy for a sustained period of time, the school district is 
entitled to be declared unitary unless there have been intervening 
acts of di~crimination.'~~ 
The Department of Justice concurred. 
The prime thesis of this argument was that the 1974 Final Judg- 
ment and Decree, as modified in 1976, was a complete remedy for all 
of the constitutional violations found in the case and adequate to de- 
segregate the school district. If the Board has implemented this plan 
and refrained from unconstitutional segregative acts, "pupil assign- 
ment unitariness will have been demonstrated and the District Court 
must end its supervision of pupil assignments." As each of the criteria 
for a unitary system was fulfilled, the defendants theorized, that that 
aspect could be removed from court supervision. One major issue, bi- 
lingual, bicultural education, stood clearly in the way of the defend- 
ant's theory. 
In the United States Supreme Court Decision involving Keyes, 
the Court in 1973 had ordered.tria1 of the factual question of whether 
the Denver School Board's policy of deliberate segregation in the Park 
Hill schools constituted the entire school system as a dual system.226 
It formally recognized that hispanics suffered many of the same eco- 
nomic and cultural deprivations as blacks, and that petitioners were 
entitled to have schools with a combined predominance of Blacks and 
Hispanos included in the category of segregated s~hoo1s.''~ 
Upon remand to the District Court, the Congress of Hispanic Ed- 
ucators (CHE) and 13 Mexican American parents, represented by the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), 
filed a motion to intervene which was granted by Judge Doyle on Jan- 
225. Branscornbe, Matsch Allows Intervention, Denver post, Feb. 10, 1984, at 1A. 
226. Keyes, 609 F .  Supp. 1491, 1498 (C.D. Colo. 1985). 
227. Keyes, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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uary 11, 1974.228 The intervenors wanted: 1) equitable treatment in 
any desegregation plan; b) employment discrimination remedied; and 
c) the desegregation order to protect and enhance bilingual 
programs.229 
The special interests and needs of Hispanic children had been ad- 
dressed in 1974 in a part of the Finger Plan. This section of the Finger 
Plan had been developed by Dr. Jose Cardenas, an expert witness of 
the plaintiffs. The Cardenas Proposal was "premised on the theory 
228. Id. at 197-198. 
229. The intervenors brought their claims as a class action under Rule 23@)(I) and (3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 
U.S.C. 5 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the 
class would create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of 
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party oppos- 
ing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as 
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or correspond- 
ing declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of 
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of 
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties 
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: ". . . . [No state may] deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
42 U.S.C.A. 1983 (West 1985 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Temtory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti- 
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Con- 
gress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a 
statute of the District of Columbia. 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 601,42 U.S.C.A. 4 2000d (West 1985) provides: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
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that the poor performance of minority children in public schools re- 
sulted from 'incompatibilities' between the cultural and developmental 
characteristics of minority children on the one hand, and the methods 
of expectations of school system on the other."230 Because most 
school systems were operated to meet the needs of middle class anglo 
children, schools inevitably failed to meet the differing needs of poor 
minority 
The Cardenas Plan, therefore, required an overhaul of the school 
system's entire approach to educating minorities. Its proposals ex- 
tended to matters of educational philosophy, governance, instructional 
scope and sequence, curriculum, student evaluation staffing, non-in- 
structional service and community involvement. It also included a 
mechanism for comprehensive monitoring of the program's pro- 
g r e ~ s . ' ~ ~  The Cardenas proposals touched all aspects of curriculum 
planning, methodology, and philosophy that normally was the respon- 
sibility of local school a~thorit ies. '~~ 
The plaintiffs contended that inclusion of the Cardenas Plan in 
the court's order was justified on either of two grounds. First, the plan 
was necessary to achieve meaningful desegregation in the schools. The 
separation of races alone was not enough. School authorities also had 
to establish a receptive scholastic environment for minority students in 
order to eradicate the very evil at which Brown and subsequent. cases 
were directed; that is, isolation of minority students in an essentially 
alien school system.234 The second justification for the Cardenas Plan 
corrected the~oard 's  failure to provide an equal educational opportu- 
nity for minority children. The plaintiffs argued that this failure, 
which the district court had found in an earlier phase of the case,235 
was a separate violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to which the 
Cardenas Plan was reasonably directed. 
230. Roos, Implementation ofthe Fedeml Bilingual Education Mandate: The Keyes Case as 
a Paradigm, p. 3, unpublished paper on file, the Institute of Judicial Administration, Inc. [herein- 
after cited as Roos]. 
231. Keyes, 521 F.2d 465, 480 (10th Cir. 1975). See supm at p. 15. 
232. Id. 
233. Because the school system itself "lacked[ed] accountability," continuing evaluation 
would be conducted by ten "Equal Educational Opportunity Committees," each composed in 
part of persons from outside the school system, if necessary, according to the plan. Id. 
234. Id. at 480-81. "The plan suggested specific courses in the curriculum, adoption and 
publication of specific educational principles, provision of early childhood education commenc- 
ing at age three and adult education for minorities." 
235. Id. at 481. 
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The circuit court felt that the lower court's adoption of the Car- 
denas Plan overstepped the limits of its remedial powers.236 The dis- 
trict court had made no finding on remand from the Supreme Court 
that either the school district's curricular offerings, or its method of 
- 
educating minority students constituted illegal segregative conduct. 
The district court did conclude that since "many elementary school 
Chicano children are expected . . . to acquire normal basic learning 
skills which are taught through the medium of an unfamiliar lan- 
guage," a meaningful desegregation plan must provide for the transi- 
tion of Spanish-speaking children to the English language.237 
Offering a lesson in judicial restraint, the circuit court vacated the 
lower court's acceptance of the Cardenas Plan, because it went beyond 
merely removing obstacles to effective desegregation and helping his- 
panic children to reach the proficiency in English necessary to learn 
other basic subjects: 
Instead of merely naming obstacles to effective desegregation, the 
court's order would impose upon school authorities a pervasive and 
detailed system for the education of minority children. We believe 
this goes too far. 
Other considerations led us to the same conclusion. Direct local 
control over decisions vitally affecting the education of children 'has 
long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community 
concern and support for public schools and to the quality of the 
educational process' . . . Local control permits citizen participation 
in the formulation of school policy and encourages innovation to 
meet particular local needs.238 
The court concluded that the District Court's adoption of the 
Cardenas Plan would "unjustifiably interfere" with state and local at- 
tempts to deal with the problem of educating minority 
The implication of plaintiffs' arguments in support of the Cardenas 
Plan, the court concluded, was that minority students were entitled 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to an educational experience tai- 
lored to their unique cultural and developmental needs. "Although 
236. Id. at n.17. 
237. Id. at 483. 
238. Keyes, 380 F. Supp. at 695. 
239. Keyes, 521 F.2d at 482. The court cited 1973 COLO. REV. STAT. 5 22-1-103 in which 
Colorado policy is to encourage local school districts to develop bilingual skills and to assist in 
the transition of non English speaking children to English. 
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enlightened theory may well demand as much, the Constitution does 
not,"240 concluded the court. It remanded the bilingual issue for a 
determination of the relief, if any, necessary to insure that hispanics 
and other minority children would have the opportunity to acquire 
proficiency in the English language. 
The circuit court decision meant that if a hispanic community 
wished to piggyback a language order into a desegregation ruling, it 
had to establish that English language deficiencies were a product of 
unlawful segregative acts. Also, entire schools could not be main- 
tained as segregated in the name of bilingual education while the 
school system is under court order to desegregate. However, the deci- 
sion did allow some degree of clustering to maintain administratively 
viable language programs.241 
For nearly four years efforts to negotiate a resolution of the Eng- 
lish language proficiency issues were unsuccessful.242 The intervenors 
had little leverage, and the school district little interest in reaching a 
settlement.243 On November 3, 1980, the plaintiff intervenors filed a 
supplemental complaint in intervention adding a claim under a provi- 
sion of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA) and 
the Colorado English Language Proficiency Act (CELPA).244 
The EEOA was a political reaction by the United States Congress 
to the use of busing as a means for mitigating the effects of segregation 
from the operation of a dual school system. Section 1701 of EEOA 
includes a specific statement of support for neighborhood schools.245 
- -- - - 
240. Id. at 482-83. 
241. Id. at 482. 
242. Roos, supra note 309, at 6-7. 
243. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (D. Colo. 1983). This is the key decision involving the 
resolution of the bilingual issues. 
244. Roos, supra note 230, at 7. 
245. Equal Education Opportunities Acts of 1974, 4 202, 20 U.S.C. 44 1701 et (1978). 
Although the supplemental complaint indicated that the parties were the same as in the original 
complaint, the statement of the claims expanded the group of intervenors to "those students who 
are limited-English proficient" without regard to native language. The supplemental complaint 
contained no class action allegations. The School Board never responded to either the original 
complaint or the supplemental complaint. It was only on April 26, 1982 that the school district 
challenged the class certification. Judge Matsch supported the class certification. Keyes, 576 F. 
Supp. at 1506-08. 
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The act also attempts to establish more uniform guidelines than had 
been provided for by the Courts for dismantling dual school sys- 
t e m ~ . ~ ~ ~  Section 1703(f) makes it unlawful for a state to deny equal 
educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, 
color, sex, or national origin by: 
(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action 
to overcome language bamers that impede equal participation by its 
students in its instructional programs.247 
This was the gravamen of the plaintiff-intervenor's claim. EEOA 
and the Bilingual Education Act were enacted as 1974 amendments to 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, yet Congress in 
describing the remedial obligation it sought to impose on the states, 
did not specify that a state had to provide a program of "bilingual 
education" to all limited English speaking students. Congress's use of 
the less specific term, "appropriate action," rather than "bilingual ed- 
ucation," has been interpreted to indicate ". . . that Congress intended 
to leave state and local educational authorities a substantial amount of 
latitude in choosing the programs and techniques they would use to 
meet their obligations under EEOA."248 
In determining whether a school system is using appropriate and 
good faith remediation efforts, courts have utilized a three part analy- 
- 
246. Section 1701 states: 
8 1701. Congressional declaration of policy 
(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States that- 
(1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational 
opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and. 
(2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school 
assignments. 
(b) In order to carry out this policy, it is the purpose of this subchapter to specify 
appropriate remedies for the orderly removal of the vestiges of the dual school system. 
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 202, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West 1978). 
247. Section 1702(a). The Congress finds that- 
(6) the guidelines provided by the courts for fashioning remedies to disman- 
tle dual school systems have been, as the Supreme Court of the United States has 
said, "incomplete and imperfect," and have not established, a clear, rational, and 
uniform standard for determining the extent to which a local educational agency is 
required to reassign and transport its students in order to eliminate the vestiges of 
a dual school system. 
b) For the foregoing reasons, it is necessary and proper for the Congress, pursu- 
ant to the powers granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, specify appro- 
priate remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of dual school systems, except that 
the provisions of this chapter are not intended to modify or diminish the authority of 
the courts of the United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States. 
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 203, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1702 (West 1978). 
248. 20 U.S.C.A. 1703 (West 1978). 
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sis: (1) is the school district pursuing a program based upon an educa- 
tional theory recognized as sound or at least as a legitimate 
experimental strategy by some of the experts in the field; (2) is the 
program reasonably calculated to implement that theory; and (3) after 
being used for sufficient time to be a legitimate trial, has the program 
. produced satisfactory results?249 
The CELPA is essentially a funding statute, but it does establish 
an affirmative duty: (a) to identify students whose dominant language 
may not be English; (b) to assess such students to determine if their 
dominant language is not English; (c) to certify to the State Education 
Department those students whose dominant language is not English; 
and (d) to administer and provide programs for such students.250 Col- 
orado has not directed the use of any particular type of language 
program. 
The statute's classification system is based upon that developed 
by the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) as 
part of its Lau guidelines with HEW drafted as administrative recom- 
mendations following the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Lau v. Nicho l~ .~~ '  The Colorado statute tracks the Lau categories, and 
the Denver School District uses these  classification^.^^^ State funding 
for bilingual bicultural education is computed pursuant to a statutory 
formula which sets limits on the funding allowed for limited-English 
speaking children.253 
249. Castenada v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit in Cas- 
tenada concluded that by granting limited English speaking students a private right of action to 
enforce the obligations to address the problems of language barriers in the EEOA, Congress must 
have intended that schools make a genuine effort, consistent with local circumstances and re- 
sources to remedy the language difficulties. 
250. United States v. State of Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 371 (5th Cir. 1982). 
251. COLO. REV. STAT. g 22-24-105 (Cum. Supp. 1982). 
252. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 151 1. 
253. COLO. REV. STAT. 22-24-103(4) (Gu. Supp. 1982). Section 22-24-103(4) of the Colo- 
rado statute provides for the classification of children as follows: 
'Student whose dominant language is not English' means a public school student whose 
academic achievement and English language proficiency are determined by his local 
school district, using instruments and tests approved by the department, to be impaired 
because of his inability to comprehend or speak English adequately due to the influence 
of a language other than English and who is one or more of the following: 
(a) A student who speaks a language other than English and does not comprehend or 
speak English; or 
(b) A student who comprehends or speaks some English, but whose predominant 
comprehension of speech is in a language other than English; or 
(c) A student who comprehends and speaks English and one or more other languages 
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At the time of trial in April 1982, the Denver school district used 
a survey which identified 3,322 children as limited-English speaking. 
Of that total, 2,429 were Lau categories A and B, and 893 were Lau 
category C.254 Although forty-two languages were represented among 
the district's limited-English proficiency children in 1981-82, the ma- 
jority fell into two language groups, Spanish and one of four In- 
dochinese languages.255 
The Denver school system elected to use what is called a "transi- 
tional bilingual approach": 
The intent of bilingual education is to facilitate the integration of 
the child into the regular school curriculum. English is not sacri- 
ficed, in fact it is emphasized; the nature language is used as a me- 
dium of instruction to ensure academic success in content areas 
such as math, social studies, etc., while the child at the same time is 
acquiring proficiency of the English language.256 
and whose dominant language is difficult to determine, if the student's English language 
development and comprehension is: 
(I) At or below the district mean or below the mean or equivalent on a nationally 
standardized test; or 
(11) Below the acceptable proficiency level on an English language proficiency 
test developed by the department. 
254. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 1515. Allocated funds on a per student basis maximum amount 
was $400 per year in 1983 for a Lau A or B child, and $200 for a Lau C child. CELPA prohibits 
the funding of a student's educational program for longer than two years. COLA. HEV. STAT. 22- 
24-10ry3) (Cum. Supp. 1982). 
255. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 1151. At the elementary level (Grades K-6), 1,639 students were 
identified as Lau A and B and 637 as Lau C. In the secondary grades (7-12), there were 790 Lau 
A and B students and 256 Can C. During the 1981-1982 school year, the school district operated 
117 schools-eighty-eight elementary, nineteen junior high, and ten senior high schools-with a 
total enrollment in grades 10-12 of 54,644 students. Lau Category A and B students in the forty- 
two language groups attended eighty-three of the school district's eighty-eight elementary 
schools. There were Lau A and B students in all nineteen of the junior high schools and in all ten 
of Denver's senior high schools. Id. 
256. There were 1,851 children, or 55.72 percent of the total number of LEP students at all 
grade levels, whose other language was Spanish. The second largest group, comprising 36.48 
percent of all LEP children, consisted of 1,212 children who spoke one of four Indochinese 
languages. Id. at 151 1-12. "The languages were Cambodian (1 16), Aug (417), Lao (174), and 
Vietnamese (505). At the elementary level, 919 Spanish language students were identified as Lau 
A and B, which represents 2.8% of the K-6 population. At the time of the trial, eighty percent of 
the Spanish language Lau A and B children were in grades K-3. At the junior high level, 146 
Spanish language A and B students were identified, representing 1.07% of the junior high school 
population. At the senior high school level, the survey identified 86 Spanish language A and B 
students or two-thirds of one percent (.67%) of the senior high population. District-wide the 
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A bilingual program is what the name implies. Teachers or aides 
who speak English and Spanish can teach subjects such as mathemat- 
ics, social studies, and science in Spanish at the same time the children 
are learning English. Students placed in bilingual classrooms partici- 
pate with the rest of the student body for classes in art, music, and 
physical education-and for lunch and recess. The pupils then lose no 
learning time compared to their English speaking schoolmates. 
Ideally, every child would be taught by teachers fluent in the stu- 
dent's native language. However, the number of foreign languages 
spoken in the school district, 42 at the time of trial and 52 in 1984, 
made it impossible to find a sufficient number of fluent teachers. As a 
result, most non-English speaking children were enrolled in English as 
a Second Language Programs (ESL). In elementary schools these pro- 
grams were run by part-time or "travel" teachers who visited several 
schools one or two days each'week. The certified bilingual teachers 
were aided by native language tutors or interpreters. The theory was 
to start non-English speaking children in small groups of four to eight. 
As they learn to speak, write, and read English, they are moved to 
larger classes with certified teachers. When they are able to function 
in regular class, they are placed there.257 
At the time of trial, a transitional bilingual program existed at 12 
elementary schools.258 Most of these schools had one designated bilin- 
gual classroom for each grade level in the program. More Spanish 
speaking children than others benefited from bilingual classrooms.259 
Because of the dearth of certified teachers, no non-Spanish, non-Eng- 
lish speaking children, nor any Spanish-speaking "Lau C level" chil- 
dren received instruction in designated bilingual classrooms.i60 
Spanish language A and B population K-12 totaled 1,151 or 1.9% of the total district enrollment. 
An additional 700 Spanish language students were identified as Lau category C." 
257. Intervenors Exhibit 26 cited in Keyes, 576 F.  Supp. at 1516. 
258. Branscornbe, Bilingual Pro-am Evolving: Englkh Taught the 'hard way', Denver Post, 
Jan. 16, 1984, at 5A. 
259. At eleven of the schools, the program was for grades K-3. At the twelfth, the program 
ran from grades K-6. Not all classrooms in these twelve schools were designated bilingual 
classrooms. 
260. While only 13.4% of the total number of limited-English proficiency children enrolled 
in the district (Lau A, B and C children, including all forty-two language groups) were receiving 
instruction in bilingual classrooms during 1981-82, 31.03 percent of the total number of Spanish 
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There were differences in the teaching staff in the desegregated 
bilingual schools. Each bilingual classroom was taught by a certified 
teacher, but many of those teachers spoke only English. Most teach- 
ers, including all of the monolingual English teachers, had a bilingual 
aide to assist in communication. In several designated bilingual class- 
rooms, there were full or part-time ESL tutors who assisted in English 
language instruction. In other classrooms, ESL was taught by teach- 
ers and aides.261 The children who were not in designated bilingual 
classrooms received ESL instruction from a full time ESL teacher or 
from tutors who instructed ESL.262 All ESL instruction, whether by a 
teacher or tutor, occurred on a "pull-out" basis: the children were 
taken from their regular classrooms to receive from thirty to sixty 
minutes of ESL instruction each day.263 
At the secondary level, there was no program comparable to that 
found in the designated bilingual elementary schools. The principal 
program for secondary level limited-English proficiency students was 
ESL taught by teachers and tutors for about forty-five minutes each 
day. At four of the district's 30 secondary schools, ESL instruction 
was not available. 
One of the central aspects of the bilingual suit was the status of 
spealang, elementary level limited-English speaking children were in bilingual classrooms. 
Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 1512. 
261. The bilingual classrooms were intended to have about forty percent limited-English pro- 
ficiency children, and sixty percent English proficient children, but the actual figures deviated 
from this goal. 
262. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 1512. "In addition, each bilingual school, except for Mitchell, 
had a bilingual resource teacher who serves in an administrative and supportive role. (Del 
Pueblo and Valdez have two bilingual resource teachers, while Bryant-Webster and Greenlee 
have half-time bilingual resource teachers.) The resource teacher's duties are extensive, includ- 
ing: coordinate between the classroom teacher and the aide in establishing an instructional pro- 
gram; provide technical and other assistance to bilingual classrooms; coordinate the total 
bilingual effort within the school; meet weekly with the teachers and aides to discuss student 
progress and other program concerns; provide at least two hours of in-service training to the 
aides weekly; develop curriculum and materials; involve parents and the community in the pro- 
gram; assess and evaluate limited-English speaking children; diagnose their needs and prescribe 
specialized cumcula; demonstrate techniques and methodologies involved in bilingual instruc- 
tion; second language acquisition, ESL, and Spanish oral language development; read to children 
in Spanish; and work with children on conceptual development using the child's native language. 
All the bilingual resource teachers are bilingual." 
263. There were approximately 1200 children, 500 who were Spanish speaking, in Lau A and 
B categories who did not receive bilingual education. For all but the four elementary schools 
which had a full-time ESL teachers and for all the non-Spanish speaking Lau A and B children in 
the twelve bilingual schools, instruction was by full or part-time tutors. 
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the Lau C level children.264 These children, with home language 
backgrounds other than English, comprehended and spoke English, 
but did very poorly on reading and writing tests. An important issue 
in Keyes-was whether DPS had a legal obligation to provide such stu- 
dents with special language assistance. The school district's position 
was that these students were simply low achievers. DPS's only re- 
sponsibility was to provide the same programs offered to other low 
achievers.265 The intervenors offered expert testimony to show that a 
student could have minimally acceptable oral proficiency, while suffer- 
ing an impediment in writing and reaching skills owing to his non- 
English home language background. The intervenors argued, and the 
court agreed, that the failure to address the reading and writing defi- 
ciencies was a denial of equal educational opportunity and a violation 
of section 1703(f).266 
The identification of limited-English speaking children, and the 
placement of those children in Lau categories A, B and C, did not 
occur through a formal testing process, but through a questionnaire 
that was filled out by each child's parents and reviewed by a teacher. 
If the parents and teacher concurred that the child was not limited- 
English speaking, the district determined him to be ineligible for the 
bilingual/ESL program.267 
264. The school district's fifty-five tutors sewed Lain A and B children in seventy-five ele- 
mentary schools, generally meeting with groups of two to four children at one time, and tutoring 
an average of twenty children per six-hour day. For the rest of the day, the chid received content 
instruction in the regular classroom, entirely in English. Some regular classroom teachers were 
bilingual and the child could receive some content instruction in his native language through 
those teachers. The elementary ESL program used the "IDEA Kit," which employs pictures, 
actions and other materials to teach Lain A and B children oral skills in English. Keyes, 576 F. 
Supp. at 1513. 
265. Roos, supra note 230, at 11. 
266. Id. 
267. An October, 1981 survey identified 146 Spanish A and B Category students in the junior 
high schools. Of this number 121 or 82.8% attended schools with ESL programs, and 108 of the 
121 (89.2%) had bilingual teachers instructing them. In the senior high schools, 78 of the 86 
identified Spanish speaking Lain A and B students had ESL programs available. In addition, 316 
A and B students in other identified language groups attended schools with structured ESL pro- 
grams. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 15 13. 
In addition to the specific ESL programs, course materials in content areas of American 
History, geography, physical science, natural science, mathematics, sex education, health and 
hygiene, and general hygiene had been translated into the five major language groups for use in 
0 
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Parents commonly overstated the language abilities of their chil- 
dren. While the teacher's involvement was intended to safeguard 
against that, most of the district's teachers were neither trained in lin- 
guistics, bilingual education, other languages, or in detecting language 
problems. Testimony was introduced of the subtle pressures that ex- 
isted within the school system to overstate a child's English language 
skills, which served to minimize the District's obligations to address 
bilingual needs, particularly when they were difficult and expensive to 
meet. Many teachers were philosophically opposed to bilingual 
programs.268 
The school district used standardized tests to measure the pro- 
gress of elementary school children receiving bilingual and ESL in- 
struction. If the student scored well on the test, he would graduate 
from the ESL Program unless his tutor or teacher determined that it 
would be inappropriate to mainstream him at that point. No records 
were kept of the progress of children who had left either the bilingual 
or ESL programs. Nor was continuing support provided to students 
who exited from either program. The district did not compare their 
performance against that of non-limited English speaking children. 
Nor did the tests used by the district measure the capabilities of lim- 
ited-English speaking children in their native languages in either lan- 
guage skills or content areas. 
Teachers in designated bilingual classrooms were placed by the 
school district's personnel office, rather than by the bilingual program 
administrator. These placement decisions did not depend upon the 
teacher's proficiency in a second language or in bilingual instruction 
skills. The personnel office often assigned tenured teachers, or teach- 
ers already working within a particular school, to fill vacancies in bi- 
lingual classrooms, even though those teachers were neither bilingual, 
had no training for bilingual teaching, and non-tenured bilingual 
teachers were available.269 During the 1980-8 1 school year, more than 
the school curriculum. Materials had also been translated for use in the home economics, physi- 
cal education, and industrial art areas. Id. 
268. At the secondary level, those students who were identified as LEP were given an ESL 
test to place them in ESL levels I, 11, 111, or IV. Roos, supra note 230, at 10. 
269. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 1513-14. At the secondary level, the school district measured 
0 
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two hundred of the district's teachers-predominantly teachers who 
did not lead designated bilingual classrooms or teach ESL-received 
an eighteen hour in-service training course.270 
The Denver Bilingual Program, the subject of the 1983 litigation, 
began in September 1980. The number of. bilingual teachers had in- 
creased from three to 36 at the time of trial in 1982, tutors from 12 to 
72, an increase from seven to 1 1 schools, and placement of 17 tutors in 
addition to the regular classroom teachers and full-time ESL teachers 
in 27 secondary During this period, the school district's 
funding for bilingual and ESL instruction increased from $139,326 in 
1979 to $1,293,625.272 
JUDGE MATSCH'S 1983 OPINION O N  THE LANGUAGE ISSUES 
On December 30, 1983, Judge Matsch issued an opinion on the 
bilingual issue.273 The Court specified that while the opinion was di- 
rected toward the bicultural issue, the analysis was made in the con- 
text of a desegregation case which had been in the court for more than 
a decade.274 Joining the desegregation to the bilingual issues made 
easier the resolution of the latter. 
The Court applied the tripartite analysis to the § 1703(f) 
progress in the ESL program through the Structure Test of English Language (STEL). The test 
was administered twice each year. 
270. Id. at 1514. There is no state endorsement for bilingual classroom teachers. Selection is 
based on oral interview. The district did not administer a written test to evaluate either language 
skills or bilingual instruction skills. No special training or state certification was required for 
ESL teachers. Nor were ESL teachers required to be bilingual. 
271. The training course covered the basics of linguistics, ESL (including the IDEA Kit 
curriculum), and multicultural awareness. The school district did not follow up on whether 
those teachers actually used such training in their classrooms; nor did the school district know 
whether those teachers taught in classrooms or schools with large numbers of limited-English 
speaking children. Id. 
272. Id. at 1515. 
273. In 1982 this figure was over and above the salaries of the regularly assigned teachers in 
the program. In 1981-82, the district received a $81,687 federal Title VII Computer Demonstra- 
tion Grant, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 601,42 U.S.C.A. 8 2000d, $137,200 under the Transition 
Act for Refuge Children, and $991,137 in State funds. Id. at 1515. 
274. Id. at 1503 (D.  Colo. 1983). The judge said the delay stemmed from the difficulties 
involved in using the adversary process to assess the efforts made by a public 'school district to 
achieve a unitary school system. 
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claims.275 It held that Denver "transitional bilingual approach" was a 
recognized and satisfactory educational theory.276 However, the court 
found the school district in violation of $ 1703(f) when it applied the 
second prong of the analysis-whether Denver pursued its bilingual 
program with adequate resources, personnel, and practices. Teachers 
assigned to bilingual classes often lacked the necessary skills and were 
not given training to develop them. Assignments often were based on 
seniority.277 Another criticism by the court was that bilingual classes 
were available only at 11 elementary schools, and that only students 
who spoke Spanish and lived near one of those schools were assigned 
to the bilingual program.278 Other concerns were the reliance on oral 
the disregard of any special curricular need of the Lau C level 
children,280 and the lack of adequate tests to measure the district's 
results.281 
The third prong of the Castenada analysis, whether the Denver 
transitional bilingual program achieved satisfactory results, is the most 
difficult because it raises qualitative issues of measurement. Again, 
Judge Matsch sounded the clarion of judicial restraint: 
It is beyond the competence of the courts to determine appro- 
priate measurements of academic achievement and there is damage 
275. Id. 
276. See text supra at n.248. 
277. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 15 16. 
278. Teachers were designated as bilingual on the basis of ali oral interview. There were no 
standardized testing procedures. The assignment of bilingual teachers was based upon seniority, 
the same procedure used for all other assignments. Thus, an English speaking only teacher who 
passed an oral interview and had seniority would have a preference to fill a vacancy in a bilingual 
classroom at bilingual schools, even though a qualified bilingual teacher with less seniority was 
available for placement there. Id. The ESL component was taught by ESL designated instruc- 
tors who received little training and were not subjected to any standardized testing. Some had no 
second-language capability. The tutorial program relied upon professionals who had second lan- 
guage skills, but were not required to show competence or experience with content area knowl- 
edge, or teaching techniques. Id. 
279. Most students with limited-English proficiency were not in those classes and attended 
schools without a bilingual program. "Lain A" and "Lain B" children were receiving no content 
instruction in a language which they understood. Some secondary students from certain schools 
were brought together for extended ESL services at  the Fred Thomas Center. This approach is 
called clustering. Id. 
280. Id. at 1518. ESL instruction was limited to forty minutes per day of remedial English 
instruction using an audio-lingual approach. 
281. Lain C children are those who comprehend and speak English and another language, 
whose dominant language is difficult to determine, and whose English language proficiency is 
below national or district standards. See supra at p. 58. These children were given no remedial 
English language programs, in violation of the Colorado statute. 
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to the fabric of federalism when national courts dictate the use of 
any component of the educational process in schools governed by 
elected officers of local government. 
Fortunately, it is not now necessary to discuss this question 
because of the findings of the district's failure to take reasonable 
action to implement the bilingual education policy which it 
adopted.282 
The court commented upon two indications of failure in achiev- 
ing equal educational opportunity: (1) the number of hispanic drop- 
outs and the relationship between the sharp decline of Lau C level 
students between grades 7-9 and 10-12, and (2) the use of "levelled 
English," or watered down handouts for LEP students in the secon- 
dary schools, an indication that LEP students had failed to obtain a 
reasonable parity of participation with other 
In ordering a remedy, Judge Matsch brought the languages issues 
into the mainstream of the desegregation litigation. He did not order a 
discrete remedy for the language issues, but linked their resolution to 
the creation of a unitary school system. The failure to remove the 
language barriers was a failure to establish a unitary system.284 Only a 
changed attitude by the Board and greater institutional commitment 
to equal educational opportunities would suffice. The Board said the 
court had to have a broader focus than forced busing. The language 
issues were related to the other aspects which made up the require- 
ment of a unitary school system. As Matsch attempted to draw the 
Board away from its fixation with busing, he squarely placed the re- 
sponsibilities for remedying the bilingual program on elected officials. 
Judge Matsch's December 1983 decision on the bilingual issue 
militated- against the Board's January 1984 motion for a declaration 
that DPS was a unitary system and that previously ordered remedies 
ended the need for continued court supervision. Opposition to the 
Board's motion soon surfaced. On February 15, 1984 lawyers for the 
bilingual intervenors filed a brief stating that until all vestiges of segre- 
gation, including differences in achievement between minority and 
282. Keyes, 576 F. Supp. at 1518. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 1519. 
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white students were eliminated, the court should deny the District's 
motion that the schools be declared integrated.285 The plaintiffs 
pointed to evidence of continuing segregation and argued that the 
school district should exhaust all practicable remedial alternatives 
before it could be considered integrated. Leaders of three public ser- 
vice organizations: the Denver Public School Improvement and Ac- 
countability Committee; the Denver League of Women Voters; and 
the Denver County Parent, Teacher, Student Association, urged the 
Board to "openly articulate" to the public its commitment to equal 
educational opportunity. Among the relevant questions which the 
Board had never answered, according to representatives of the three 
organizers, was "whether there is a basis for believing, with reasonable 
certainty, that there will be freedom from racial discrimination in the 
future."286 
On April 10, 1984, the Board unanimously approved resolution 
2233, a declaration of policy which was intended to follow the termi- 
nation of court supervision. The 18 paragraph resolution stated that 
the Denver schools should be operated in conformity with all federal 
laws, that "there shall be no sudden alteration of the court ordered 
busing plan then in effect," that no practices would be taken for the 
purposes of discriminating against any person, that the Board would 
attempt to achieve the beneficial effects of integration, that the benefi- 
cial effects of integration are most fully realized in stabilizing inte- 
grated neighborhood schools, and that the Board "shall preserve 
contiguous attendance zones for schools that are integrated and shall 
establish contiguous attendance zones wherever it appears that stable 
integration can be maintained in the schools serving such areas." 
The resolution committed the Board to developing additional 
magnet schools and special programs, using all available means to en- 
sure that they would be integrated. In addition, the Board said it 
would develop and actively promote a voluntary program to en- 
courage students to transfer to schools where their race is a 
minority.287 
Nationally recognized desegregation experts felt there was little 
285. Id. at 1521-22. 
286. Burling, Continued Supervision Urged for Denver schools, Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 
16, 1984, at 8. 
287. Branscornbe, Groups Seek DPS Resolve on Equality, Denver Post, Mar. 10, 1984, at 7A. 
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chance of convincing the Court that the system was unitary. Some of 
the problems of the district, including the failure to stay within court 
ordered reduced racial quotas in 27 of the 108 schools, the shortage of 
minority teachers, the high minority dropout rate, the gap in majority- 
minority achievement scores, and the number of one race classrooms 
were cited in local newspaper accounts.288 
In addition to its new counsel, Chicago attorney Phillip Neal, the 
Board retained John Michael Ross, a Washington statistician who had 
prepared evidence for the hearings leading to the Pasadena settlement. 
Ross, who was paid nearly $200,000 for his efforts, offered complex 
testimony that only served to confuse M a t ~ c h . ~ ' ~  Using a detailed se- 
ries of graphs, indices, and tables, he testified that the district had 
come close to achieving racial balance. Ross then admitted, however, 
that judges had not relied on statistics to declare other districts 
de~egregated.'~' 
Ross's statistics attempted to show that extensive movement of 
population within Denver, and a steady and large decline in enroll- 
ment-almost all of which represented a loss of anglo students-were 
the prime causes of racial imbalance in certain schools.291 Matsch 
criticized the Ross presentation for failing to give a complete picture 
of the demographic movements of Denver residents, particularly those 
288. Branscombe, School Board Will 'Promote Integration', Denver Post, Apr. 11, 1984, at 
4A. 
289. Enda, Busing: Race Gap Persists, Experts Say, Rocky Mountain News, Apr. 15, 1984, 
at 1. Gary Orfield, the expert witness in several desegregation cases, including Denver's stated: 
I think it will get thrown out. The judge has thrown out an effort by the school 
district to get out from the court order before. He was obviously very impatient then 
[in 19821. He threw it out one day after the evidence was presented. 
He described the school district's motion as "a provocative and stupid thing for them to do 
. . . a slap in the face of the judge." Id. 
290. Branscombe, School Board Claims Data Proves its FUN Compliance, Denver Post, Apr. 
17, 1984, at 4A; Enda, Judge Puzzled by Consultant For DPS Plan, Rocky Mountain News, May 
12; 1985, at 19. Roos was paid $1 19,825 on a per diem arrangement that claimed from $400 per 
day to $500 by May 1985. He also received $37,078 for travel and clerical expenses and spent 
$37,462 for computer time. These expenses, along with the legal fees, when made public became 
an embarrassment to the Board. 
291. During the hearing Matsch hid neither his confusion or annoyance: "I have a negative 
understanding of this exhibit," Matsch declared at one point. At another: "the excitement level 
is just too intense," and he adjourned for lunch. Enda, Judge Puzzled by Consultant for DPS 
Plan, Rocky Mountain News, May 12, 1985, at 19. 
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who lived in Denver in 1975, but moved away before 1980.292 
In his opening statement Greiner said that there had been sub- 
stantial problems for the last two years with the Board's compliance 
with court decrees in such fields as affirmative hiring, pupil assign- 
ments and disproportionate disciplining of minority students. He 
termed the "consensus" desegregation plan "a disastrous step back- 
ward for minority students." He also offered a new school assignment 
proposal, requiring additional busing for eleven elementary schools.293 
This would desegregate the four elementary schools with the fewest 
anglo students of any in the city. On May 23, the last day of the hear- 
ings, Matsch denied the plaintiff's new busing plan on the ground that 
the racial imbalances at the four schools were "chronic, not acute." 
He felt that the desegregation efforts at the four elementary schools 
should await resolution of the larger issues in the case.294 
As the hearing developed, the chances of the Board's succeeding 
on its motion lessened. Board members' testimony did not help their 
own case. Omar Blair, the only black member of the Board, told the 
court: 
I believe we've been under court order long enough. I think 
the turmoil and trauma has caused the district to lose a lot of its 
students almost to the point of no return. 
Second, the only way I know to find out whether we're unitary, 
and if not why not, is to bring the question to this court. 
Under cross examination, Blair admitted he did not sufficiently trust 
his colleagues on the Board to seek or maintain desegregation. He 
believed that racist practices still occurred in schools, and that the 
three new members of the Board had nearly destroyed the credibility 
of the district by wresting authority from the ~uperintendent.~~' Blair 
suggested that the court allow plaintiffs' attorney, Gordon Greiner, to 
"say each year whether [we have] done what we said we'd do. 9,296 
Judge Matsch questioned board member Paul Sandoval: sa bout 
the school with a twelve percent Anglo population, you said you 
292. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1508 (D.C. Colo. 1985); Weaver, Busing Triggered White 
Flight? Truism Being Debunked by Experts, Denver Post, Apr. 14, 1985, at 6E. 
293. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1508 (D.C. Colo. 1985). 
294. Branscornbe, Plaintrffs Offer Enlarged Busing Plan, Denver Post, Apr. 26, 1984, at 1A. 
295. Branscornbe, More City School Busing is Denied, Denver Post, May 24, 1984, at 1A. 
296. Branscornbe, DPS Release From Court Control Urged, Denver Post, Apr. 20, 1984, at 
4A. 
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wouldn't be concerned about that so long as the program is equal?" 
Sandoval replied, "where children go is a parental right." Matsch re- 
sponded, "you understand that the Supreme Court has told us sepa- 
rate is unequal? ,9297 
Two other members of the Board testified that they voted to seek 
relief from court ordered busing without knowing or having asked 
whether the segregative violations had been corrected. When Board 
vice-president Franklin Mullen was questioned by Norma Cantu, at- 
torney for bilingual intervenors, about whether the Board had ever 
requested standardized achievement scores to be broken down by 
ethnicity, Mullen responded that he didn't put much stock in stan- 
dardized test scores.298 
The hearings promoted criticism of the school system's efforts at 
desegregation. Former school board member Kay Schomp criticized 
the use of magnet schools by the system because they siphoned off 
anglo students from schools with low anglo enrollments, and thus 
were detrimental to the schools. that pupils had left behind.299 A fa- 
ther of a child is an extended day program at one of the city's magnet 
schools testified that he and other parents had confronted "an institu- 
tional wall" of resistance to the efforts to improve and expand the 
school's academic and parent involvement program.''' Carol Ruckel, 
President of the Denver Parent Teacher Student Association, testified 
that parents used the hardship transfer system to get their children 
into a neighborhood school in order to avoid busing, but the Board 
failed to consider the racial effects of such transfers. School adminis- 
trators corroborated Ruckel's charge.'O1 
The court-appointed desegregation experts testified that the 
Board had been unresponsive to their efforts to help develop and im- 
297. Id. 
298. Branscombe, School Oflcials Dbagree as Judge Weighs Decontrol, Denver Post, Apr. 
21, 1984, at IA. 
299. Cantu then asked whether Mullen recalled that one of the original complaints in the 
case was that some minority schools had low standardized test scores. "That's something every- 
body is concerned about," he responded. Mullen admitted he had never received a list of low 
achieving schools before voting on the resolution. Branscombe, Board Member Didn't Know if 
Bias Violations Ended, Denver Post, Apr. 26, 1984, at 3A. 
300. Branscombe, Magnet Schools Hurt Integration, US. Court Told. Denver Post, May 8, 
1984, at 4A. 
301. Branscombe, School Board Shunned Offers, Expert Says, Denver Post, May 9, 1984, at 
9. 
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plement a plan to end court control of the system. Willis Hawley said 
that his dealings with the school board and administrators left him "at 
least skeptical" of the Board's commitment to maintain a desegregated 
school system. Hawley testified that he wrote several letters to 
Michael Jackson, school board attorney, offering to collaborate on the 
court-appointed tasks and proposing plans and programs for discus- 
sion. Seven months went by before he even received any response to 
his letters.302 Another court-appointed expert, Charles V. Willie, a 
professor of education and urban studies at the Harvard Graduate 
School of Education, cited data showing that the faculty in 48 of the 
district's 108 schools was grossly unbalanced racially, and testified 
that: "Denver schools have never achieved a unitary affirmative ac- 
tion [employment] system." Willie called Denver's record 
"abominable" .303 
In the final brief, Greiner argued that the district was not fully 
integrated, and that court supervision should not end until the district 
had: submitted plans for desegregating the three most racially im- 
balanced elementary schools; revised its hardship transfer policies; and 
evenly distributed black and hispanic teachers throughout the dis- 
trict's schools. He also requested a permanent injunction ordering the 
district: 1) not to operate a dual school system; 2) to construct schools 
and create magnet schools so as to promote integration; 3) administer 
hardship transfers so they would not hurt desegregation; 4) to con- 
tinue affirmative action policies in the hiring, transferring, and assign- 
ment of minority faculty and administrators; and 5) to keep annual 
racial and active records on student enrollment, faculty, and staff and 
hardship  transfer^.^* In its final brief, the Congress of Hispanic Edu- 
cators claimed the district's gifted and talented program was racially 
identifiable as a program for whites and reinforced disparities in treat- 
ment of hispanics and other minorities.305 
302. Branscombe, Ma-et Schools Hurt Integration, US. Court Told, Denver Post, May 8, 
1984, at 4A. 
303. Branscombe, School Board Shunned Ofleers Expert Says, Denver Post, May 9, 1984, at 9. 
Hawley said beginning March 4, 1983 he and Charles Willie sent a series of letters to Michael 
Jackson, Board attorney, offering cooperation and suggesting DPS staffers be appointed to work 
with the panel. He received no answer at all until October 1 1  and no answer in any way respon- 
sive until November 2, 1983. 
304. Branscombe, Denver Schools Not Desegregated, Court's Expert Says, Denver Post, May 
10, 1984, at 7A. Willie also testified about the board's lack of response to compliance assistance 
panel initiatives. See supra at 16. 
305. Bingham, Permanent School Bias Ban Urged, Denver Post, Dec. 23, 1984, at 4A. 
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The Board's final brief said that only three of the district's 108 
schools did not meet the original court's test for integration. The per- 
centage of anglos at any school must be within 15 percent of the per- 
centage of anglos in the entire The Board argued that the 
number of anglo students had declined from 48 percent in 1975 to 39 
percent in February of 1985. No one could force anglo students to 
stay in the Denver schools, and the school district's desegregation plan 
did not have to be changed to integrate schools that anglo students 
leave. On February 19, 1985, the Justice Department filed its brief in 
support of the Board's position.307 
. By the beginning of February 1985, the settlement talks had bro- 
ken down. There were not substantive discussions for nearly three 
months. Greiner claimed the stalemate resulted because the district 
failed to respond to plaintiff's proposals.308 The sticking pint, as it 
had been in the past, was the racial imbalance of four elementary 
schools-Mitchell, Barrett, Harrington and Gilpin-the most segre- 
gated in the district. A lack of communication and consensus over 
board strategy emerged. The vice-president, Franklin Mullen, said the 
school district's failure to negotiate was "inexcusable. 309 
In the middle of February 1985, the Board switched gears and 
publicly announced that it had instructed its counsel to move more 
aggressively toward an out of court settlement of the lawsuit.310 At 
the same time, a new superintendent, James Scamman, who had over- 
seen desegregation in South Bend, Indiana, had been selected. The 
Board's negotiating posture was much more conciliatory than its final 
brief had indicated. It presented a compromise plan for integration of 
the elementary schools. "It's the same thing we rejected five months 
ago," responded Greir~er.~ll The two sides did not meet until the end 
of March. 
306. Bingham, DPS Segregation Claimed, Denver Post, Jan. 8, 1985, at 4A. 
307. The plaintiffs claimed that twenty-nine of the 108 schools were below the guideline. 
308. Bingham, Brief Opposes Desegregation Plan Update, Denver Post, Feb. 20, 1985, at 3A. 
309. Enda, Talks to End DPS Suit Breakdown, Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 3, 1985, at 6. 
310. Id. He also criticized Jackson for not updating the Board on the negotiations. "We pay 
enough to legal fees to get full-time service." Jackson cited the need to file a final brief and the 
search for new superintendent in justification of his inability to negotiate. 
31 1 .  School Board Seeking Speedy Suit Settlement, Denver Post, Feb. 15, 1985, at 8B. 
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CHANGES I N  T H E  LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT 
The middle of May 1985 brought several changes in the environ- 
ment of the lawsuit. First, the new superintendent of schools became 
more actively involved. Second, public criticism had arisen over the 
costs of the litigation and the fees spent for court experts.312 An indi- 
cator of this change was the May 21st school board election for two 
school board seats, which resulted in anti-busing advocate William 
Schroeder's defeat and a change in the political balance of the 
In addition, two liberals were elected: Edward Gamer, a 
marketing specialist who became the only black member of the Board, 
and Carol McCotter, a former teacher. Garner said that he would 
stop spending money fighting desegregation in the courts: 
What we have to do is follow the dictates of the court and hope it 
won't be unpleasant for all . . . the board has never bought into the 
idea of promoting desegregation. Unless we do, we will always be 
faced with expensive appeals.314 
Of those elected during the 1970s, when busing was the major issue, 
only Naomi Bradford remained.315 Another indicator that the "polit- 
ical" climate of school board elections had changed was that only 
seven percent of the voters turned out, less than half of the usual 15 to 
18 percent turnout for an off year Denver school board 
During the course of the hearings, negotiations were proceeding 
312. Bingham, Bwrd to Offer Integration Plans for 3 Schools, Denver Post, Feb. 21, 1985, 
8 5, at 3. 
313. Enda, Judge Puzzled by Consultant for DPS Plan, Rocky Mountain News, May 12, 
1985, at 19. 
314. Instead of focusing upon busing, the issue of the seventies, candidates concentrated on 
reversing the poor image of the schools. The new code phrase was "quality of education". The 
support of the Denver business establishment seemed to reflect the change in emphasis. The 
Denver Board of REaltors did not endorse William Schroeder, a member of their organization, 
as they had six years before when he ran as an anti-busing candidate. Nor did they gain support 
Mary Baca, who ran unsuccessfully in 1983 on an anti-busing platform. No one openly ran 
against busing. 
315. Bingham, Garner, McCotter Win Denver School Election, Denver Post, May 22, 1985, at 
1A. 
316. Edgar Benton, whose views on integration cost him his seat on the school board in 1969, 
said busing continues to be an issue in the mid-1980s, albeit one that's below the surface. "I 
think, for example, this upcoming May 1985 election for the board of education that if someone 
were to run and would say many very kind things about the school desegregation program in 
Denver . . . that person would not be elected. That's not an absolute theorem." Nor did former 
school board member Kay Schomp believe the busing issue would disappear soon: "I don't think 
it'll change until it becomes moot. I assume that as long as there's a court order, there are going 
to be people who run against the court order." Benton Interview, supra note 51. 
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favorably toward a settlement of the bilingual issues. Realizing they 
would lose on their motion to declare the district unitary, the Board 
began to seriously negotiate a settlement which would end the suit and 
make certain the district would be subject to no additional busing after 
the resolution of the bilingual issues. On the other hand, the plaintiffs 
wanted to ensure that a settlement would not decease any of the deseg- 
regation programs in place, particularly busing and, a most difficult 
problem, desegregation of a few racially-unbalanced elementary 
scho01s.~ l7
REACTION TO THE DECISION 
Unlike the posturing that followed other court opinions involving 
pupil assignments, the Board's reaction to the December 1983 decision 
on bilingual education issues was muted and responsive. One reason 
for the change was the Board's mid December 1983 application to the 
court for the system to be declared unitary and the court to relinquish 
control over the school district. Board President Naomi Bradford, a 
staunch anti-buser, said she was "not overwhelmed by the opinion" 
and that the decision was not completely negative. She hoped to get 
the school district to move quickly with acceptable proposals for a 
January 20, 1984 court hearing. Bradford felt that the bilingual pro- 
gram merely needed fine tuning.318 
By January 5, 1984, at the time the Board was prosecuting its 
motion to end the desegregation aspects of the lawsuit, the school dis- 
trict's staff members unveiled a series of proposals to improve the bi- 
lingual program. The proposals included: (1) the creation of clusters 
of elementary schools from which LEP pupils would be bused to a 
central location and given instruction in English as a second language, 
(2) expansion of the English tutoring program at individual high 
317. In suburban school elections where desegregation has not been an issue, only one to two 
percent of the electorate usually votes. Bingham, Garner, McCotter Win Denver School Election, 
Denver Post, May 22, 1985, at 1A. 
318. Branscombe, School PIaint~~Talkc Aim at Busing Freeze, Denver Post, Oct. 2, 1984, at 
1A. Negotiations continued through the fall of 1984, but then stalled. Greiner refused to negoti- 
ate and prepare a final brief at the same time. After receiving two extensions on November 28, 
1984 an impatient Matsch refused to give him additional time to file his brief. Bingham, Desegre- 
gation Suit negotiations Stalled, Denver Post, Nov. 17, 1984, at 7A. Matsch wanted to render his 
decision during the then-current school year to permit the district time to implenient changes in 
pupil assignments before the start of the next school year. Greiner was ordered to file his final 
brief by December 18, 1984. Bingham, Extension Denied in DPS Busing Case, Denver Post, 
Nov. 29, 1984. at 8A. 
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schools; and (3) a commitment of the Board to seek ways to keep the 
seniority provisions of the union contract from preventing the assign- 
ment of bilingual teachers to bilingual schools.319 The suggestion of 
busing elementary students out of their neighborhoods to a central 
school split the Board's anti-busing majority. Paul Sandoval was the 
only anti-buser who opposed the idea-n the ground that it would 
further segregate students-and would therefore, be opposed by the 
court. Sandoval was isolated and undercut by his anti-busing allies. 
the momentum toward resolution of the language issue was the hope, 
unrealistic in retrospect, that resolution of the bilingual problems 
would prove that the school system was not unitary. 
RESOLUTION OF THE BILINGUAL ISSUES 
Board President Bradford's comments about the bilingual deci- 
sion were read by the plaintiff-intervenors as an opening. As board 
president, she was considered crucial to any resolution of the dispute. 
Immediately after the decision, the plaintiff-intervenors, led by Peter 
Roos, an attorney with the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, 
met with the Board and advised Judge Matsch that the parties would 
like to attempt to negotiate a settlement and work things out them- 
selves rather than presenting alternative plans in formal judicial 
proceedings. 
Initially, Roos had hoped to build an elaborate committee system, 
identifying issues and building a plan from the bottom up. That ap- 
proach did not Instead, a committee was established com- 
posed of clients, parents, interested people, and hispanic teachers in 
the school system. Through this committee, a proposal was developed 
for board consideration. 
At the outset, Roos made a determination to insist that the school 
district's representatives include members of the Board and its 
president: 
I had been through too many negotiations with school officials and 
found them blown apart at the board level.32' 
The Board established a committee on limited English proficient 
319. Lundstrom, School Board to Act Fost on Ruling, Denver Post, Jan. 3, 1984, at 1A. 
320. Branscombe, Bilingual Program Changes Proposal, Denver Post, Jan. 6, 1984, at 1B. 
321. Telephone Interview with Peter Roos, Counsel for plaintiff intervenors (Sept. 18, 1985). 
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students composed of Bradford, the Board's president; Judy Morton, 
chairman of the Board's education committee; Paul Sandoval, board 
member; James B. Bailey, deputy superintendent of schools; Michael 
Jackson, counsel for the school board; Terry Marshall and Dale Vigil, 
consultants. 
The committee met with the plaintiffs regularly, sometimes with- 
out counsel present. Their agenda included the identification of eligi- 
ble participants, personnel, elementary and secondary school 
programming, and the unique linguistic and cultural needs of the In- 
dochinese LEP students.322 The negotiators met every two weeks, 
sometimes more frequently, through the spring of 1984 until June, 
when a report to the board of education, "A Program for Limited 
English Proficient Students," was published and became the basis for 
the August, 1984 out-of-court settlement. 
According to Roos, the negotiations were non-adversarial. The 
parties worked hard toward reaching a settlement. Roos felt that if 
the plaintiffs demonstrated honesty in their approach, were open to 
Board suggestion and not hung up on ideology, a settlement could be 
achieved. 
In presenting plans, the plaintiffs argued for good educational 
programs and accountability-items that also mattered greatly to the 
board members. They attempted to assuage the Board's concerns. 
Both parties shared the belief that many bilingual programs were 
"mostly fluff". Thus, the final settlement had extensive testing and 
accountability provisions. The plaintiffs saw the settlement plan as an 
opportunity for Denver to achieve a model program which would be 
on the cutting edge of bilingual-bicultural education. 
Judge Matsch played a background role. The parties met several 
times with him. When establishing the negotiations, the parties agreed 
that a report to Matsch would be submitted every month. However, 
Matsch had an important backup role which gave leverage to the 
plaintiffs. If the negotiations fell through, the plaintiffs could always 
return to court to hold more formal hearings. This approach was later 
used successfully by the plaintiffs in the desegregation portion of the 
lawsuit. Because the Board wanted to settle that part of the lawsuit, 
322. Id. 
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the negotiations proceeded smoothly. Agreement was reached in the 
spring and the suit was settled in August, 1984. 
On June 3, 1985, Nearly eighteen months after the Board filed to 
dismiss the lawsuit, Judge Matsch denied the defendant's motion.323 
Reviewing the history of the lawsuit, the court highlighted the years of 
the Board's intractability and lack of commitment to remedying the 
constitutional violations; the acceptance by the court of the consensus 
plan in 1982; and the well-founded reservations because of the Board's 
lack of commitment to a unitary system;324 the Board's lack of compli- 
ance with the Tenth Circuit's requirement that the district assign per- 
sonnel so that in each school the ratio of minority-to-Anglo staff not 
be less than fifty percent of the ratio of minority teachers to staff of the 
entire system;325 the failure to develop a policy to distribute neutrally 
the number of minority teachers throughout the a hardship 
transfer program which functioned as the equivalent of a "voluntary 
transfer program" for neighborhood schools and had a resegregative 
effect;327 and a failure by the Board to keep records as to the effects of 
the transfer program on transferor or transferee schools. 
The court held "that the law of the case was the 1974 final judg- 
ment and the decision was not an adequate remedy for segregated 
school assignments. "328 The court pointed to the Board's failure to 
work cooperatively with the Community Assistance Panel and, con- 
trary to what was represented to the court and community, the adop- 
tion of a secret agenda in hiring new counsel and an expert witness to 
convince the Court to terminate the lawsuit.329 
323. Roos, supra note 230, at 20. 
324. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Colo. 1985). 
325. Id. at 1507. 
326. Keyes, 521 F.2d 465, 484. 
327. The court found that schools with a high percentage of minority teachers were in 
predominantly minority areas. 
328. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. at 1512. The proposal measures for hardship transfers were 
babysitting needs in the elementary schools and work opportunities for students in high school. 
Students would transfer to schools closer in their neighborhoods. 
329. Id. at 1499. 
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THE FUTURE OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION 
The court also indicated it would retain jurisdiction until it was 
convinced that there was no reasonable expectation that constitutional 
violations would remain-whether or not the school system should be 
found unitary. 330 Even accepting the defendant's argument that the 
modified 1974 final judgment and decree were complete and adequate 
remedies, the court's jurisdiction would continue because it was com- 
pelled to conclude that resegregation was inevitable if the school board 
followed the Colorado constitution, which prohibits busing.331 Board 
Resolution 2228, modeled after a resolution offered in the Spangler 
case, reaffirmed the Board's commitment to a unitary system. How- 
ever, as 15 years of litigation demonstrate, a unitary system. However, 
as 15 years of litigation demonstrate, a unitary system would be im- 
possible without mandatory busing. 
If court jurisdiction ended, the school board, unless it was to be in 
direct violation of the Colorado constitution, would have to dismantle 
the school assignment and busing programs.332 The court placed little 
reliance on Resolution 2228 or in any other resolution binding future 
boards.333 The Keyes case had commenced after a board resolution 
was repealed by a succeeding board. Thus, with the uncertainty of the 
legal requirements as to when a school district is unitary, and the anti- 
busing provision of the Colorado constitution, the court would not 
dismiss the case. Whenever Keyes ended, the court would issue a final 
injunctive order.334 
Judge Matsch pointed out that any final injunction was civil in 
nature and did not have to be specific as to pupil assignments, percent- 
ages, faculty ethnicity, or even commitment to transportation. What 
the court would require was the development of a decision-making 
330. Id. at 1505. 
331. Id. at 1514. 
332. The Constitution of the State of Colorado expressly prohibits the use of such busing in 
the following language of the "anti-busing" amendment, adopted in 1974: 
No sectarian tenets or doctrines shall ever be taught in the public school, nor shall any 
distinction or classification of pupils be made on account of race or color, nor shall any 
pupil be assigned or transported to any public educational institution for the purpose of 
achieving racial balance. 
Colo. Const. art. IX, 5 8. It is the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, art. 
IV 5 2 that permitted the operation of the Denver schools under the existing busing plan which 
otherwise was a clear violation of the Colorado Constitution. 
333. This distinguished the Denver case from Spangler, where no such provision existed. 
334. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. at 1520. 
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structure for local government authorities, and assurance that those 
who make such decisions had adequate information and provided for 
minority participation to act in concert with the principles of equal 
educational opportunity.335 The court explicitly cited the Ad Hoc 
Committee's guidelines as a useful working framework within which 
such a structure could be developed. It requested the parties to come 
together to negotiate to settle the lawsuit and develop a consensual 
final order. Because of the recent school board election and the hope 
that a new environment had emerged, the court declined to set a spe- 
cific timetable. 
THE SUMMER OF 1985: STUMBLING TOWARDS ETTLEMENT 
On June 7, 1985, four days after the decision was issued, lawyers 
for both sides conferred with Superintendent of Schools James Scam- 
man. On the weekend of June 9th, Scamman and the Board met at a 
retreat to develop goals and a negotiating strategy to settle the lawsuit. 
The new superintendent, who had experience in developing the type of 
monitoring system ~ a t s c h  said was needed, publicly indicated that he 
would play a greater role in the negotiations than his predecessors.336 
However, any settlement proposed by him would have to be approved 
by the Board in an open meeting.337 
The Board and Scamman, hoping to reach a mutually agreeable 
settlement which would be presented jointly to the court at the end of 
June,338 drafted new educational goals to resolve the case. Once again, 
strategy changed as the Board focused upon educational rather than 
legal issues. The goals which were aimed at assuring equal educa- 
tional opportunity for all students included: transferring teachers to 
335. The Fifth Circuit, which has probably had the greatest experience in school desegrega- 
tion cases, requires a court to retain jurisdiction for three years following judicial determination 
that a school district is unitary. This assures that determination of unitary status is not prema- 
ture. In that period, the district files semi-annual reports with the court. At the end of the three 
years a hearing is held at which plaintiffs may show cause why the case should not be dismissed. 
The district court then makes a final determination as to whether the district has achieved uni- 
tary status and at that time may dismiss the case. See Roos v. Houston Independent School 
Dist., 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 509 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
336. Keyes, 609 F. Supp. at 1521. 
337. Bingham, Denver School Chief Opens Tolks to Settle Desegregation Suit, Denver Post, 
June 8, 1985, at 1A. 
338. Bingham, Scommon Mandate: Speed End to Lawsuit, Denver Post, June 11, 1985, at 
22C. 
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reduce the number of schools dominated by minority faculty and stu- 
dents; reviewing "hardship transfers"; creating magnet programs;339 
improving teacher training and sensitivity; establishing an independent 
committee of community representatives for various ethnic groups to 
monitor desegregation; and using computers ,to track the individual 
progress of students.340 
On June 21, 1985, eight days before counsel were to meet again 
with Judge Matsch to discuss the development of a process to achieve 
settlement, Scamman announced he would reassign 40 teachers and 
review 1,000 "hardship" student transfers. In the fall of 1985, as a 
first step towards meeting the objections raised by the court, 13 
schools with the most obvious racial imbalance would have teachers 
reassigned. Denver board member, Franklin Mullen, said the trans- 
fers were part of the Board's strategy of dealing with the schools 
rather than with the About the same time, the Board an- 
nounced that it was developing a comprehensive data bank which in- 
cluded information on faculty and student racial balances in all 
schools and on programs within schools, to monitor integration.342 
~es{ite visible efforts and verbal commitments by the Board to 
come to terms with the June decision, it was silent on the most difficult 
issue: the integration of three still substantially-segregated elementary 
schools-Barrett, Mitchell, and H a m p t ~ n . ~ ~ ~  At the hearing on June 
28, 1985, no settlement proposals were presented to the court; nor did 
the judge offer any guidance. The purpose of the hearing was to deter- 
mine the parties' respective positions and to gauge the possibilities of 
settlement. According to James Nabrit, associate counsel for NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund: 
We first began out of court negotiations last' fall. We agreed we 
339. Bingham, DPS Drafts Bold Goals to End Integration Suit, Denver Post, June 13, 1985, 
at 1A. 
340. On September 24, 1985 Denver was awarded a 3.9 million dollar grant for magnet 
schools. Bingham, Denver Awarded 3.9 Million for Magnet School, Denver Post, Sept. 24, 1985, 
at 3A. 
341. Enda, School Board Plan Misses on Key Issues, Rocky Mountain News, July 1 1 ,  1985, at 
7. Other goals included curriculum reviews for more personalized learning plans for elementary 
students, reduction of class sizes and the dropout rate. Bingham, DPS Drarfts Bold Goals to End 
Integration Suit, Denver Post, June 13, 1985, at 1A. 
342. Enda, Desegregation to Transfer 40 Teachers, Rocky Mountain News, June 21, 1985, at 
7. 
343. The data monitoring system was developed by educators at Indiana University. Bing- 
ham, Data Bank will Monitor City School Integration, Denver Post, June 22, 1985, at 1A. 
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would not reveal to the judge the details of the negotiations . . . The 
judge wants it that way. This is still a lawsuit, and if he has to rule 
on it, he'll do it the traditional 
In early July, 1985, the Board offered plaintiffs a settlement pro- 
posal. It did not, however, include a plan to end the racial isolation of 
the three elementary schools. ' Nor would the Board agree to a perma- 
nent injunction. The Board had earlier offered to shift students to bal- 
ance the three schools racially, but retreated from that position.345 
Matsch told the attorneys to report to him on a monthly basis regard- 
ing their efforts to end the litigation. 
The desegregation of the three elementary schools returned to 
Judge Matsch on October 15, 1985, when plaintiffs moved the court to 
direct the defendants: to file plans for the desegregation of the three 
elementary schools; to file a proposal for the modification of "hardship 
transfers" and their monitoring for segregative effects; and to direct 
defendants to file with the court their proposals for the modification of 
the policies relating to the assignment, monitoring and reporting of 
minority faculty to bring the district into compliance with the 1974 
order.346 Board member Franklin Mullen, arguing that the histrict 
had done its best to desegregate the schools, responded: "You can't 
keep changing the  goalpost^."^^' 
On October 29, 1985, Matsch ordered the Board to integrate the 
three schools and to issue guidelines to ensure even distribution of mi- 
nority faculty and to monitor hardship transfers. At the end of No- 
vember, the Board introduced its plan to integrate the three schools by 
establishing them as magnets to offer Montessori classes for kinder- 
gardeners and first graders. New computer centers, reduced class 
sizes, and pilot programs of various educational methods would be 
introduced along with drama, music, dance, after-school-programs 
344. Barrett was the focus of the original lawsuit in 1969. Bingham, Board Hopes for New 
Integration Guidance, Denver Post, June 27, 1985, at 5A. 
345. Bingham, Lawyers in Denver Integration Suit Told to Keep Talking, Denver Post, June 
29, 1985, at 1C. 
346. Board member Mullen stated: 
In terms of ethnic, numeric ratios, that is, for the most part, a passe issue. We're 
working on the things that are more qualitat~ve and have more equity in the services 
and distribution of staff. 
Enda, School Board Plan Misses on Key Issues, Denver Post, July 1 1 ,  1985, at 7. 
347. Joint Motion of Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors, Civil Action No. C-1499, filed Oct. 
15, 1985, a copy is on file at the Institute of Judicial Administration, Inc. 
Heinonline 32 Howard L.J. 7 1 0  1 9 8 9  
19891 ENDLESS JOURNEY 71 1 
art, and Spanish as a second language. The cost of the programs was 
estimated at one million dollars. Concurrently, the Board appealed 
Matsch's decision on the Tenth Circuit.348 
On Sunday, December 15, 1985 the case was almost settled dur- 
ing a four hour negotiating session between Greiner, lawyers for the 
school board, and the board members. The Board hoped that active 
judicial supervision of the school system could be ended. Under a pro- 
posed compromise plan, the plaintiffs accepted a slightly modified ver- 
sion of the Board's one million dollar plan to integrate the Mitchell, 
Barrett, and Harrington elementary schools by enhancing their educa- 
tional programs. Plaintiffs would not have called for additional busing 
or boundary changes. The school district would have been able to 
remove itself from active court supervision as soon as the three largely 
minority schools were at least thirty percent anglo. The Board would 
drop its appeal of Matsch's June, 1985 opinion and would agree to a 
permanent court order that would require DPS to maintain bilingual 
schools, not to create racially identifiable schools nor to resegregate 
the district, and to continue faculty integration.349 
There were two sticking points. One was the language that the 
Board could not create one race or racially identifiable schools. The 
other was that the Board wanted assurance that it could be declared a 
unitary district and be released from court order.350 Despite the in- 
ability to reach agreement on a settlement, the sides. seemed to move 
closer together and be more conciliatory. 
On Saturday, March 15, 1986, Judge Matsch ruled DPS could 
implement its plan to integrate the Mitchell, Barrett and Harrington 
elementary schools. He noted that the district had not come up with 
guidelines for determining when integration had been achieved, but 
felt that the district had complied with his October order to submit 
plans to desegregate the three elementary schools, to deal with transfer 
policies that increased one-race schools, and to set guidelines to better 
distribute minority fa~ulty.~" The court requested briefs to detail 
348. Bingham, Formal Ruling Sought on School Integration Case, Denver Post, Oct. 16, 
1985, at 14. 
349. Bingham, 3 Schools Unveil Integration Plan, Denver Post, Dec. 3, 1985, at 1B. 
350. Bingham, Desegregation deadlock broken?, Denver Post, Dec. 15, 1985, at 1A. Bing- 
ham, Desegregation issue still plagues schools, Denver Post, Dec. 16, 1985, at 1A. 
351. Bingham, Desegregation issue stillplagues schools, Denver Post, Dec. 16, 1985, at 1A. 
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what guidelines should be used to determine that integration had been 
- 
achieved and the system was unitary. 
The jostling between the plaintiffs and defendants continued. The 
district wanted the judge to give up his supervision of DPS and declare 
that the school system has fully complied with previously issued inte- 
gration orders. Plaintiffs requested court supervision for at least three 
more years, in part because Judge Matsch had not issued a final ruling, 
and the efforts of the school board were inadequate to make the system 
unitary. Plaintiffs requested additional relief through more specific di- 
rections to implement the decree and the entry of additional orders for 
detailed monitoring and reporting requirements.352 
On February 25, 1987, Judge Matsch issued a ruling relaxing 
court control over the Denver public However, since the 
district had chosen not to increase the amount of busing to integrate 
the school system for fear that it would have a destabilizing effect, but 
utilized more subtle methods to achieve a unitary system, the court 
would retain jurisdiction to insure that the methods were effective.354 
The court rejected the plaintiff's request for detailed monitoring and 
reporting requirements because the district would probably conduct 
such data collection and monitoring itself, to convince the court that 
the system was unitary and that court supervision should end. Judge 
Matsch stated that a permanent injunction was the logical conclusion 
to the lawsuit, because the court had the responsibility to define the 
duty owed to the plaintiffs by the defendants. A final injunctive order 
was also necessary because of the proscription against student trans- 
portation to achieve racial balance in the Colorado constitution,355 
and it would protect those who might be adversely affected by Board 
action. The court considered the defendant's argument that a final 
permanent injunctive order would be inappropriate because the Board 
352. Bingham, Judge gives board OK on integrating 3 Denver schools, Denver Post, Mar. 16, 
1986, at 1B. 
353. Keyes, 653 F. Supp. 1536, 1538-40 (D. Colo. 1987); Corcoran, DPS wants ruling from 
higher court, Denver Post, Apr. 8, 1986, at 1B. The plaintiffs argued that the District should 
have only two years to meet its goals of tightening transfers and integrating the three elementary 
schools, and if integration did not improve by the Fall of 1987, to develop alternate plans. They 
wanted the District to make specific orders for detailing monitoring and reporting. Bingham, 
Brief urges jug to keep school role, Denver Post, Apr. 22, 1986 at 1B. Keyes, 653 F. Supp. at 
1539. 
354. Keyes, 653 F. Supp. 1536 (D. Colo. 1987). 
355. Id. at 1540. 
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cannot bind future boards. The court agreed and stated that was ex- 
actly why there had to be a permanent injunctive order.356 The court 
directed that it would meet with counsel to discuss necessary modifica- 
tions in the existing orders, a time frame for the district to prove the 
effectiveness of its new programs, and the text of the final injunction. 
At the present time, the parties are working on the language of a 
permanent injunction. In April, 1987, the Board adopted new guide- 
lines to redefine integration for the schools. The guidelines deal with 
more than racial balance between schools, but within schools and 
within special programs as well. The guidelines were a response to 
Judge Matsch's criticism that previous guidelines were neither specific 
enough nor a guide to future action.357 In November, 1987, the dis- 
trict will prepare to report to the court on the effectiveness of its pro- 
grams. School board members, however, have not agreed to withdraw 
the appeal of the June 1985 decision from the Tenth Circuit. 
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE BILINGUAL ISSUES 
A settlement of the bilingual issues was accepted by Judge 
Matsch in August 1984. The bilingual settlement focused on student 
identification, assessment and reclassification, selection and qualifica- 
tion of personnel, elementary and secondary curricular programming, 
and special attention to non-Spanish language minorities. 
The identification process was to begin with a home language 
questionnaire. If the questionnaire completed by the child's parents 
indicated that the child's first language was other than English at 
home or that a language other than English was spoken in the stu- 
dent's home, he would be referred for asses~ment.~'~ A fundamental 
programmatic determination was that LEP students should be placed 
in bilingual classrooms to the maximum extent feasible.359 
- 
356. Id. at 1541. See supra note 278. 
357. Id. at 1542. 
358. Bingham, Schools set rules to curb racism, Denver Post, April 8, 1987 at B1, col. 5. 
359. Each student was to be given an oral proficiency test by a person proficient in English, 
and wherever possible, in the student's home language. If the student was determined by the test 
to be LEP, or his ~ n ~ i i s h  kills were so limited that testing was inappropriate, then he would be 
classified as Lain A or B. 
Students identified as those with Limited English Proficiency who were above the second 
grade would be given a written test. If their score fell below the thirtieth percentile at the ele- 
mentary level or the fortieth Percentile at the middle level and high school level, the student was 
classified as Lau C. 
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The result of improved identification and assessment techniques, 
put into effect even prior to the settlement of the dispute, was to raise 
the number of students classified as LEP from 4,000 to 8,300.360 The 
school system was required to publish an accurate census of LEP stu- 
dents by October 15th of each school year. The classification process 
was improved so that if a child was reclassified as English proficient, 
and parents disagreed with such classifications, due process proce- 
dures were introduced. 
A unique feature of the Denver plan is that the bilingual class- 
room is primarily defined by the skills of the teacher. Unlike the situa- 
tion at the time of trial, where seniority under the school district's 
contract with the teacher's union was the sole criterion for selection as 
a bilingual teacher, the settlement mandated bilingual teachers be cer- 
tified through their passage of the New Mexico Test of Spanish Lan- 
guage Skills. The settlement also requires the district to train bilingual 
and ESL teachers. An elaborate preference system has been created 
which will determine the designation and classroom assignments of 
bilingual and ESL teachers.361 Strong pressures have been placed 
upon teachers to obtain certification and to take in-service training. 
Teachers hired under the preference system, who were not qualified 
bilingual teachers, have to engage in a course of study leading towards 
qualification within two years. If the teacher fails to become qualified, 
he loses his position.362 
360. Roos, supro note 230, at 22. If a student scored poorly on a test and came from a non- 
English home language background, the student would be given access to a classroom where he 
would receive special help. Students between the thirtieth and fortieth percentile at the elemen- 
tary level were to be evaluated by a committee to determine whether the student should be 
classified as LEP. Id. at 23. Denver Public Schools, Report to the Board of Education, A PRO- 
GRAM FOR LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT S UDENTS (June, 1984) [hereinafter Report].. The 
assessment sought to determine if there were learning problems related to speaking, understand- 
ing, reading, or writing. 
361. Bingham, 20 Schools ore going bilingual, Denver Post, Oct. 13, 1984, at 1A. 
362. Both bilingual and ESL teachers have to possess a basic teaching credential, and must 
have completed the approximate course hours required for state endorsement. The bilingual 
teacher, in addition, must establish language skills through a standardized test. Non-English 
language skills are merely desirable for the ESL teacher. Roos, supro note 230, at 24. 
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The elementary school program required bilingual programming 
for Spanish proficient students when a sufficient number are present in 
a particular school. For speakers of the fifty-one other lan- 
guages,where the number of students at an individual school do not 
justify a bilingual program or qualified teachers are unavailable, a 
meaningful English language development program such as ESL is re- 
quired. A unique aspect of the Denver settlement is that the school's 
number of Spanish speaking children, rather than a class's number, 
triggers the program.363 
In addition to schools identified as bilingual schools, at least one 
school in each zone was to be designated as bilingual whenever at least 
three grade levels in the zone had ten or more LEP students of the 
same language.364 The settlement also contained detailed provisions 
on curriculum development and implementation requiring the same 
skill level and curriculum content as required of non-bilingual stu- 
dents. Regular assessment of student progress was also to be required. 
LEP students who are not in a bilingual classroom were to be 
- 
given intensive English as a second language assistance for a minimum 
of thirty percent of the school day, or two hours, whichever is greater. 
Lau C students were to be provided with ESL for a minimum of ten 
percent of the school day, or one hour, whichever is greater. The stu- 
dent-teacher ratio in ESL programs was set at no greater than 15 to 
one.365 A district-wide advisory committee was established with one 
parent representative from each designated bilingual school and one 
363. The unqualified teacher as well had to show steady progress towards qualification, or his 
position would be lost. Under the settlement, a teacher with the lowest preference-a lack of 
oral proficiency in a second language-will be transferred from the bilingual program at the end 
of any semester in which a teacher with a higher preference becomes available. Nor would any 
teacher be assigned to a designated bilingual classroom if,a teacher with a higher preference was 
available. Report, supra note 360, at 7. 
364. Roos, supra notre 230, at 25. Schools will be designated as "bilingual schools" if K-6 
schools have seventy or more students identified as LEP, K-3 schools have forty or more students 
identified as LEP, and K, 4-6 schools have thirty or more students identified as LEP. Report, 
supra note 360, at D15. 
365. Any school that has sufficient numbers to require a program (approximately ten chil- 
dren per grade per year) must establish a minimum of one bilingual classroom at each level. The 
rationale behind this approach was that a student should be entitled to a coherent coordinated 
program throughout his career in a bilingual program. A program that altered the entitlement 
based upon numbers that a given grade level would not meet this standard. Roos, supra note 
230, at 26. 
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representative from each additional school with twenty or more LEP 
students. 
Trial testimony had indicated that secondary school level bilin- 
gual programming may be more important than at the elementary 
school level, because the curriculum is so much more advanced that it 
cannot possibly be negotiated in a language that is not easily compre- 
hended.366 Due to the diversity of curricula and the range of student 
achievement in the middle schools, the logistics involved in establish- 
ing good programs at the secondary level are substantial. The settle- 
ment provided that all LEP Spanish speaking students could be 
clustered at three middle schools. In any school where 30 or more 
students were Spanish-speaking, such students were to be instructed 
by a qualified bilingual teacher in the core curriculum of mathematics, 
science, social studies, and English.367 Non-Spanish speaking LEP 
students in middle schools were to be instructed in the core curricu- 
lum by a qualified ESL teacher. The pupil-teacher ratio was to be 15 
to one. 
At any high school with 40 or more Lau A and B Spanish speak- 
ing students, qualified bilingual teachers were to be designated to each 
of the core area  department^.^^' Other students were to be served by 
ESL teachers. 
NON-SPANISH SPEAKING LEP STUDENTS 
A particularly difficult problem is the breadth of languages repre- 
sented in the Denver schools, and specifically the number of In- 
dochinese students. There simply was not a sufficient number of 
trained teachers to establish enough bilingual pro&ams. Three ap- 
proaches were adopted for addressing the needs of non-Spanish speak- 
ing LEP students. Students were entitled to intensive ESL 
instruction-at least two hours each day, of small group instruction by 
trained teachers, for students who failed the oral proficiency assess- 
ment. One day of ESL instruction was to be given for those who were 
366. Report, supra note 360, at B3, at B14. 
367. Roos, supra note 230, at 27. 
368. Report, supra note 360, at D23. 
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designated LEP because of low written test scores. Paraprofessional 
aid was to be provided on a ratio of one to An advisory commit- 
tee for Asian language students was established to oversee this pro- 
gram. The district committed itself to a special effort to recruit 
teachers of any language wherever there existed a shortfall between 
the needs of students and available teachers. Utilizing services of the 
two Vietnamese speaking teachers in the district, a Vietnamese bilin- 
gual program was established. This program will expand as qualified 
Vietnamese speaking teachers become available. 
As a result of the settlement, 20 additional elementary schools 
became designated as bilingual, for a total of 3 1 schools out of 8 1 ele- 
mentary schools in the system.370 Some of the new bilingual schools 
are "zone" schools to which LEP students are bused. The Board initi- 
ated a campaign to recruit more than 100 additional bilingual 
teachers. 371 
J 
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPACT OF SIXTEEN YEARS OF 
LITIGATION ON DENVER'S CHOOLS 
How one perceives the impact of the sixteen years of litigation on 
Denver, and on its school system, depends upon one's attitude toward 
the busing remedy. Robert Crider, who served on the Denver School 
Board from 1971 to 1983, does not mince his words: "It ruined a 
growing school district," he said. Pointing to the sharp decline in an- 
glo enrollment, which has dropped roughly from 43,000 to 20,000 
since the court order took effect in 1974, Crider firmly believes that 
busing was not the way to redress past wrongs in the Denver Public 
Schools, advocating instead the use of magnet and neighborhood 
There are other Denverites whom, though aware the remedy has 
had its share of problems, feel that the lawsuit, and resulting decree, 
have had a positive impact on both the school system and the commu- 
nity. Proponents of desegregation cite the increasing equality and 
quality within the whole school system, saying that the lawsuit af- 
369. Id. at 19. 
370. Report, supra note 360, at 12-13. . 
371. Bingham, 20 Schools are Going Bilingual, Denver Post, Oct. 13, 1984, at 1A. 
372. Bingham, 4300 More Denver Pupils Need Bilingual Aid, Denver Post, Oct. 19, 1984, at 
2A. 
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fected the whole school system by making people aware for the first 
time of the differences in the qualify of education provided in different 
schools; by teaching people from different backgrounds and cultures to 
live with one another373 with less fear; and by promoting a better un- 
derstanding between the races.374 Schools should prepare students for 
life as well as impart knowledge. The lawsuit has enabled students in 
desegregated schools to have a more realistic view of life outside of the 
classroom. 375 
There is general agreement that schools throughout the system 
have improved, and the qualify of education in Denver is much higher 
than before. 
There has been more public examination of equipment, assignment 
373. Crider Interview, supm note 119. Bradford contended that busing was not the proper 
way to desegregate a school system-a view shared by not a few Denver residents. Branscombe, 
Denver School Board OKs Busing Plan, Denver Post, Mar. 3 1, 1982, at 1B. during the past 16 
years, the city's voters have sent many anti-busing candidates to the school board. Anti-busing 
candidates for public office have carved out a solid constituency. 
374. Kay Schomp, whose school- board career spanned the same years as Crider's, said the 
remedy "made it possible for the entire school district to claim quality." "It exposed the whole 
system," she added, "to examination of the city. Before the case, most knowledgeable people had 
kids in good schools. People became aware of the difference in the quality in education. 
Schomp, who chaired the Ad-Hoc Committee, which developed the core of the current 
student-transfer plan, said the quality of education in DPS has improved since 1969. "We're 
now educating a more diverse population. We have made progress. We've learned to live with 
each other better." Schomp Interview, supra note 27. 
In the opinion of Omar Blair, the only black on the school board during the eleven years 
following the court order, the remedy, for all its faults has been worthwhile: "Keyes has im- 
proved the quality of education for all kids. We've maintained and improved quality because of 
people in the city-parents who care about kids," he said. Problems remain, among them aca- 
demic grouping that tends to resegregate students. "In some high schools, Anglos are in the 
accelerated classes, while the black kids are reading the funny books. That's wrong." Interview 
with Omar Blair, former member Denver Board of Education, in Denver (Sept. 14, 1984). 
James Daniels was an elementary school principal in Denver before becoming director of 
long-range planning for the district. "The suit," he said, "has provided opportunity for kids with 
different values and cultural differences to come together. Different teachers could work with 
different kids." 
He felt the order did not receive the backing of the entire community, a situation that 
filtered down and hurt the quality of education. "We should have agreed as a community to do 
it. We didn't," he noted, adding there was too much fighting in the press and on the school 
board. But, positive results have occurred. For one thing, he felt the district made "a sincere 
attempt" to understand and help minority needs. Daniels Interview, supra notre 161. 
375. George Bardwell, a researcher for the plaintiffs, felt that race relations improved as a 
result of the litigation and the remedy. "There's less fear. There's better understanding between 
the races." Bardwell Interview, supra note 22. 
Ann Casey, principal of George Washington High School, agreed that the remedy has had a 
positive impact on race relations. "The social tension that was there ten years ago has practically 
subsided," she said. "Because we're now at a point when the children who are now in high 
school have been together since they were in kindergarten." Casey Interview, supra note 163. 
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of teachers and utilization of school facilities. The school district is 
more responsive to minorities. The disparity in assignment of 
teachers has been cleaned up. Equalization of facilities has been 
cleaned up. Keyes has helped minorities. It's given minorities a 
chance to enter the mainstream. Better opportunities have opened 
up for minority teachers and  administrator^.^^^ 
Of particular importance is that the lawsuit has brought the His- 
panic population into the political and educational process. Former 
school board member Bernard Valdez claimed the suit has had a posi- 
tive impact beyond the classroom, especially in the city's Hispanic 
community. 
I think the emotional dynamics that the court order has created- 
the shock of their kids going off to another school-mixing blacks 
and Hispanics and other minorities created a more democratic soci- 
ety. I think the whole community is better as a result. That's why 
we have a Hispanic Mayor [Tony Pena, elected in 19831. The dy- 
namics played a role in that.377 
INTEGRATION WITHIN DPS 
Denver public schools appear to be more integrated than they 
were when the lawsuit commenced. However, heavy concentrations of 
minorities and anglos remain in some schools. In 1969, Denver's high 
schools, with the exception of Manual, were predominately anglo; 
Abraham Lincoln high School was 85 percent anglo; East was 50 per- 
cent anglo, George Washington 94.4 anglo; John F. Kennedy 97.2 an- 
glo; Manual (traditionally the minority high school) 8.2 percent anglo; 
- - - -- -- - --- 
376. In the view of Edgar Benton, whose pro-integration views cost him his school board seat 
in 1969, the year the suit was filed, the remedy has ushered in a new, more well-rounded type of 
education for all students in the school district. He said his two daughters' both of whom at- 
tended the Denver Public Schools, benefited from an integrated setting. 
To what extent will the [students] have a more dependable, accurate and therefore 
more useful understanding of the reality of the society in which they are going to live 
and function? And I think on that score, which in my view is a very important part of 
educational accomplishment and maybe in a sense more important than how someone 
performs on a battery of standardized tests, I think in that respect desegregation has 
been enormously important. 
Benton Interview, supra note 5 1. 
377. Bardwell Interview, supra note 22. Denver Parent Teacher Student Association Presi- 
dent Carol Ruckel, who credits much of the remedy's success to middle- and lower-level admin- 
istrators who "really tried hard," concluded the remedy has had a positive impact, both on the 
- schools and the community. "We haven't really seen any significant loss of quality in formerly 
Anglo schools and we have seen significant improvements in formerly minority schools," she 
said. Ruckel Interview, supra note 34. 
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North High School 61.4 percent anglo; South 91.6 percent anglo; 
Thomas Jefferson 94.5 percent anglo; and West High School 56.6 per- 
cent ang10.~~' Fourteen years later, in 1983, at least statistically, 
things had changed: Lincoln was 40 percent anglo; East, 53 percent; 
Washington, 38.6 percent; Kennedy, 49.3 percent; Manual, 48.6 per- 
cent; North, 27.7 percent; South, 59.8 percent; Jefferson, 59.3 percent; 
and West, 20.4 percent. With anglo enrollment at 38.8 percent that 
year throughout the school district, anglo enrollment at any particular 
school could, according to the court order, swing from 53.8 percent to 
23.8 percent-within 15 percentage points of the district wide anglo 
enrollment, a rule mandated by the court. Only three high schools- 
South, Jefferson and West--did not meet this criterion.379 
At the elementary school level, in 1969, many of the schools 
tended to be predominately one-race institutions. Of the district's 93 
elementary schools that year, 42 of them were at least, and usually 
well in excess of, 60 percent anglo. In 1983, the number of racially 
isolated schools had diminished considerably, but there were still ex- 
ceptions. Barrett Elementary School, for instance, was seventy-seven 
percent black and only 14.8 percent anglo-far below the minimum 
level ordered by the court. Whittier Elementary School's black enroll- 
ment stood at 63.7 percent that year, also above the court-ordered 
level, and Stedman's black population was 67.8 per~ent.~" The dis- 
trict-wide black enrollment that year was 22.7 percent, meaning the 
highest black enrollment in any particular school should have been 
37.2 percent. Also, while the schools are more integrated numerically 
in the mid-1980s than they were before the Keyes case commenced, 
ability grouping within schools tends to make classrooms predomi- 
nately one race. This issue is just being addressed. 
Denver's bilingual program is ambitious and expensive. It offers, 
for the first time, the hope of equal educational opportunity for the 
city's students with limited English proficiency. Given that the deseg- 
regation aspects of Keyes have proved particularly difficult to resolve, 
378. Valdez Interview, supra note 22. 
379. Denver Public Schools, Enrollment Figures (1983). A copy is on file at the Institute of 
Judicial Administration. - 
380. Id. 
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how was a settlement of the bilingual issues, outwardly satisfactory to 
all parties, achieved? 
From the beginning, the bilingual litigation was a lawsuit within a 
suit, subordinate to the larger desegregation issues. The plaintiff-inter- 
venors' counsel tended to focus on Milliken I1 re me die^,^" which 
dealt with remediation, whereas the larger lawsuit was concerned with 
racial balances, ostensibly Milliken I a~pects."~ In one sense, in- 
dependent resolution of the bilingual question, because it was tied to 
the larger issues, was more difficult. There were distinctions from the 
desegregation issues which enabled the creation of a consensus for 
resolution. 
First, there was broader moral agreement to provide for educa- 
tional needs of Hispanic students than for upgrading educational op- 
portunities for black students. Indeed, many whites questioned 
whether education for blacks was inferior. Most whites and some 
blacks doubted that integration through forced busing was the best 
way to remedy past discrimination. On the other hand, there was little 
dispute that students who could not understand English were at a se- 
vere disadvantage in an English speaking classroom.383 Even con- 
servative board members could understand the need to teach Spanish 
children English. Bilingual issues did not foster the same political di- 
visiveness as desegregation. 
Another distinguishing factor was that the burden and benefit of 
the bilingual remedy impacted largely upon one identifiable group: 
limited English proficiency students. Unlike the desegregation aspects 
of the lawsuit, where busing and racial integration affected the lives of 
all students and parents in the school system, bilingual-bicultural edu- 
cation issues could be addressed without reassigning or otherwise dis- 
locating majority students. In addition, the bilingual deficiencies 
might be cured by additional dollars, much of which would come from 
federal and state sources rather than from the school district. More- 
381. Id. 
382. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) Milliken 11, After Milliken I; 418 U.S. 717 
(1974) where the Supreme Court refused to order a metropolitan integration plan, the District 
court ordered a Detroit-only busing plan and ordered the local board to provide a broad range of 
compensatory educational programs half financed by the State of Michigan. The state defend- 
ants appealed on the grounds that the order exceeded the scope of the constitutional violation. 
The Supreme Court upheld the District Court's order of the compensatory programs. 
' 383. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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over, the Board did not bear the full brunt of blame for the deficiencies 
in bilingual-bicultural education that were pointed out in Matsch's 
1983 decision. The placement of unqualified bilingual and ESL teach- 
ers in classrooms was blamed on the teachers' union contract.384 
Nonetheless, negotiations to reach an out-of-court settlement 
dragged on the ten years before agreement. Resolution only became 
possible when the bilingual-bicultural settlement became part of a 
larger strategy adopted by the school board to end the desegregation 
suit. If the bilingual issues could be solved, the Board reasoned, settle- 
ment would be used to indicate to the court the Board's good faith, 
and lead to the return of the school system to the Board without judi- 
cial oversight. Ironically, although the political problems were less 
intractable than those relating to the desegregation issue, the attain- 
ment of improved educational outcomes resulting from settlement was 
perhaps more problematic. By appealing to conservative board mem- 
bers' desires for effective programs, the plaintiffs succeeded in institut- 
ing a bilingual-bicultural program containing provisions for 
accountability and assessment. 
Since many of the provisions of the settlement have been intro- 
duced only recently, it may be too early to evaluate the impact of the 
bili~gual awsuit upon the community. However, as Bernard Valdez 
has suggested: 
. . . the human relations aspect of education has improved dra- 
matically. The shock, the old status quo and the stereotypes and 
prejudices that all human beings had in the Denver system prior to 
the court order I think have [changed] and created a much better 
environment for a Democratic society. . . 
A court order has helped the Hispanic community politically 
in terms of changing the value systems of the whole community. In 
other words, parents whose kids get mixed up with other minorities 
are not so scared any more. After meeting parents in the school 
setting . . . they are not that different. We can work with them- 
that kind of thing.385 
384. In the past, hispanic students who remained in school had been thrust into "Mexican 
rooms" where they remained until they learned English, albeit far behind their English speaking 
peers. More commonly, the dropped out of school at the earliest age permitted by law. Burling, 
Teaching in 2 Languages Has I G w l ,  Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 8, 1984 at 18. See supra at 7. 
385. CJ Keyes, 576 F .  Supp. at 1517. Branscombe, Bilingual Program Changes Proposed, 
Denver Post, Jan. 6, 1984, at 5B. 
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Clearly, the lawsuit has helped the Asian community as well. 
For all bilingual communities, the lawsuit connected parents to 
the educational process, many for the first time. Within the school 
system, there is now evident a much greater sensitivity to language 
issues. James Scammon, the new superintendent of schools, has said 
that settlement on these issues is his most important task. The head of 
the bilingual program has a reputation as an activist, and within the 
system there is a higher level of visibility. Previously, the administra- 
tion of the bilingual program had been located far away from the cen- 
tral board of education. Now its office is on the same floor as the 
deputy superintendent in the main building. 
However, the ultimate success of the bilingual settlement will not 
be in bringing individuals into the political process, but in achieving 
educational success. Will the dropout rate of minorities decline? Will 
children be able to be channelled back into English language educa- 
tional programs? These will be the benchmarks in the program's 
success. 
NEW GOALS AND REALITIES 
Times change. School districts do too. The primary focus of mi- 
nority parents now is on the quality of education their children receive 
rather than where or with whom they go to school. Resource alloca- 
tion is a very real concern. As Denver's demographics have changed, 
the northwest part of the city, largely hispanic, has suffered severe 
overcrowding. New pockets of racially-unbalanced schools have 
emerged. These schools, such as Bryant Webster, which in 1985-86 
was 82 percent hispanic and only 15 percent anglo, is well below the 
desegregation guidelines.386 From a legal perspective, the racial im- 
balance in the northwest is different from that of the schools which led 
to the Keyes suit, for it has resulted from shifting demographic pat- 
terns. As it has not been caused by either DPS or state action, these 
racially-imbalanced schools have not become part of the lawsuit. Nor 
is there a constitutional infra~tion.~~'  
Hispanic parents, who have always had mixed views about the 
386. Valdez Interview, supra note 22. 
387. Bingham, Hispanicsprotect crowded Denver Schools, Denver Post, Dec. 8, 1985, at 1C. 
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integrative aspects of K e y e ~ , ~ ~ ~  are more concerned with the over- 
crowding and perceived lack of quality in these northwest schools than 
the racial imbalance. The Mexican American Legal Defense and Edu- 
cation Fund, which filed suit in Los Angeles protesting against similar 
overcrowding and lack of resources for hispanic schools, has stated it 
will wait to see how DPS will reduce the overcrowding in that part of 
the 
For blacks, quality education within schools, no matter where 
children attend, has become the prime concern as well. The NAACP, 
the Denver Urban League, and other civic groups have formed Citi- 
zens Concerned About Quality Education.390 Test results have shown 
that anglos and Asians have done as well or better on statewide or 
national standardized tests, but blacks and hispanics score below state 
an national norms.391 The concern over quality education, imbalance 
of resources, and the tracking of minorities into special education are 
second generation problems that will concern the DPS long after this 
lawsuit is settled. 
THE LAWSUIT AND THE SCHOOL SYSTEM 
There can be little dispute that the protracted litigation has in- 
creased the school district's sensitivity and responsiveness to the edu- 
cational needs of its constituents. Accompanying this has been an 
increase in the educational system's fairness. Throughout the system, 
in terms of the allocation of resources for facilities, distribution of 
teachers, and efforts towards those with special educational needs, the 
quality of education and the quantity of resources has measurably im- 
proved. There is now a sincere effort to promote equal educational 
opportunity. Such gains are likely to be maintained because the law- 
suit has also increased DPS's accountability. The politicalization of 
the board has been a prime factor in the prolongation of the lawsuit 
because educational issues became political ones. Nevertheless, public 
awareness of educational issues has forced the school system to re- 
spond and to be held accountable. The lawsuit had led to an ongoing 
monitoring process, which has arisen as part of the settlement of par- 
388. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437 (1976). 
389. See supra note 25. 
390. Bingham, Hispanics protect crowded Denver Schools, Denver Post, Dec. 8, 1985, at 1C. 
391. Bingham, Schooling, not busing, the issue, Denver Post, Mar. 10, 1986, at 1B. 
Heinonline 32 Howard L.J. 724 1989 
19891 ENDLESS JOURNEY 725 
ticular issues. Civic groups, the plaintiffs, the court, and affected par- 
ents now require DPS to collect and report a broad range of 
information and to respond to parents' needs. 
The political process itself has forced Board members to change 
their positions. The Board now stresses educational quality, rather 
than other issues. The lawsuit has brought minorities into the educa- 
tional process, such as the Indochinese community, who had been 
completely ignored heretofore. The hispanic community has also be- 
come more active educationally and politically. 
THE ROLE OF THE COURT 
The Keyes case is a classic example of the following: "multi-po- 
lar" public law litigation so common in efforts of institutional reform; 
the sprawling and amorphous party structure; a diffused adversarial 
relationship intermixed with negotiating and mediating processes; the 
judge as a dominant figure in guiding the case; the wide range of 
outside experts drawn upon for support and oversight assistance; and 
the court as a manager of ongoing relief.392 However, we disagree 
with participants in the judicial activism debate that the Keyes judge 
adopted a new activist role.393 In the context of this litigation, the 
judge exercised remarkable judicial restraint. The actions of Judge 
Matsch in pushing the school system toward a unitary system reflect 
Professor Diver's view of the judge as a political power broker, alter- 
nately threatening, extolling, and pushing the educational system to- 
ward reform.394 
As in all extended litigation, the political, legal, and in this case, 
the educational environment, changed during the course of the law- 
suit. These changes, ranging from varying United States Supreme 
Court standards relating to the finding of a Constitutional fault to 
changing attitudes by the lower courts of their remedial capacity, 
392. Bingham, Denver Anglos. Asians did well in school tests, Denver Post, Aug. 6, 1986, at 
1A. The same results occurred on achievement tests administered by DPS as part of an academic 
excellence plan and more rigorous graduation requirements. Bingham, Minorities weaker on 
DPS tests, Denver Post, Jan. 14, 1986, at 1A. 
393. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1282-84 (1976). 
394. See REBELL & BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS (1982); 
Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 
DUKE L.J. 1265 (1983). 
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served to lengthen the litigation and decrease the court's flexibility in 
reacting to changes. 
Courts have surprisingly little leeway and flexibility in multi-po- 
lar public law litigation unless the trial judge wants to supersede the 
parties and either run the institution himself or through a surrogate, 
such as a master. Certainly, Judge Matsch did not desire to adopt this 
role. Unlike the picture of the activist judge portrayed by both sides in 
the judicial activism debate, Judge Matsch acted passively in most 
matters unless forced to make a decision. 
When Judge Matsch took over the Keyes case, he told the Com- 
munity Education Council, which had been monitoring the desegrega- 
tion of the school system, "I'm looking forward to having a very 
minor role in the desegregation of the ~ c h o o l s . ' ' ~ ~ ~  While the Judge 
was wrong on his evaluation of his role, he has been consistent in at- 
tempting to withdraw the court from oversight of the school system so 
long as it can be achieved by constitutional means. This case is not an 
example of aggressive judicial activism. Rather, it demonstrates 
courts' reluctance to control school systems, combined with a readi- 
ness to exercise their remedial powers in the face of a recalcitrant 
board of education. 
Once the plan goes into effect, a court is particularly limited in its 
ability to change a desegregation plan, even if demographics change. 
People-particularly the children-affected by a desegregation plan 
make changes in that plan difficult. When the consensus plan in Keyes 
was adopted, even though with reservation, it developed a momentum 
of its own, making it difficult to change. In a sense, the real measures 
of a board's commitment to develop a unitary system and to get the 
court to withdraw from a desegregation lawsuit comes at the point 
where the student reassignment plan must be changed. The 
demographics of urban school systems are such that change is con- 
stant. Typically, immediately following the implementation of a de- 
segregation remedy, an erosion of white students increases racial 
imbalance in some schools. Bureaucracies tend to favor inertia. 
School systems facing politically hostile reactions to increased busing 
are reluctant to alter an implemented plan. At some point, school 
boundaries must be shifted, and new groups of students bused. 
395. Diver, The Judge us Politico1 Powerbroker: Superintending Strucrurol Chonge in Public 
Institutions, 64 V A .  L. REV. 43 (1979). 
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Whether the board affirmatively attempts to implement these changes, 
or as in Denver, places the burden on the court and seeks to hinder 
and delay, change is the benchmark for ending the lawsuit. Over time, 
the court's flexibility seemed to decrease. The court forced the school 
board to make decisions which maximized integration within the con- 
straints of the situation. 
The judicial process itself operates as a facilitator of change. In 
Keyes, it freed the Board to make decisions, while allowing it to escape 
the political consequences. The court creates a framework for the par- 
ties to come together. Through its decisions, the court educates the 
Board and the public. The scope of Judge Matsch's 1985 decision 
demonstrates this educational function. 
In the latter stages of litigation, Judge Matsch was passive, serv- 
ing as a boundary. Only when the parties were unable to resolve an 
issue would he make substantive choices. For instance, during the 
hearings on the board's motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs demanded 
that the racially unbalanced three elementary schools be integrated. 
Judge Matsch demurred from ordering such a step, because he wanted 
it to be part of the final negotiated ~ettlement. '~~ When the issue could 
not be resolved by the parties themselves, Matsch ordered the 
solution. 
The ongoing supervision by Judge Matsch is similar to that of 
courts in other areas of the law, such as trusts, probate, bankruptcy, 
and antitr~st.'~' The difference is primarily in the number of people 
directly affected and the extent of public scrutiny of the results. Still, 
we suggest that the role of the judge in Keyes was traditional and pas- 
sive. Rather than adopt a policy-making role, Judge Matsch assumed 
a boundary setting responsibility. The leeway and scope of the remedy 
was determined within limits set by the parties. In Keyes, the court 
never did control the Denver public school system. The court forced 
the schools to create an information system which would enable plain- 
tiffs and the public to monitor the desegregation process. This case is 
not an example of the substitution of government by the federal judici- 
ary. The court used its remedial powers to force the appropriate bod- 
ies to exercise their responsibilities, but it did not supersede them 
unless absolutely necessary. 
396. Parsons, The Busing Judge, Denver Post, Feb. 5,  1984, at 1A. 
397. See supra p. -. 
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This is not to suggest that the judicial process does not distort the 
functioning of our system of separation of powers. It does force reallo- 
cation of limited funds within the school system and external alloca- 
tion of money to the educational system. The distortion is that the 
legislative branch has the responsibility to allocate monies.398 The ju- 
dicial process in this case served as a means of getting other branches 
of government and administrative agencies involved. 
The lawsuit has led to the legalization of educational change in 
Denver. Issues which are traditionally considered of educational pol- 
icy have legal overtures which may subsume the former. Educational 
decision-makers now focus upon the legal implications of a course of 
action, often at the expense of educational ones. We suggest that the 
courts will remain as the prime arena to work through educational 
policy. When additional grievances arise, they will be less likely to be 
resolved through the educational system. Courts will become policy 
mediators for future disputes. The educational system's constituents 
have learned that access to a court is more likely to vindicate constitu- 
tional rights and to force the educational system to change. The in- 
creasing use of the courts to settle public policy disputes is the way our 
political system now works in many areas, not only education.399 
398. See Eisenberg and Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litiga- 
tion, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 481-491 (1980). 
399. See Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. 
REV. 661 (1978); Frug, the Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 PA.  L. REV. 715 (1978). 
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